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The realm of information security is plagued with increasingly sophisticated and persistent 
threats to communication networks that combine multiple technologies and methods to 
achieve their desired end.  The development of new threat tools or vulnerability exploits 
often outpaces advancements in network security detection systems.  As a result, detection 
systems often compensate by over reporting partial detections or routine network activity 
to security analysts for further review.  Such alarms seldom contain enough forensic data 
for analysts to accurately determine the validity of the report or explain the incident to other 
stakeholders without lengthy investigations. As a result, security analysts often ignore the 
vast majority of network security alarms provided by sensors, resulting in security breaches 
that may have otherwise been prevented.   
 
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) software has been introduced 
recently in an effort to enable data correlation across multiple sensors, with the intent of 
producing a lower number of security alerts with little forensic value and a higher number 
of security alerts that accurately reflect malicious actor actions.  However, the 
normalization frameworks found in current SIEM systems do not accurately depict modern 
threat activities resulting in suboptimal correlation and alarm data aggregation.  As a result, 
recent network security research has introduced the concept of a “kill chain” model 
designed to represent threat activities based upon patterns of action, known indicators, and 
methodical intrusion phases.  Such a model was hypothesized by many researchers to result 
in the realization of the desired goals of SIEM software.   
 
The focus of this thesis is the implementation of a “kill chain” framework within SIEM 
software.  A novel “kill chain” model was developed in this thesis and implemented within 
a commercial SIEM system through modifications to the existing SIEM database.  These 
modifications resulted in a new log ontology capable of normalizing security sensor data 
in accordance with modern threat research.  New SIEM correlation rules were developed 
using the novel log ontology and compared to existing vendor recommended correlation 
rules using the default normalization model.  The novel log ontology produced promising 
results indicating improved detection rates, more descriptive security alarms, and a lower 
number of false positive alarms.  These improvements were assessed to provide improved 
visibility and more efficient investigation processes to security analysts resulting in a 
reduction in the mean time required to detect and escalate security incidents.   
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1 Introduction  
 
Development of timely, accurate and actionable alarms associated with network 
threats is the goal of any network security monitoring solution, and is cited as an 
axiom of mature security organizations such as the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (Romney, et al., 2005).  Unfortunately, security alerts depicting suspicious 
activity provided by sensors employed in network security monitoring and anomaly 
detection are often prone to false positives based on their location within the network, 
limitations in their ability to apply advanced rule logic, or the inability to represent 
complex organizational data hierarchies; such as user accounts, critical computing 
resources, subnet risk levels and work hours.   These limitations result in either a 
multitude of alarms flooding security analysts charged with monitoring network data 
for security threats, or a lack of alarms due to overzealous alarm suppression designed 
to "tune out" excessive alerting.  Furthermore, alarm suppression on a single device 
is often conducted via a volumetric threshold or rote suppression of the entire rule 
signature (Greenwood, 2007).   
 
The information security landscape is constantly evolving, with new threats emerging 
every day.  Evolutions in threat vectors, software vulnerabilities, and malware 
mutations have made traditional detection methods exorbitantly complex (O'Reilly, 
2012). Many different technologies have been developed to detect specific threats 
within a network, at varying stages of the OSI model.  However, information from 
such devices is routinely “tuned-out” by security personnel due to high false-positive 
ratios, hindering the ability to detect malicious activity within a network (Flynn, 
2012).  Recently leading information security companies have developed specialized 
correlation software designed to aggregate data provided by disparate sensor feeds 
thus enabling holistic analysis of all network data from a single, centralized, alarm 
feed.   
 
Despite the changes in “hacking tools,” the motivation behind malicious actors has 
remained fairly constant and this continuity proves to be the weak link in detecting 
indicators of compromise. Holistic analysis of data from these devices may reveal 
patterns of activity conducive to fingerprinting individuals, or threat groups, based 
on a signature of behavior comprised of the trail of seemingly innocuous data spread 
across an entire network of sensors.  However, aggregating data alone does not take 
advantage of attacker methodologies, it is the development of custom algorithms 
designed to analyze this data in the context of phased attack ontologies that truly 
provide additive value in threat detection and prevention.   
 
Unfortunately, merely aggregating data from sensors does not greatly improve 
detection rates nor decrease false-positive ratios.  Figure 1.1 depicts over 500,000 
logs collected from a laboratory environment over a two week period prior to security 
testing.  This represents a common problem in network security analytics associated 





Figure 1.1: Log Volume Visualization via Elasticsearch Logstash and Kibana 
 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the trend of firewall logs drastically outnumbering endpoint 
operating system logs.  Many security experts argue that weeding through troves of 
firewall log data is impractical and often must be combined with data from other 
sources for attack attribution (Barraco, 2013).   
 
 
Figure 1.2: Log Visualization by Type via Elasticsearch Logstash and Kibana 
  
Discerning notable security events from log data, and implementing timely 
remediation for incidents, is a daunting task without an effective alerting engine 
employed to filter, categorize and escalate security events appropriately.  Security 
data must first be normalized into a standard ontological framework, analyzed within 
the context of known attacker methodologies, and finally allowed to accrue suspicion 
dynamically as threat activity progresses throughout the network to fully realize the 








1.1 Problem Statement 
 
Current software solutions exist for data normalization and threat action modeling 
via SIEM software.  However, these solutions merely provide a framework for 
normalizing disparate data feeds and performing logical comparisons of metadata 
contained therein (Chickowski, 2013).  Often these tools are employed to implement 
static trigger criteria based on volumetric thresholds or watch lists containing threat 
signatures.  This methodology is prone to false detections similar to the limitations in 
traditional intrusion detection systems outlined in the introductory section of this 
thesis.   
 
A method of implementing dynamic suspicion escalation through contextualized 
data, aggregated from multiple sources, and attributable to specific threat actions is 
not found within SIEM software by default. A threat framework must first be adopted 
to attribute malicious activity to specific threat objectives.  This framework may then 
be leverage to attribute varying levels of risk and suspicion associated with the extent 
to which this activity satisfies said objective phases.   
 
This thesis analyzes existing threat frameworks for potential inclusion within a SIEM 
solution in order to provide threat attribution and dynamic suspicion escalation 
resulting in improved metrics associated with timely, accurate and actionable alerts.  
Ultimately, a new novel threat model was devised based on the tenants of the 
competing threat models evaluated.  This novel model was implemented through 
modifications to the database structure of a commercially available SIEM system.    
1.2 Significance 
 
Advanced correlation software in SIEM systems is designed to increase investigative 
and data retrieval functions associated with security events, as well as implement a 
process for real-time alerting of potential incidents.  Analysis of raw sensor feeds 
proves to be overwhelming for human analysts both in volume of alerts and false 
positive ratios associated with improper notification of non-security events.  
Implementing programmatic analysis decreases false positive ratios and provides 
mechanisms for abstraction of human labor functions to a higher analytical plane via 
a unified graphical user interface (GUI) enabling establishment of analyst pools used 
within the managed security service provider industry.     
1.3 Research Methodology 
 
An empirical research methodology was applied to evaluating existing research 
associated with intrusion detection technology, SIEM software, and network attack 
methodologies.  The concepts of data triage, suspicion escalation, threat actor groups, 
and models for representing threat methodologies were evaluated.  This research lead 
to the selection of a commercial SIEM product for evaluation of an existing 
ontological framework used to represent security data in a normalized format.  
Finally, a laboratory environment was constructed consisting of a security device 
sensor array, comprised of multiple security devices configured in series, and the 
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selected SIEM product.  SIEM rule hierarchies were implemented in accordance with 
the model devised in this thesis for evaluation of detection performance in relation to 
sensor feeds in isolation or without rule chaining.  Figures 1.3 illustrates the 
laboratory design employed during the experimentation phase of this thesis.  . 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Laboratory Concept Configuration 1: Control 
1.4 Organization 
 
This thesis is organized into the following chapters.   
 
Chapter 2: Network Security Monitoring - This chapter provides an overview of 
previous research pertaining to network security intrusion detection.  Data from the 
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) intrusion detection system 
competition is analyzed for insights in improving alarm aggregation and fusion.  Data 
aggregation from heterogeneous intrusion detection systems and sensor placement 
are also addressed in relation to their impact on alarm correlation.  Current regulations 
and standards pertaining to security monitoring are discussed briefly in relation to 
their benefit to determining monitoring requirements.  Finally, the chapter concludes 
with a brief synopsis of the challenges associated with conducting security 
monitoring that may be addressed by implementing SIEM software. 
 
Chapter 3: The Threat: Taxonomy of Hackers and their Methods - This chapter 
provides taxonomy of malicious actor stereotypes in order to identify differences in 
attack vectors based on group motivations. The concept of kill chains is introduced 
to describe a methodical process leveraged by specific threat groups to attack 
networks.  The Lockheed Martin Kill Chain is compared to the Mandiant APT Attack 





Chapter 4: Security Information and Event Management Software (SIEM) – 
This chapter provides an overview of previous research pertaining to the development 
of SIEM software and the essential components of a SIEM system.  The concepts of: 
data fusion, dynamic suspicion escalation, and alarm chaining are addressed in 
relation to solving common problems described in security monitoring research.  
Additionally, in depth analysis is conducted on the commercial SIEM product 
LogRhythm for its suitability in applying the SIEM concepts discussed by 
researchers.  This chapter concludes with the fusion of threat kill chains discussed in 
chapter 3 with SIEM theoretical concepts into a hierarchical model conducive to 
SIEM rule correlation.  
 
Chapter 5: Rule Chaining Validation: Penetration Test Data Review – This 
chapter provides analysis of data extracted from network security penetration tests 
conducted in a live environment.  Data is evaluated in the context of the hierarchical 
model devised at the conclusion of chapter 4 in order to determine the feasibility of 
utilizing SIEM correlation rule chaining for real-time threat detection.  This chapter 
identifies potential data sets of forensic value during investigations, or for real time 
alerting and SIEM correlation.  Shortcomings are identified with basing correlation 
off of event sequence, as well as over generalization of log data into nonspecific event 
classifications within the LogRhythm ontological framework.   
 
Chapter 6: Threat Framework Development and SIEM Ontology 
Modifications- This chapter builds upon the insights gained from the penetration test 
data review in chapter 5 to revise the SIEM ontological model devised at the 
conclusion of chapter 4.  The hierarchical model of SIEM correlation dependent upon 
even sequence is adjusted to a flat model, which applies classification tagging to 
events associated with perceived attacker objectives and provides an acceptable 
subset of metadata for further correlation.  Candidate data points of forensic interest 
are depicted within the expanded framework illustrating their relationship to the 
Advanced Persistent Threat continuum.  Software modifications required to 
incorporate the new threat model within LogRhythm’s existing threat ontology are 
discussed as well as aggregation fields used to combine data of interest within these 
new classification fields.   
 
Chapter 7: Threat Framework Evaluation and Conclusions- This chapter 
discusses the results of applying the new threat ontology within SIEM software.  
Alerts generated by the SIEM are evaluated based on the ability for an analyst to 
describe attacker activity with alarm data alone or the number of data points that must 
be researched that are not contained within the alarm.  Performance is graded based 
on the estimated effort to retrieve forensics data adequate for answering the 
interrogatives: who, what, when, where and why associated with activity observed.  
Additionally, the framework devised in chapter 6 is evaluated as a tool for manual 
analyst hunting for malicious activity within log data absent of SIEM alarms.  
 
Chapter 8:  Contributions and Areas for Further Research- This chapter 
highlights novel discoveries uncovered by the research conducted throughout this 
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thesis.  The following items are identified as potential contributions to future research 
in network security monitoring and threat detection:  
 Network Security Laboratory Design  
 Advanced Persistent Threat Attack Replication 
 Network Security Investigation Processes 
 SIEM Metadata Correlation and Aggregation 
 An Ontology for Security Metadata  
 
Potential future research projects stemming from these discoveries are also 
highlighted.  Notable research areas include: the application of the security data 
ontology as a weighting mechanism for probabilistic modeling, the adoption of belief 
functions in SIEM software and the implementation of dynamic suspicious escalation 
across multiple “kill chain” phases within SIEM systems.     
 
Appendix A: Network Security Lab Design and Validation of Advanced 
Persistent Threat Framework- Static analysis of historical penetration test data 
proved to be insufficient for validating the efficacy of modifications to the 
commercial SIEM system.  A dedicated network security lab was required to provide 
adequate control over security event generation to validate detection mechanism in 
discrete phases.  This chapter discusses the process used to design a simulated 
enterprise network capable of providing multiple corroborating sensor feeds 
configured to detect network security events.  Extensive details are provided 
pertaining to device selection, configuration, and auditing levels enabled to provide 
adequate forensic data for SIEM correlation.  Laboratory construction details are 
intended to be detailed enough for future researchers to emulate the laboratory 
environment referenced throughout this thesis.   
 
An attack scenario consisting of 26 distinct attack phases was created depicting 
common advanced persistent threat techniques.  These test cases generated adequate 
security data to generate SIEM correlation rules in each phase of the “kill chain” 
model.  The attack scenario is described in adequate detail to serve as a guide for 
future security research dedicated to the detection of advanced persistent threat 
actions.  Source code is provided where necessary to create custom programs required 
to effectively execute all test cases depicted within the attack scenario. 
 
Appendix B: Network Security Lab Test Case Results- This chapter provides 
detailed results for each of the 26 test cases evaluated in Appendix A.  Each test case 
is accompanied with a brief description of the attacker objectives and actions 
performed along with a network diagram indicating data flow and sensors critical to 
detecting the test case actions.  Alarms detected by the baseline SIEM configuration 
and the modified SIEM configuration are compared within each test case subsection.  
Finally, statistics are provided for raw log data generated within each test case, 





2 Network Security Monitoring 
2.1 The Origins of Network Security Monitoring 
 
Network device monitoring has existed for over three decades, beginning with the 
implementation of remote logging via the syslog protocol, invented by Eric Allman 
in 1983 and released with the Berkeley Software Distribution of Linux version 4.2 
(Eaton, 2003).  The syslog protocol was originally designed to assist in 
troubleshooting application issues on remote servers. However, eventually 
administrators found additional uses for a remote logging protocol for network 
devices.  Today logging via syslog is common on network switches, routers, printers, 
network storage, and network security devices (Nawyn, 2003).  Though syslog has 
existed for over thirty years, the standard that defines it is very ill defined and open 
to considerable interpretation.  Syslog existed in production for nearly twenty years 
before it became a registered protocol in 2001 with the approval of RFC 3164 by the 
IETF.  In fact, two separate versions of syslog are registered with the IETF, RFC 
3164 and RFC 5424-6. The latter was registered in 2009, with many notable 
improvements such as support for the TCP protocol and encryption (Asuria Ltd, 
2012).  Unfortunately, neither of the syslog standards off guidance regarding what 
data should exist within log data, or how it should be formatted in regards to network 
security monitoring.  This lack of standardization for log data has spawned thousands 
of discussion regarding what is noteworthy within network data as it relates to 
security.   
 
One of the earliest, and most frequently cited, papers dedicated to security monitoring 
and intrusion detection systems is Dorothy Denning’s “An Intrusion Detection 
Model” (Denning, 1987).  This paper was groundbreaking as it not only identified 
the need to develop real-time intrusion detection systems; it also provided a 
rudimentary set of minimum data components for anomaly detection.  Denning 
argued an intrusion detection system must consist of six components: subjects, 
objects, audit records, profiles, anomaly records and activity rules.  Audit records 
would contain, at a minimum: the subject, the entity performing an action; the object, 
the entity acted upon; the action, what was performed upon the object; the exception-
condition, the system response to the action; the resource-usage, any quantitative 
elements of the action, such as CPU usage, bandwidth consumption, records written 
etc.; and the time-stamp, indicating when the action occurred.  These audit records 
would be compared to historical profiles mapping subjects and objects to normal or 
approved behavior.  Any deviation between audit records and a profile would 
generate an anomaly record.  This became the basis for behavioral anomaly detection.      
 
In an attempt to provide standard data for  intrusion detection system research and 
development, a famous study was conducted on behalf of the Department of Defense 
and the international Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition 
referred to as the KDD in 1999 (University of California Irvine, 1999).  The data 
during this study was analyzed by numerous intrusion detection technology 
companies in order to evaluate the efficacy of existing security systems as well as 
evaluate experimental detection algorithms and data modeling for improved detection 
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rates.  The results of this competition indicated that no single intrusion detection 
system was suitable for reliably detecting all of the various attacks leveraged during 
the study.  Additionally, even systems that were considered the best solution for 
detecting specific attack families would fail to detect several attacks more than half 
of the total instances within the data set (Lippmann, et al., 2000).  The KDD study 
spawned multiple additional research projects with the benefit of delivering insights 
toward improving network security by leveraging a standard set of data.  This led to 
the development of attack signatures (Korba, 2000) and probabilistic models for 
predicting anomalous activity within a pool of network data (Yu & Frincke, 2005).   
 
However, the KDD study also indicated that effective network security monitoring 
requires much more than merely collecting and filtering network data.  Many 
researchers have conducted studies to address the large volume of aggregated 
network security data associated with innocuous network traffic referred to as the 
false-positive alarm rate of intrusion detection systems (Garcia-Teodoro, 2009).  
Additionally, intrusion detection systems alone are often easily thwarted by attackers 
masquerading as legitimate users once they have infiltrated a network, leading to 
false-negatives, or failure to detect malicious activity (Axelsson, 1999).   
 
 
2.2 Security Monitoring Correlation 
 
Studies following the 1999 KDD evaluation have indicated that correlating data from 
multiple sensors is capable of reducing the number of alarms generated and 
potentially limiting false positives observed within network traffic.  However, merely 
aggregating similar data from dissimilar sensors based on common meta data, though 
beneficial in decreasing notification volume, does not necessarily result in enriched 
data presented to analysts.  Valdes argued that proper correlation consists of three 
phases: event aggregation, sensor coupling and meta-alert fusion (Valdes & Skinner, 
2000).    
 
Aggregation, as defined by Valdes, is the combination of multiple low-level events, 
such as TCP connections and audit records.  These events often contain very few 
meta-data fields or are of low forensics value when analyzed in isolation.  However, 
aggregating said data offers additional insights to the scope of an attack, such as a 
volumetric denial of service, or a TCP scan enumerating available ports and services 
on an endpoint.  Without context, each of the TCP connections individually would 
not generate alarm to a machine or analyst, however the volume and variation of the 
connection attempts would be alarming.  Valdes also discussed the notion of “alert 
threads,” wherein multiple aggregated events are represented by a single alarm with 
the ability to review child aggregated events within the context of the parent alarm 
via a “drill down” function.  This drill down function becomes more beneficial to 
analysts if there is variation within the data collected by aggregated events 
(Anderson, et al., 2002).  Variation may be accomplished by the concept of sensor 




Sensor coupling is the degree to which sensors are aware of one another and capable 
of contributing to combined alarms in an additive fashion, rather than generating 
alarms in isolation.  Ideally, additive contributions would offer slightly different, but 
supporting evidence of a security incident.  For example, a network intrusion 
detection system reporting a potential denial of service attempt on an endpoint and 
an endpoint log indicates the loss of a service.  Valeur et. al. also discussed this 
phenomenon referred to as “alarm fusion” (Valeur, et al., 2004), while Valdes et. al. 
refer to this as a “meta alert”  (Valdes & Skinner, 2000).  Without combining related 
events in this manner, analysts would easily become overwhelmed with unnecessary 
alerts to triage while potentially overlooking an important, but unrelated alert, buried 
within the chaos.  The benefits of alarm fusion described in the Valeur et. al. study 
are depicted in table 2.1 below. 
 
 
Table 2.1: IDS Alarm Reduction From Multi-Source Correlation and Attack 
Session Reconstruction (Valeur, et al., 2004) 
 
However, Valeur et. al. noted several challenges associated with effective correlation.  
The network topology, meta-data provided by sensor logs, and the nature of the attack 
all significantly impacts the ability to correlate multiple data points to a single event.  
Aggregating data from multiple heterogeneous sensors, similar to Valeur’s “attack 
session reconstruction,” is no small task, often hindered by the lack of standardization 
in sensor alarm logging formats (Anderson, et al., 2002).  Valeur et. al. proposed the 
following process for sensor alert correlation.   
 
 
Figure 2.1 Valeur Correlation Process Overview (Valeur, et al., 2004) 
 
Valeur stated the intent of the correlation process is to transform disparate intrusion 
detection sensor alerts into consolidated intrusion reports.  However, not all intrusion 
detection alerts may be treated equally, based on varying degrees of data provided 
and the nature of the attack being conducted.  Unfortunately, Valdes et. al. does not 
provide guidance toward what criteria is most suitable for combining alarms into 
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meta alerts.  Valeur et. al. also stated that multi alarm fusion is difficult based on the 
fact that related alarms may not necessarily share related meta data,  such as a 
common IP address or computer name.  Essentially, two separate sensors may be 
describing the same event, but with a different meta data language, making 
combination of alarms based on meta data alone impossible.     
2.3 Network Security Monitoring Architecture 
 
The KDD CUP 1999 data set was designed to represent a large network consisting of 
thousands of computers.  Many of these systems were represented by emulated 
computers and servers hosted on a handful of machines designed to appear like traffic 
originating and returning to different IP addresses.  All network traffic during this 
study was channeled through two network sensors designed to capture network traffic 
for offline replay through intrusion detection systems.   
 
Figure 2.2 KDD CUP 1999 Study Network Hierarchy (Lippmann, et al., 2000) 
 
However, the KDD study network is not a realistic depiction of a modern network 
security monitoring architecture as it did not include any network security devices to 
generate log data in real time.  Some researchers have criticized the KDD CUP 1999 
data set for including duplicate or redundant data which may have caused issues in 
anomaly detection systems leveraging behavioral learning models (Tavallaee, et al., 
2009).  Additionally, this data set had very few data points for analysis of Microsoft 
Windows platforms, all of which were based on the Windows 2000 family of 
operating systems (Korba, 2000).   
 
McHugh et al. argued that there are multiple dimensions to intrusion detection, based 
upon sensor deployment throughout the network (McHugh, et al., 2000).  Deploying 
network and host based sensors at multiple locations within the network increases the 
probability of generating corroborating alerts to generate meta alarms, ultimately 
resulting in better intrusion reports. The figure below depicts a small enterprise 
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network with intrusion detection sensors designed to isolate a critical public facing 
web server from the internet.  This allows for threat detection, as well as 
determination of the depth to which the network has been compromised following an 
incident.   
 
Figure 2.3 Defense In Depth Network Security Architecture (McHugh, et al., 2000) 
2.4 Network Security Monitoring Standards and Regulations 
 
The frequency and damage associated with network security breaches has increased 
dramatically within the last decade.  A report on the cost of information network 
security breaches in 2003 indicated that in many cases, publicly disclosed information 
security breaches did not have an adverse effect on the company’s stock value 
(Campbell, et al., 2003).  The information security breach the affected the Target 
corporation in 2013 is estimated to have cost the company $162 million, much of 
which was due to lost revenue due to decreased customer confidence (Seals, 2015).  
In order to assist in preventing similar incidents from occurring in the future, many 
regulatory committees are leveraging stiff penalties to entities that process sensitive 
data that are incapable of proving due diligence in monitoring the security posture of 
their organization. As such, a discussion of security monitoring is incomplete without 
mention the state of current regulations and standards associated with security 
monitoring.  
 
It is difficult to cite a single authoritative source for network security monitoring 
practices, as many different standards and regulations exist across multiple industries 
around the world.  The most commonly cited standards include: COBIT, ISO 27001, 
PCIDSS, and the NIST Cyber Security Framework (Susanto, et al., 2011).  Several 
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studies have been conducted comparing the security controls outlined within these 
regulations.   
 
The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCIDSS) was designed to force 
a minimum standard for information system security in order to reduce the risk of 
processing credit card data.  This standard is deceptively simple, consisting of merely 
twelve requirements.  However, many of these requirements are open to 
interpretation, spawning an entire branch of information security consulting 
dedicated to performing PCIDSS specific compliance audits.  Many researchers have 
criticized this standard both for its ambiguity and the leniency it provides to 
administrators charged with interpreting its guidelines.  Despite widespread 
acceptance, implementation and stiff penalties for nonconformance to this standard, 
the frequency of security breaches in payment card processing networks continues to 
increase (MacCarthy, 2011).  Additionally, only one of the twelve controls addresses 
monitoring, and this control only stipulates collecting logs associated with access to 
network resources or card holder data.   
 
The Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) standard 
was created by the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) in 
order to provide a general framework for synergizing information technology 
solutions with business processes.  COBIT stresses the importance of garnering 
executive management support and recognition of the impact information system 
security has on the enterprise as a whole through a process referred to as information 
technology governance.  The COBIT framework offers general guidelines toward 
establishing information technology governance as well as a series of control 
objectives used to measure compliance toward establishing a mature information 
security program (Sheikhpour & Nasser, 2012).     Though COBIT is much more 
suitable toward defining the requirements of establishing an effective network 
security monitoring program, it is still far too ambiguous to be applied consistently 
across disparate organizations.     
 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standard 27001 (ISO 
27001) was derived from a series of existing information security best practices 
circulated within the information security community.  These best practices were 
codified within the annex of ISO 27001 as a series of controls and objectives.  In 
addition to specific controls, ISO 27001 formally recognizes the importance of 
continuously monitoring an information security management solution.  ISO 27001 
is praised for providing a structured, security focused standard, with specific and 
measureable control criteria for standard enforcement   (Shojaie, et al., 2014).   
 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has published several 
standards associated with information security and network security monitoring.  The 
NIST special publication 800-37, Guide for Applying the Risk Management 
Framework to Federal Information Systems, is specifically tailored toward designing 
and implementing an information security monitoring solution.  Additional NIST 
publications address specific information system security controls.  NIST SP-800-53 
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provides very detailed descriptions of security controls in its appendix F as well as a 
section mapping these controls to associate ISO 27001 controls via a table in 
appendix H.  NIST publications also include a mature incident handling process 
documented in NIST SP-800-61, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide.  
Finally, these publications have been incorporated into an overarching security 
framework in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.  This framework combines all 
previously mentioned NIST publications into five core functions: identify, protect, 
detect, respond and recover.  This framework will be adopted as the reference model 
for defining the process of responding to security incidents within this thesis 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2014).   
2.5 Summary 
 
Security monitoring has evolved considerably over the past three decades, from 
merely collecting audit log data from remote systems, to detecting and reporting 
anomalous network activity with specialized intrusion detection systems.  Public 
opinion     toward the severity of network security events has changed drastically, and 
international standards have been established to govern minimal acceptable standards 
for monitoring device controls.   
 
However, as intrusion detection systems have become better at identifying malicious 
activity, and security personnel have adopted a more vigilant stance against security 
threats, the number of alarms analysts are expected to triage has grown drastically.  
Alarm volume may be addressed by combining related events into “meta alerts” in 
order to decrease the number of open incidents that must be addressed by security 
personnel.   
 
Multiple challenges must be addressed in order to effectively perform alarm fusion.  
First, a network of heterogeneous security sensors must be constructed to offer 
additional perspectives of individual events.  Second, a standard data model must be 
adopted in order to facilitate alarm normalization into standard comparable fields 
amongst alarms.  Finally, related alarms must be fused into enriched incident reports 
for human analysis.  The following section addresses specialized software designed 
to address these challenges called Security Information and Event Management 




3 The Threat: A Taxonomy of Hackers and their Methods 
 
3.1 Malicious Actor Categories 
 
It is necessary to understand the nature of threats and threat methodologies in order 
to establish an accurate ontological framework for alert triage and analysis.  The 
origins of the term hacking are rooted in the meritocratic nature of early computer 
programmers motivated by friendly competition to establish novel, elegant, or 
ingenious methods of manipulating data and technology to solve problems.  This 
iterative discovery process was often referred to as “hacking” to describe multiple 
failed attempts, succeeded by minor improvements similar to “hacking” down a tree 
with an ax.  This term was colluded with the term “cracker” used to describe 
malicious actors. The term “cracking” was adopted based on its similarity to the 
process of cracking a safe, password, or other security device to gain unauthorized 
access (Internetcleaner, 2013).  
 
Hald & Pedersen (2012) established taxonomy of hacker groups consisting of nine 
primary hacker categories based upon motivations and competencies.  These 
categories are:  
 Novice (NV) 
 Cyber-Punks (CP) 
 Internals (IN) 
 Petty Thieves (PT) 
 Virus Writers (VW) 
 Old Guard Hackers (OG) 
 Professional Criminals (PC) 
 Information Warriors (IW) 
 Political Activists (PA) 




Figure 3.1: The Hald & Pedersen Motivation/Skill-Level Circumplex (Hald & 
Pedersen, 2012) 
 
The Hald & Pedersen categories exhibit considerable overlap in hacking tools, 
techniques and methodologies when articulating the skill level of these groups.  These 
categories may be further abstracted into a smaller subset of categories based upon 
motivation alone.  Additionally, the goal of indefinite persistence within a network 
for future exploitation is not addressed in the Hald & Pedersen taxonomy.  This thesis 
subsumes these nine categories into the three categories: prestige, publicity, and 
profit.  Additionally, the fourth category “persistence” is added to address the actions 
exhibited by modern information warriors.    The following subsections elaborate on 
the characteristics of these threat categories. 
3.1.1 Prestige Hackers 
 
Prestige hackers are most similar to the original hackers described above, and often 
focus on developing novel code or techniques with the intent of furthering the 
computer science, electrical engineering or networking bodies of knowledge.  This 
category subsumes the Hald & Pedersen categories of: novice, and old guard.  
Though often benign in their intentions, these individuals, or groups, may contribute 
to the discovery of vulnerabilities, exploits, techniques or tools that will be employed 
by more malicious groups.  This group of hackers does not often apply a methodical 
doctrine toward breaching security, but rather in depth analysis of specialized 







3.1.2 Publicity Hackers 
 
Publicity hackers are often referred to as “hacktivists;” a portmanteau of hacker and 
activist, based on the nature of their targeted activities (Denning 2000).  This category 
focuses on defacing publicly visible information assets to manipulate media coverage 
often in conjunction with ideologically relevant events.  Hald & Pedersen cyber-punk 
and political activist groups are included in this category.  The nature of attacks 
exhibited by this group varies in sophistication, but tends to be covert in inception 
and overt in execution.  Sophisticated hacktivists will attempt to avoid detection until 
the revelation of their activities may be employed for propagandistic exploitation.  
Unsophisticated hacktivist actions may require no obfuscation, such as an overt 
denial of service campaign against a public facing website, where the mere presence 
of hacking activities discredits the victim and incites media coverage.     
3.1.3 Profit Hackers 
 
Profit hackers manipulate information security breaches for financial gain. This is a 
broad category of malicious actors that focus on malware development, and 
organized crime activities.  Virus writers, petty thieves and professional hackers 
belong in this category.  This group is more apt to follow an established, or 
automated, methodology in order to reap the benefit of economies of scale.  Victims 
will be targeted indiscriminately and techniques will be reused multiple times to 
affect the largest number of systems possible and increase the potential for 
profitability.  This category will continue to use well known tools or techniques as 
long as victims prove to be vulnerable to them.  Volume and rate of system 
compromise are more important than avoiding detection.  Compromise exploitation 
is often very rapid, or instantaneous, making prevention of such attacks preferable 
over mere detection.      
3.1.4 Persistence Hackers 
 
Persistence hackers are simultaneously the most dangerous and difficult category to 
detect.  This category subsumes the Hald & Pedersen information warrior and internal 
threat groups.  Their primary goal is to breach network security and maintain a 
persistent threat within the targeted environment to gather information indefinitely.  
This category encompasses corporate espionage and nation state actors.  This group 
will employ a sophisticated and methodical approach to network penetration and will 
avoid reusing tools that have been detected previously.  Actions are designed to 
appear like routine network traffic and remain below the detection thresholds of 
individual sensors.  The remainder of this thesis will focus on the techniques 
employed buy this group of hackers as well as the means to detect them.   
3.2 Intention Based Ontological Frameworks: Hacker Methods 
 
Research mentioned previously did not focus on codifying attacker intentions into 
the ontological framework for incident detection.  Lagrand’s work was the closest to 
establishing a hierarchy conducive to this analysis with a multi-tiered alert analysis 
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model; however the ontological framework for how persistent threat groups penetrate 
networks and exploit vulnerabilities was not addressed.   
 
Emerging research in dynamic and modular threat detection is leveraging the 
intention based ontological properties of “kill chains.”  The term “kill chain” is 
derived from the Department of Defense joint targeting process (Defense, 2013).  
This process is designed to ensure positive identification and culpability assignment 
of actions to suspected actors via an approved and vetted methodology.  The US 
targeting kill chain is epitomized by the acronym F2T2EA, which consists of the six 
phases: Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage and Assess.  This process is similar to a pipe 
and filter model in software engineering, with the product of one phase providing 
input to subsequent phases in a serial fashion.  Disruption of any phase within this 
chain prior to its successful completion will result in dissolution of the process in its 
entirety.  The following studies outline research in establishing kill chain models. 
 
3.2.1 The Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill Chain 
 
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) employ a methodical targeting process similar 
to the DoD kill chain (Hutchins, et al., 2013).  Lockheed Martin devised the “intrusion 
kill chain” consisting of seven phases of activities APTs must conduct in order to 
compromise a system.  The seven phases of this model are: Reconnaissance, 
Weaponization, Delivery, Exploitation, Installation, Command and Control (C2), and 
Actions on the Objective.  These phases are illustrated in figure 3.2 below. 
 
 
The Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill Chain Model (Hutchins, et al., 2013) 
 
Reconnaissance, as defined by the Lockheed Martin Model, represents the initial 
phase of an intrusion involving data and intelligence gathering pertaining to the 
targeted system or entity.  Unlike common for-profit hackers, that are primarily 
concerned with the speed and breadth of compromise, persistent threats have a 
specific target and goal in mind prior to taking action.  Hackers focus on determining 
vulnerabilities within an organization, which are not limited to networking systems 
or technology.  This phase often involves social engineering and research of key 
personalities within an organization via open source intelligence techniques 
(Mandiant 2013).  A common product of reconnaissance is a spear phishing campaign 
targeting influential personnel within an organization.  
 
Focused attacks against high value targets often require specially designed software 
in order to exploit obscure flaws in vulnerable software.  The weaponization phase 
represents this development of customized malware, often imbedded in the payload 
of a nondescript program or document.  Microsoft Office and Adobe Portable 
Document Format (PDF) files are commonly used as weaponization vectors due to 
their prevalence within government and business organizations.  This is tailored to 
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exploit the weakness identified during the reconnaissance phase with the intent of 
establishing a remotely accessible back door within the compromised system.  A 
successfully engineered payload will appear to be a document with relevance to 
normal operations within the organization, such as a financial report document, or 
routine notifications.   
 
The malicious payload must be transferred to the targeted system in order to continue 
the kill chain, and is represented by the delivery phase in the kill chain model.  The 
three most common delivery methods are via electronic mail, web content or 
removable media (Mandiant 2013).  Websites frequently visited by high powered 
executives, such as personal blogs of industry paragons, are prime targets for seeding 
weaponized payloads intended for industrial espionage.   
 
Once delivered, the payload must be executed and capable of modifying the targeted 
system.  This is depicted in the "exploitation" phase of the kill chain.  Exploitation 
requires the presence of a vulnerability within the system itself, or the system’s user.  
Most commonly the user is the weakest link and likely succumbed to a well-
engineered payload disguised as an important document.  However, unpatched 
systems with operating system or application layer vulnerabilities continue to be 
exploited on a daily basis.       
 
A persistent connection between the compromised system and the malicious entity 
must be established following the initial exploitation.  This process is represented in 
the "installation" phase.  Though the initial exploitation may involve software 
installation, this phase differs in that it is typified by the installation of additional 
special purpose software.  Once the system has been exploited, and the payload has 
been installed, the target system is modified to receive remote commands and execute 
actions on behalf of the attacker. 
 
Malware designed for financial gain is often automated and sends data automatically 
to a collection host.  This type of connection is very chatty and easy to detect over 
time.  However, persistent threats often establish command and control channels 
through manual interaction, where the compromised system waits to receive control 
traffic, rather than providing a beacon at regular intervals.  This makes identification 
of compromise more difficult, but is also a key differentiator between novice and 
more advanced threat groups. Signatures associated with this type of traffic may be 
used to attribute alerts to the "command and control" phase.    
 
The Lockheed Martin Kill-Chain model culminates with the "actions on the 
objective" phase.  This phase occurs after the threat actor has established autonomous 
control over the compromised system and established a persistent foothold within the 
network.  The Lockheed Martin model concludes with data exfiltration from the 
system within this phase.   
 
It is common for actions other than data exfiltration to occur after a persistent threat 
has compromised a system, which are not adequately addressed by the Lockheed 
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Martin model.  These actions may include lateral reconnaissance to determine more 
susceptible systems, followed by repetition of steps one through six, or data collection 
and exfiltration from the compromised system itself.  It is uncommon for an advanced 
threat to attempt to transfer data from the initial compromised system, as such activity 
increases suspicion and may risk loss of the system as a persistent access point into 
the network.    
 
3.2.2 The Mandiant APT Attack Lifecycle Model 
 
The Mandiant Corporation devised a model that includes the iterative process 
attackers employ to gain additional footholds within a network following the initial 
compromise.  This is represented in their six phase model called the "Mandiant APT 
Attack Lifecycle." This model considers the possibility of branch and recursion at 
phase five, spawning sub phases associated with lateral infection (Mandiant, 2013).  
Figure 3.3 illustrates the Mandaint Attack Lifecycle: 
 
 
Mandiant's Attack Lifecycle Model (Mandiant, 2013) 
 
The Mandiant model greatly simplifies the initial phases of the Lockheed Martin kill 
chain by incorporating the "weaponization," "delivery," "exploitation," and 
"installation" phases into a single phase called "initial compromise."  The "command 
and control" phase of the Lockheed Martin is represented in the Mandiant "establish 
foothold" phase, which incorporates any modifications required to maintain 
persistent access to a system.  These modifications may include some aspects of the 
Lockheed Martin "installation" and "command and control" phases.   The Mandiant 
description of these phases is more appropriate in the context of this thesis as it 
attributes purpose rather than action, and the intent of applying a threat framework in 
this context is to aggregate multiple actions  serving a common purpose.   
 
Another key differentiator between the Lockheed Martin model and the Mandiant 
model is the "escalate privileges" phase.  Mandiant identifies multiple tools used by 
APT groups to gain access to additional resources on the compromised system.  These 
tools provide behavioral signatures that may serve as key indicators of compromise 
and differentiate between routine and persistent threat activity.  Figure 3.4 depicts 
known publicly available tools used by APTs to gain privileged access to a 
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compromised system.  Following this phase, the APT may continue to infect 
additional systems by progressing to phase five and its sub-phases, or it may bypass 
this process and culminate with phase six.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Publicly Available Privilege Escalation Tools Associated With APTs 
(Mandiant, 2013) 
 
The optional recursive phases of the Mandiant model also represent a key 
differentiator between the Mandiant model and the Lockheed Martin model.  These 
phases consist of network reconnaissance to identify additional prospective infection 
vectors.  Unlike the initial reconnaissance phase, this is almost exclusively network 
based and may be detected by anomalous network traffic associated with internal 
scanning.  This phase often includes domain fingerprinting whereby the attacker 
executes a batch script to dump user group membership information into a text file 
for future analysis.   Lateral movement between susceptible hosts, typified by access 
to network resources and file shares.  These phases also include a phase similar to the 
"establish foothold" phase labeled "maintain persistence."  Though the actions 
exhibited in these phases will appear very similar to previous phases, their purpose 
and sequence differ.  As mentioned previously, a savvy attacker is unlikely to 
leverage their initial foothold for launching their final attack.  Therefore, 
differentiating the initial foothold from persistence activity is an essential part of an 
investigation and should be considered when developing a monitoring solution.  
Again, this is an instance where the Mandiant model applies attribution to the purpose 
of action, rather than the discrete actions themselves.     Likely indicators of 
persistence within a network include backdoor software being installed on additional 
systems and or the establishment of a covert channel for persistent external data 
transmission either via cannibalizing an existing victim remote VPN connection, or 
tunneling data through an inconspicuous protocol such as ICMP, DNS or HTTP. If 
the attacker chose to implement the optional recursion phases, and maintain presence 
21 
 
through lateral infection, privilege escalation will be conducted on subsequent 
machines to establish persistent access.  Again, this provides another opportunity to 
gather data associated with the compromise. 
 
The Mandiant model improves on the granularity of events along the kill chain that 
may indicate compromise, but it does not make direct applications to SIEM 





This chapter discussed the different motivations behind malicious actor stereotypes, 
which may prove beneficial toward developing standardized models of actions 
associated with distinct groups.  The concept of kill chains was introduced as a 
method for discovering threat activity within a data set as well as predicting the future 
sequence of events to be attempted by specific threat groups.  The two kill chain 
models reviewed, the Lockheed Martin Kill Chain and the Mandiant APT Attack 
Lifecycle model, were compared for their potential application for inclusion within 
security information and event management (SIEM) software, for dynamic attack 




4 Security Information and Event Management Software (SIEM) 
4.1 The Origins of SIEM 
 
Amrit Williams and Mark Nicolett coined the term SIEM in 2005 while working for 
the Gartner technology research firm to describe the convergence of Security Event 
Management (SEM) and Security Information Management (SIM) software into a 
single consolidated product (Williams, 2007).  Historically, SIM software was 
focused on post-incident review and analytics associated with forensic audit data, 
while SEM software was designed to provide real-time alerting of intrusions or other 
security incidents.  Additionally, SIEM products provide inherent log management 
services, as log collection, analysis and retention are integral parts of the SIEM 
process.   
 
Several papers have been written to address the individual components that provide 
data for SIEM systems, such as improving detection ratios in low level sensors (Kim, 
et al., 2013), log retention and management data structures (Madani, et al., 2011), or 
packet inspection (Silowash, et al., 2013); unfortunately very few studies have been 
conducted specific to SIEM software.  However, understanding the underlying 
mechanisms of SIEM systems provides insight to potential areas for optimization.  
These mechanisms include: security event management, threat taxonomies, attack 
ontologies, and incident weighting. 
 
4.2 SEM Data Triage and Analysis 
 
Security Event Management (SEM) systems focus on the process of actively 
detecting security events as they occur.  Jingxin (2007) argues that the “singleness” 
of intrusion detection systems hinders the detection process, and that data 
verification, aggregation, and correlation analysis by a consolidated analyzer is 
required for accurate event detection.  Furthermore, Jingxin proposes a hierarchical 
SEM architecture for analyzing events with the ultimate addition of a situation 
assessment module prior to alerting a human analyst.  This model consists of four 





           Jingxin SEM Analysis Model (Jingxin, et al., 2007) 
 
The final result of detection triage, filtering, and analysis from the Jingxin model is 
an event data set consisting of normalized information from disparate sensor feeds 
that is conducive to human analyst review.  However, this process relies heavily on 
security analyst expertise and   familiarity with the network environment to be used 
effectively for false positive triage and incident identification.  
 
SEM researches began developing ontologies for classifying information security 
data to facilitate sensor aggregation and corelation across disparate systems.  This 
thesis relies on the Jurisica (1999) definition of ontologies consisting of four broad 
ontological categories: static, dynamic, intentional, and social.  Static ontologies 
describe the existence, attributes, and relationships of persistent objects.  Dynamic 
ontologies describe state transitions and processes. Intentional ontologies represent 
belief systems, motivations, and argumentative statements.  Social ontologies cover 
roles, authority, organizational structures, and social communities. ontology as a set 
of statements about a knowledge domain consisting of terms from a controlled 
vocabulary and the relatioinships among them. 
 
Legrand (2008) addresses the daunting task of wading through the massive flood of 
alarms associated with holistic network analysis by subjecting normalized SEM data 
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to a causal event ontology based on five factors: why, who, where, how and what.  
Legrand’s ontology represents a static ontology associated with security event meta 
data provided via detection sensors.  Each ontological factor must be satisfied by an 
observable network event and the sumation of these events constitutes an action.  The 
result of this ontological analysis is further applied to a threat algorithm called the 
progression of dangerousness, where actions are evaluated through an interative 
process of weighting .  Action weighting is calculated via the function f(a) = 
(d1(a),d2(a),…,dp(a) where each observable action ‘a’ is iteratively evaluated against 
all ontological dimensions d1 through dp.  The purpose of this weighting process is to 
identify which actions are the most threatening to network assets and require 
immediate attention.  Unfortunately, human expertise is still required to perform such 
analysis and the assignment of weights.  Future work is aimed at developing a 
probabalistic model for weight assignment.  Furthermore, this model focuses on 
intrusion detection alert triage, but not the process of detecting specific threat actions, 
and consequently relies heavily on the intrinsice detection capabilities of sensors. The 
following Figure illustrates the Legrand progression of dangerousness. 
 
 
                     Legrand Progression of Dangerousness (Legrand, et al., 2008) 
  
Chien et al. (2007) identifies the shortcomings of intrusion detection systems plagued 
with high false alert ratios and difficulty integrating heterogeneous sensors.  Chien 
proposed a two-layer attack framework based on Primitive Attack (PA) information 
from senor feeds into an attack subplan layer based on scenarios that conform to 
attack subontology and attacker intent.  This ontology is defined by three broad 
classes: reconnaissance, penetration and unauthorized activity.  This signifies the 
transition from static ontological analysis to a dynamic ontology with classes 
dependent upon the state transitions between PAs.  Chien also introduces the notion 
of assigning confidence values to detections on a per sensor basis to discriminate the 
quality of PA contributions to higher level incidents.  Chien’s primitive attack layer 
expands upon the event verification module concept outlined in Jingxin (2007) as 
well as incorporating the concept of ontological integration expressed in Legrand 
(2008).  Higher level subplan templates are used to align disparate PA information 




SIEM software may be improved with visualization tools conducive to postmortem 
incident auditing and predictive analysis.  Kotenko and Novikova (2013) outline the 
essential functions of a SIEM visualization subsystem:  
 Real time data monitoring 
 Integration with historical data repository 
 Graphical interface for rule editing and generation 
 Attack modeling 
 Resource management 
Histograms and linear diagrams are particularly useful in identifying attack trends 
and establishing network traffic baselines while dashboards provide real-time 
visualization of network activity.   Figure 4.3 represents the proposed Kotenko and 
Novikova SIEM visualization subsystem architecture. 
 
Figure 4.1: Kotenko & Novikova SIEM Visualization Subsystem Architecture 
(Kotenko & Novikova, 2013) 
 
4.2.1 The Flynn Event Pipeline  
 
Flynn (2012) focuses specifically on implementing kill chain methodologies within 
SIEM software and stresses the importance of collecting event data that does not 
trigger alarms on security appliances, such as local operating system function calls or 
routine authentication activity, in order to conduct holistic analysis of security 
incidents.  However, Flynn counters that accepting such data without establishing a 
continuum of progressive suspicion can easily overwhelm event analyzers and 
increase the burden of alert triage and analysis.  This is similar to Legrand’s 
progression of dangerousness discussed previously.  Flynn proposes a framework 
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referred to as the “event pipeline” consisting of: blacklisting, identity translation, 
correlation, context and analysis. 
 
 
    The Flynn Event Pipeline (Flynn, 2012) 
 
Blacklisting, in this context, is the removal of known false positives, such as 
vulnerabilities associated with operating systems that are not present within the 
network but match signatures stored on intrusion detection systems.  Identity 
translation entails maintaining a record of internal machines, users and IP addresses 
for future correlation.  Correlation consists of two sub-phases: “the attack plane” and 
“the kill chain” (Flynn 2012).   The attack plane refers to comparing disparate events 
with some shared identifying characteristics, such as identical origin host IP address, 
in order to determine group events for context and suspicion escalation.  Flynn 
specifically cites the Lockheed Martin model as the basis for the kill chain in the 
event pipeline, which provides criteria for attack plane grouping.  Context refers to 
the ability to fuse external information surrounding the detection, such as threat 
histograms and other visualization tools or cross-referencing network diagrams.  This 
pipeline culminates with the analysis phase wherein a correlated and contextualized 
alert is provided to a human being for review.     
 
The Flynn model outlines the SIEM infrastructure policies that must be emplaced to 
effectively implement kill chains during the correlation process.  Logging and 
relaying routing network information of interest, identity mapping, and suspicion 
escalation via attack planes are all integral factors attributing to detection of events 





4.3 Commercial SIEM Software Analysis: LogRhythm®  
 
The LogRhythm® SIEM software provides a mature data aggregation and analysis 
framework for collecting, normalizing, and analyzing data provided by network 
devices that is conducive to implementing the ontological models addressed 
previously.  This section will expand upon the principles introduced by previous SEM 
research to justify the selection of this solution as well as identify tools conducive to 
establishing the rule hierarchy discussed in the solution section of this thesis. 
 
4.3.1 LogRhythm® SIEM Analysis Hierarchy  
 
The LogRhythm® SIEM segregates analytical functions into a hierarchy of modules 
similar to Jingxin (2007).  Figure 4.5 depicts this module hierarchy in layered model 
consisting of six phases: 
 
 
Figure 4.2: LogRhythm Analysis Module Hierarchy 
 
This hierarchical structure offers process segregation and sequential refinement 
similar to the benefits claimed by Jingxin (2007), but with additional layers of 
abstraction conducive to the application of Flynn’s event pipeline (Flynn, 2012) 
based on module alignment along attack planes at the event manager and identity 
translation and black listing at the log manager modules respectively.  A brief 
description of the functions performed by each module follows: 
 
Collection Agent: This module receives, or pulls, sensor data from multiple 
heterogeneous devices.  Data compression and encryption functions are conducted 




Log Manager: The log manager receives and parses sensor data relayed from the 
collection agent.  Parsing entails data normalization in accordance with the 
LogRhythm® ontological framework and the application of identifying 
characteristics in accordance with the LogRhythm® entity structure.  Both the 
ontological framework and entity structure will be expounded upon in later sections.  
Additionally, log data may be committed directly to archives and omitted from 
generating alerts based on ontological data or other identifying characteristics, thus 
realizing Flynn’s principle of automated triage via black listing (Flynn, 2012).  This 
function provides the ability to filter data even if access to the sensor device is 
prohibited, or the device is incapable of such granular data segregation.   
 
Advanced Intelligence Engine (AIE): The AIE module spans multiple layers and 
modules to provide two integral functions in establishing multi-layer attack rules, 
similar to the primitive attack and subplan framework discussed by Chien et al. 
(2007).  The initial appearance of AIE at the log manager enables preliminary event 
tracking conducive to suspicion escalation, similar to the Legrand Progression of 
Dangerousness, and log grouping for correlation with disparate feeds at the event 
manager module.  Additionally the AIE module enables rule generation and serial 
rule chaining to permit a hierarchy of primitive attacks feeding into high level 
subplans.     
   
Event Manager: The event manager correlates normalized log data from disparate 
sources into logical groups based on rules established by the AIE module.  This 
correlation process enables the generation of attack planes in accordance with Flynn’s 
event pipeline (Flynn 2012).  Attack planes may be generated based off of any data 
fields contained within the ontological framework.   
 
Alarming and Response Manager (ARM): the ARM applies weighting calculations, 
called the Risk Based Priority (RBP), to event data relayed from the event manager 
and determines whether the event warrants notification or the elicitation of response 
actions.  Additionally, the RBP weighting function enables the ability to establish a 
global alarming threshold to exclude alarm generation for routine network events 
with low threat probabilities, yet maintain the ability to collect such low level data in 
congruence with Flynn’s principle of a continuum of events (Flynn 2012).   
 
Analyst Graphical User Interface (GUI):  LogRhythm® provides a GUI interface that 
addresses all of the essential visualization functions outlined by Kotenko and 
Novikova (2013).  Dashboards provide real time statistical data pertaining to incident 
detection frequency, while histograms and line diagrams provide historical 
information for contextualization of incoming alerts with recurring activity thus 
improving analyst ability to perform anomaly detection via visualization.  Attack 
modeling is enabled by the contextualization of attack planes at the event 
management layer prior to triggering an alert by the ARM process.  This enables an 
investigator to conduct granular graphical analysis of events that pertain only to a 
29 
 
particular alarm.  This enables rapid identification of known threat methodologies via 
visual cues, greatly reducing human analytical effort.   
 
 
4.3.2 LogRhythm® Ontological Framework and Data Normalization 
 
The LogRhythm® log ontology is based upon three broad classifications of events: 
audit, operations, and security (LogRhythm, 2013 e).  These classifications are 
further expounded in figure 4.6. 
 
 
LogRhythm Security Log Ontology 
  
All sensor data is normalized by the log manager in accordance with these 
classifications.  This framework provides the ability to measure the ontological 
properties of “what” and “how” expressed in Legrand’s progression of dangerousness 
(Legrand, 2008).  The ontological factors of “where” and “who” are addressed by the 
identity tracking data stored in sensor logs.  The quality of identifying data varies 
between sensor vendors, but at a minimum will provide source and destination IP 
addresses.  Additionally, LogRhythm® calculates the direction of network traffic to 
add a sixth ontological dimension, “direction.”  Direction is an integral factor in 







4.3.3 Identity Translation via LogRhythm® Entity Management  
 
LogRhythm® SIEM software provides additional identity translation via an “entity 
hierarchy” database (LogRhythm, 2013 f).  An entity is a database record used to 
define the physical location of a monitored device or network.  The entity hierarchal 
database provides fields for network identifying characteristics such as: network 
subnets, security zones (internal, external, and DMZ), geographic location (city, 
state, country), operating system version, and DNS name.  Though originally 
designed as a method for employing IP address geo-location data, this database 
provides rich data that enhances attack plane correlation and contextualization by 
providing a mechanism to develop logical network diagrams and determine the 
breadth, scope and spread of security events.   
 
Additionally, the entity hierarchy provides user adjustable “risk” and “threat” fields 
for assigning weights to entities.  Risk and threat weights impact the level of 
suspicion attributed to network traffic based on direction of flow to or from the entity 
host.  Risk is defined as the level of suspicion associated with traffic traveling to the 
host.  Threat is defined as the level of suspicion associated with traffic traveling from 
the host.  Risk and threat levels are referenced by the log manager to augment “risk 
based priority” (RBP) values associated with critical assets (LogRhythm, 2013 f).  
This property enables the application of suspicion escalation to network traffic based 
on the ontological dimension of direction discussed in the previous section. 
LogRhythm® Risk Based Priority Calculation 
 
4.4 Fusing Threat Models and SIEM Software 
 
As stated in the introductory section of this thesis, a method of implementing dynamic 
suspicion escalation through contextualized data, aggregated from multiple sources, 
and attributable to specific threat actions is not found within SIEM software by 
default. A threat framework must first be adopted to attribute malicious activity to 
specific threat objectives.  The background section of this paper established the 
theoretical foundation for security information and event management software, 
introduced the concept of intention based attack ontologies via kill chains, and 
described a specific SIEM solution that provides a dynamic ontological framework 
and analysis hierarchy conducive to implementing kill chains.  A hierarchy of SIEM 
rules that implements the progression of dangerousness principle (Legrand, et al., 
2008) may be constructed to detect threat intentions and behaviors by leveraging 
contextualized data and risk based priority metrics associated with SIEM static and 
dynamic ontological frameworks.  The following sections outline the process of 
converting a kill chain model into a SIEM rule hierarchy to serve this purpose.  This 
framework will ultimately be leveraged to attribute varying levels of risk and 





4.4.1 Adopting a Persistent Threat Ontology  
 
A combination of aspects from the Lockheed Martin Kill Chain (Hutchins, et al., 
2013) and the Mandiant APT Attack Lifecycle (Mandiant, 2013) models are used to 
establish an intention based ontology for SIEM rule generation.  The Lockheed 
Martin model expands the initial stages of compromise into a greater number of 
discrete phases leading to the successful installation of customized malware and 
communication with an external command element.  The Mandiant model provides 
a framework for detecting hostile actions post infection and accounts for recursive 
threat actions within the network congruent with lateral movement and infection 
spreading typical of persistent threats.  Combining the Lockheed Martin model 
phases three through six with the Mandiant model phases four through six increases 
the total number of phases available for suspicion escalation leading to a higher 
confidence associated with threat detection.   
  
The hybrid model is depicted in figure 4.7 and establishes a hierarchy of primitive 
attacks contained within high level phases realizing the benefits of a multi-level 
attack model discussed by (Chien, et al., 2007).  High level phase segregation permits 
implementation of a progression of dangerousness (Legrand, et al., 2008) within each 
phase and enables recursion of phases, similar to the loop depicted in the Mandiant 
model.  Furthermore, the “compromise,” “objective” and “lateral movement” phases 
align with the LogRhythm® ontological base categories of “security,” “audit” and 
“operations” respectively, lending to natural application of RBP calculations for risk 




Figure 4.3: A Hybrid Kill Chain Model for APT Actions 
 
4.4.2 Compromise Phase  
  
The compromise phase, illustrated in figure 4.8, contains four of the seven phases 
depicted in the Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill Chain and adds the “privilege 
escalation” phase of the Mandiant model.  The Lockheed Martin "weaponization" 
phase is omitted as it applies to activities that occur prior to threat entry within the 
network. The exploitation phase is omitted as it requires establishing culpability with 
the original point of infection and may only be verified via postmortem investigation.  
A detailed explanation of each phase follows: 
 
Reconnaissance: Unlike the original Lockheed Martin reconnaissance phase, this 
phase is associated with network probing, port scans, failed authentication attempts, 
operating system fingerprinting and other penetration testing techniques observed 
within the network.  This phase may or may not be employed by advanced threats. 
 
Delivery: This phase consists of a malware payload entering the network.  This may 





Installation: This phase occurs when malicious code installation is observed, or with 
the detection of modifications to critical operating system files, such as editing the 
registry file in a Windows environment.   
 
Privilege Escalation: This phase is characterized by modifications to account security 
permissions. 
 
Command and Control (C2): The final phase is identified by communication with an 
external IP address.  Higher RBP values will be applied if the external IP address is 
known to be associated with a threat group.  An IP address identified communicating 
with a known black list IP address following the authentication phase will 
automatically be added to the “compromise watch list.”  Watch lists will be discussed 
further in the rule hierarchy section.   
 
 
Figure 4.4: Hybrid Model Compromise Phase 
 
4.4.3 Lateral Movement/Persistence Phase 
 
The lateral movement is modeled after the “internal reconnaissance,” “lateral 
movement,” and “maintain presence” phases of the Mandiant model (Mandiant, 
2013) discussed in section 3.2.2.  Elaboration of these phases follows: 
 
Internal Reconnaissance:  This phase is triggered if host identifying characteristics 
(IP address, host name, DNS record, MAC address etc.) associated with an entity 
involved in the compromise phase is witnessed communicating with other internal 
hosts.  IP addresses can be identified as internal network addresses based on identity 
translation (Flynn, 2012) or adherence to RFC 1918 addressing schemes. 
 
Authentication: This phase maps with the Mandiant “lateral movement” phase and is 
triggered by successful authentication to an internal host by an entity associated with 
the compromise watch list.  Implementation of watch lists will be discussed in the 
rule hierarchy section.   
 
Command and Control (C2): The final phase is identified by communication with an 
external IP address.  Higher RBP values will be applied if the external IP address is 
known to be associated with a threat group.  However, this command and control 
phase differs from the initial compromise phase, as the command and control traffic 
may be directed toward the internal host that was initially compromised, rather than 




The Lateral Movement phase is illustrated in figure 3.3 below. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Hybrid Model Lateral Movement/Persistence Phase 
 
4.4.4 Objective Phase 
 
The objective phase of the hybrid model, illustrated in figure 4.10, mirrors the 
“complete mission” and “actions” phases of the Mandiant (Mandiant, 2013) and 
Lockheed Martin (Hutchins, et al., 2013) models respectively.  This phase consists 
of external data traffic associated with an internal host on the compromise watch list.  
This phase may be expanded to reflect a multitude of malicious actions conducted by 
the threat actor, however attribution of these actions is beyond the scope of this thesis.   
 
 
Figure 4.6: Hybrid Model Objective Phase 
 
 
4.5 SIEM Rule Hierarchy 
 
The hybrid threat model abstracts APT actions into three discrete phases and 
simplifies rule logic.  However, additional rules and mechanisms must be represented 
within SIEM software in order to enable suspicion escalation via risk based priority 
(RBP) values and account for transition between phases.  Transition rules will be 
implemented as a means to enable suspicion escalation similar to prior work in attack 
trees (Camtepe & Yener, 2007) and a watch list will be used to track actions between 
phases similar to prior SIEM work conducted by the Hewlett Packard corporation 
(Hewlett Packard, 2013).  The hierarchical attack tree results in event risk (ER) value 
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adjustments to the high level alerts of “compromise,” “lateral movement,” or 
“objective” respectively.  ER values are used instead of direct RBP value 
manipulation to enable additional refinement based upon attack planes and the 11 
remaining RBP variables.        
 
The compromise phase includes virtual events consisting of pairwise comparison of 
two sequential events firing.  Virtual events represent varying event risk (ER) values 
as the compromise phase matures.  These events are depicted by dashed boxes and 
will be reported as a “compromise” with an ER value associated with the respective 
level in the hierarchy.   A single event detection at the base level of the compromise 
group carries an ER value of 10 and is unlikely to trigger an alert, while two 
sequential events will be elevated to the second level in the hierarchy with an ER 
value of 30 and result in the addition of the associated IP address to the compromise 
watch list for integration with rule blocks in other rule groups.  The naming 
convention “W-“ followed by the first letter of the two subclass involved is used to 
indicate the second tier of detection, with “W” indicating that the IP address 
associated with the event has been added to the watch list.  Additional rule tiers follow 
the convention of “C-“ representing compromise, followed by a combination of the 
two watch list detection abbreviations that created the rule.   This naming convention 
continues up the hierarchy and concludes with a “full compromise” where all 
indicators are present in the event detection.  This naming convention provides 
traceability for the events that constructed the final detection.  The compromise phase 
is expanded in figure 4.11. 
 
Figure 4.7: Compromise Rule Group Expansion 
 
The lateral movement phase is expanded in order to account for additional suspicious 
activity associated with internal suspicious traffic represented by the compromise 
watch list from the compromise rule group, or communication with an external IP 
address black list following successful authentication activity on by a local host.  This 
rule group matures similar to the compromise rule group based upon additional 
pairwise comparison through the hierarchy.  A naming convention similar to the 
compromise rule group is used to identify lateral movement virtual events with the 
prefix “LM” followed by the first letter of each sub category involved in pairwise 
comparison.  The lateral movement phase is expanded in figure 4.12. 
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Figure 4.8: Lateral Movement Rule Group Expansion 
 
 
The objective phase is expanded is expanded to account for data transfer to an 
external network following varying levels of suspicious activity detected in the 
previous phases.  The lowest level of suspicious activity is represented by the 
compromise watch list.  A compromise alert will have already triggered the watch 
list, however it will also include additional suspicious activity indicative of 
compromise and consequently results in the highest ER value pairing.  Lateral 
movement could be the result of suspicious activity from a low level watch list event, 
so a lower ER value that a complete compromise is represented.  The expanded 
objective phase is illustrated in figure 4.13. 
 
 






This chapter discussed the origins of Security Information and Event Management 
(SIEM) software and the essential elements required for real time alarm generation 
and correlation.  The LogRhythm SIEM was selected as the platform to support the 
research conducted in this thesis based on the existing classification based security 
log ontology that may be leveraged for alarm fusion as well as the ability to 
contextualize data with an entity database.   
 
Additionally, this chapter presented a method for combining two widely accepted 
threat models with the principles of dynamic suspicion escalation within a SIEM 
system.  Threat model phases were abstracted into three distinct categories conducive 
to recursion within SIEM software and data enrichment throughout a persistent attack 
cycle.  Additionally, each threat attribution phase was dissected into constituent 
virtual events conducive to representation within a SIEM rule hierarchy.  This 
hierarchy enables contextualization of related activities observed on disparate 
sensors, and increases risk values associated with the successful completion of events 
congruent with threat objectives depicted within the hybrid threat model.  The 
following chapter will discuss implementation of these mechanisms with a SIEM, the 
design of a network laboratory to mirror threat actions, and test cases used to validate 
this SIEM rule hierarchy.    
5 Rule Chaining Validation: Penetration Test Data Review 
5.1 Overview of Penetration Test Data 
 
Historical data collected during a 96 hour penetration test was reviewed for threat 
actions that may be leveraged to support the SIEM rule hierarchy discussed in the 
previous chapter.  3.7 million logs were collected from intrusion detection systems, 
end point operating systems and networking devices.  Both internal and external 
penetration testing was performed during the 96 hour period.  Common tools used 
during the penetration tests include: Nslookup, Dig, Nmap, Ping/Traceroute, Nessus, 
WebInspect, Burp Professional, Paros, nCircle, and Metasploit. 
5.2 External Penetration Vulnerability Tests 
 
External penetration testing is defined as a security evaluation initiated from internet 
beyond the organization perimeter firewall. The following network vulnerability tests 
were conducted on the organization. 
 
Host Identification: The ICMP protocol was used to detect live hosts.  Reverse DNS 
queries were leveraged to determine host names.  TCP and UDP port scans were used 
to detect common network services.   
 
Network Route Mapping:  The Traceroute and Visual Route tools were leveraged to 




Operating System Identification: Operating system identification was conducted 
through responses to crafted TCP/IP packets. 
 
Network Services Enumeration: The NMAP tool was used to determine available 
services on live hosts. 
 
Network Service Exploration: Banner grabbing was leveraged to determine the 
version of services hosted on endpoints. 
  
Vulnerability Identification: The OpenVAS tool was used to determine potential 
vulnerabilities on end point systems. 
 
Vulnerability Exploitation: Commercial and open source tools were leveraged to 
exploit discovered vulnerabilities where applicable. 
 
5.3 Internal Penetration Vulnerability Tests 
 
An internal penetration test is defined as a security evaluation conducted from a 
computer located within the organization’s local area network. The following 
network vulnerability tests were conducted during the organization internal 
penetration test. 
 
SQL injection: SQL commands were submitted through form input fields to verify 
server-side input validation. 
 
Cross-site scripting: script tags were submitted to web servers hosting active content 
to determine susceptibility to script injection. 
 
Parameter tampering: Query strings and post parameters were modified in order to 
acquire unauthorized access to data. 
 
Cookie poisoning: Data passed in cookies was captured and replayed in order to 
evaluate response handling for unexpected cookies.   
 
Session hijacking: Secure session data was intercepted and replayed in order to 
masquerade as a legitimate network session. 
 
User privilege escalation: The penetration tester attempted to gain unauthorized 
access to the administrator  
 
Credential manipulation: Attempts to modify authentication credentials to gain 
additional privileges not originally intended by the system. 
 





5.4 Data Analysis 
 
5.4.1 Alarm Analysis 
A total of 894 alarms were generated during the penetration test period.  Security 
analysts reviewing these alarms were unaware that a penetration test was being 
conducted during the evaluation period and were currently evaluating data for 30 
other organizations.  Less than 1% of these alarms were reported by analysts.  None 
of the alarms reported by analysts were confirmed to be associated with the 
penetration test.  48.77% of the alarms were attributed to the “Critical Condition” 
alarm.  This indicates that the majority of logs matched generic correlation rules and 
offered little forensic value to analysts evaluating the results of the penetration test 
data.  9.84% of alarms generated were attributed to intrusion detection systems, 
offering greater forensic value than the generic “Critical Condition” alarm.  12.64% 
of alarms were attributed to suspicious endpoint authentication activity.  However, 
the alarms generated do not accurately depict the actions performed by the 
penetration tester.  The penetration tester successfully compromised an administrator 
account and performed multiple privilege escalation actions.  None of the alarms 
depicted represent these actions.  The following tables depict the gross alarm break 




Alarm Name Count Percentage 
Critical Condition 436 48.77% 
High Severity IDS/IPS Alerts 88 9.84% 
Silent Log Source Resumed 68 7.61% 
Password Modified By Another User 56 6.26% 
Operations : Abnormal Log Volume Fluctuation 
Decrease 54 6.04% 
LogRhythm Silent Log Source Error 53 5.93% 
Operations : Abnormal Log Volume Fluctuation 
Increase 36 4.03% 
Behavioral Anomaly : Host : Abnormal 
Authentication 23 2.57% 
Account Disabled/Locked AIE Rule 20 2.24% 
Critical Service Did Not Restart 18 2.01% 
Successive Attacks 15 1.68% 
Internal Brute Force from a Single Origin Host 7 0.78% 
Internal : Suspicious : Multiple Accounts Disabled 
By Administrator 5 0.56% 
Excessive Suspicious Activity 5 0.56% 
External : Host Compromised : 
Attack/Compromise Followed By Process Starting 5 0.56% 
LogRhythm Agent Heartbeat Missed 3 0.34% 
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Internal : Suspicious : Password Changed On 
Multiple Accounts By Administrator 2 0.22% 
   
Total 894  
Table 5.1: Alarms Generated During Penetration Test from 4/26-4/30 2014 
 
Endpoint Alarms Count Percentage 
Password Modified By Another User 56 6.26% 
Behavioral Anomaly : Host : Abnormal 
Authentication 23 2.57% 
Account Disabled/Locked AIE Rule 20 2.24% 
Internal Brute Force from a Single Origin Host 7 0.78% 
Internal : Suspicious : Multiple Accounts Disabled 
By Administrator 5 0.56% 
Internal : Suspicious : Password Changed On 
Multiple Accounts By Administrator 2 0.22% 
   
Total 113 12.64% 
Table 5.2: Alarms Associated with End Point Systems 
 
Unfortunately, as no alarms were generated for many of the actions expected to 
generate alarms during the penetration test, there are no rules to link to one another 
as is required to satisfy the rule hierarchy leading to a complete system compromise.  
Additional analysis of the log data is required to determine why expected alarms were 
not generated.   
 
 
5.4.2 Log Data Analysis 
 
3.7 million logs were analyzed during the 96 hour period of the penetration test.  The 
LogRhythm SIEM log ontology will be briefly discussed in order to identify trends 
in this data.  The LogRhythm SIEM log ontology segregates all log and alarm data 
into a three level hierarchy.  The log ontology diagram discussed in chapter two of 
this thesis depicted the top two layers of this hierarchy. The top hierarchy is called 
the “event type.” Event type represents data classified as being related to either: 
operations, security or audit data.  99.7% of all data collected was classified as the 





Figure 5.1: Log Event Type Percentage 
 
The second level below event type is “classification.”  Classification represents a 
family of related events, such as: attack, denial of service, network deny, or 
suspicious.  The classification field is beneficial for aggregating related logs into 
hyper alarms.  77.34% of all logs collected were associated with connections blocked 
by a firewall, which is considered a routine operation within the LogRhythm ontology 
and is not considered a member of the security event type.  17.49% of logs collected 
were classified as “information” only, and were unlikely to contribute to correlation 
rules.  The remaining 5.17% of operations logs were administrative warning or error 
messages associated with network equipment.  Figure 5.2 depicts the distinct 


























Less than 1% of logs collected were attributed to the “security” event type.  As such, 
the following classification percentages are based solely on this subset of log data.  
59.14% of security logs were associated with the “activity” classification.  Activity 
logs are normally associated with routine security components, rather than attacks.  
All activity logs during this evaluation were associated with internet key exchange 
(IKE) negotiation phases.  31.89% of security logs were associated with the “attack” 
classification.  This classification likely contains the majority of interesting logs 
associated with the penetration test activity.  6.17% of logs were attributed to denial 
of service or failed denial of service attacks.  The remaining 2.8% of security logs 
were associated with “suspicious” activity.  The “suspicious” classification is often 
reserved for logs or events that are not alarming in isolation, but may be beneficial 
when aggregated with other logs or events.  A breakdown of security event type 
classifications observed during the evaluation is depicted in figure 5.3. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Security Log Classification Percentage (Represented as Percentage of 
Security Event Type Only) 
 
The final categorization level is the “common event name.”  The common event name 
is a specific signature associated with a log.  This label is applied when the log is 
parsed and unique characteristics are identified by the logging device or through the 
log parser.  Additionally, the AIE correlation engine may modify the common event 
name to generate a unique event for custom alarms.  Table 5.3 depicts the top 50 
common events observed.    
 
Event Type Classification Common Event Name Event % Rate/h 
Operations Network Deny Access Denied by Firewall 28.637% 25.158 
Operations Network Deny 
Denied Inbound TCP 
Connection 23.164% 16.378 







Security: Denial of Service





Operations Network Deny 
Denied Inbound ICMP 
Packet 13.604% 11.943 
Operations Network Deny Denied UDP Packet 11.928% 6.973 
Operations Warning Bad Packet Length 1.773% 1.558 
Operations Warning General Cisco Warning 1.085% 0.955 
Operations Warning Limit Exceeded 0.527% 0.420 
Operations Warning ARP Collision Received 0.441% 0.387 
Operations Warning 
No Matching Connection 
Found 0.247% 0.217 
Operations Error Duplicate Packet 0.189% 0.166 
Operations Information 
General Cisco IPS/IDS 
Sensor 0.125% 0.110 
Operations Network Allow 
IPSec Connection 
Established 0.121% 0.107 
Security Activity IKE Phase 2 Complete 0.121% 0.107 
Operations Information General IPSec Notice 0.120% 0.106 
Operations Warning General Warning 0.120% 0.106 
Operations Information 
Rekeying Duration 
Information 0.120% 0.106 
Operations Information General Cisco Notification 0.115% 0.101 
Operations Error Device Unhealthy 0.111% 0.098 
Operations Warning 
ESP Packet Failed Anit-
Replay 0.072% 0.084 
Security Attack General Attack Activity 0.058% 0.205 
Operations Information Switch Status Is Healthy 0.052% 0.061 
Security Activity IKE Phase 1 Complete 0.037% 0.043 
Operations Warning Invalid Transport Field 0.036% 0.043 
Operations Warning Keep-Alive Configuration 0.036% 0.042 
Operations Error IKE Proposal Match Failure 0.030% 0.026 
Operations Warning 
Interfering Access Point 
Detected 0.024% 0.021 
Operations Warning 
Errors And Warnings 
Summary 0.020% 0.017 
Security 
Failed Denial of 
Service 
Failed Host Denial of 
Service 0.016% 0.028 
Security Attack Arbitrary Code Execution 0.015% 0.055 
Operations Error 
No Translation Group 
Found 0.015% 0.013 
Operations Error General Cisco Error 0.011% 0.020 
Operations Network Traffic Network Session Ended 0.011% 0.009 
Operations Critical General Cisco Alert 0.010% 0.009 
Operations Network Traffic Teardown Connection 0.008% 0.007 
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Operations Warning Health Warning 0.008% 0.007 
Security Suspicious Suspicious Activity 0.008% 0.027 
Security Attack SQL Injection 0.006% 0.021 
Operations Warning 
An Unexpected State or 
Event 0.005% 0.005 
Security Attack Cross-Site Scripting 0.005% 0.018 
Operations Information User Session Timeout 0.004% 0.003 
Operations Information 
Testing Failover 
Communication 0.003% 0.012 
Operations Error Unable to Communicate 0.002% 0.006 
Operations Warning Interface Link Down 0.002% 0.003 
Operations Information Altered Flow Control Mode 0.002% 0.003 
Security Attack Brute Force Activity 0.001% 0.005 
Operations Network Deny Packet Discarded By Rule 0.001% 0.002 
Operations Network Deny Denied ICMP Packet 0.001% 0.001 
Security 
Denial of 
Service Host Denial of Service 0.001% 0.003 
Operations Error 
Health Monitor Detected 
Inactive 0.001% 0.003 
Table 5.3: Top 50 Common Event Fields in Log Data 
 
Refining analysis of common events to only those within the security event type 
indicates many of the events that were associated with the penetration test were 
observed, such as: SQL injection attempts, cross-site scripting, brute force 
authentication activity, arbitrary code execution and denial of service attempts.  
However, privilege escalation or account modification actions described within the 
penetration test report were not properly classified as security events.  Table 5.4 
depicts common event names for the subset of logs within the security event type.   
 
Event 
Type Classification Common Event Name 
% 
Common 
Event  Rate/h 
Security Activity IKE Phase 2 Complete 0.121% 0.107 
Security Activity IKE Phase 1 Complete 0.037% 0.043 
Security Activity 
IKE Initiator: Phase 1 
Negotiation 0.001% 0.001 
Security Activity 
IKE Initiator: Phase 2 
Negotiation 0.001% 0.001 
Security Attack General Attack Activity 0.058% 0.205 
Security Attack Arbitrary Code Execution 0.015% 0.055 
Security Attack SQL Injection 0.006% 0.021 
Security Attack Cross-Site Scripting 0.005% 0.018 
Security Attack Brute Force Activity 0.001% 0.005 
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Security Denial of Service Host Denial of Service 0.001% 0.003 
Security 
Failed Denial of 
Service 
Failed Host Denial of 
Service 0.016% 0.028 
Security Suspicious Suspicious Activity 0.008% 0.027 
Table 5.4: Common Events Observed Within the Security Event Type 
5.4.3 Endpoint Log Analysis 
 
Many of the penetration test activities that were expected to generate alarms but did 
not would have been associated with endpoint or Microsoft Windows Domain 
Controller logs.  It is not obvious which events are being audited by endpoint systems 
based on the generic classifications within the SIEM.  However, analysis of the raw 
log data may yield individual event IDs indicating the audit policy used by the 
organization participating in the evaluation.  Forty distinct Windows security event 
IDs were observed within the log data.  54.52% of windows logs collected were 
associated with the Windows filtering platform firewall.  Routine account logon and 
logoff activity represented by event IDs 4624 and 4634 represented 28.42% of 
endpoint log activity.  Event 4672 is logged whenever an account authenticates to a 
machine that it possesses administrator level privileges on.  This may indicate 
unauthorized privilege use, however the extremely high number of logs generated at 
12.85% indicate that this is likely attributed to service accounts or scheduled tasks 
operating with privileged access.   
 
Interestingly, event ID 4738 was not observed within log data.  This log is associated 
with user account modifications and many of the actions performed by the penetration 
tester would have been reflected in these events.  Additionally, event ID 4728 is 
generated when an account is added to a global security group, 4732 is logged when 
an account is added to a local machine security group, and 4756 is logged when an 
account is added to the enterprise administrators group.  All of these actions were 
performed by the penetration tester without generating logs.  This indicates the 
monitored organization did not enable the “audit security group management” 
subcategory within their Windows domain, as all of these events are governed by this 
audit setting.  Event 4780 was generated indicating changes to the administrators 
group access control list, however this event ID is controlled under the “audit user 
account management” subcategory within Windows auditing settings.  This sub 
category logs changes to accounts, such as creating, deletion, and lockouts; however, 
it does not log changes to security groups, which is necessary for detecting privilege 
escalation.  All Windows 2008 event IDs observed during the evaluation are listed in 
table 5.5.   
 
Windows 
Event ID Subject Count percent 
5156 
The Windows filtering platform has allowed a 
connection 946265 30.04 
5158 
The Windows filtering platform has permitted 
a bind to a local port 771217 24.48 
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4634 An account was logged off 447874 14.22 
4624 An account was successfully logged on 447444 14.20 
4672 Special privileges assigned to new logon 404738 12.85 
4648 
A logon was attempted using explicit 
credentials 19627 0.62 
4769 A Kerberos service ticket was requested 16636 0.53 
5145 
A network share object was checked to see 
whether client can be granted desired access 16506 0.52 
4656 A handle to an object was requested 13296 0.42 
5157 
The Windows Filtering Platform has blocked a 
connection 11959 0.38 
5152 
The Windows Filtering Platform blocked a 
packet 11959 0.38 
4658 The handle to an object was closed 8337 0.26 
4663 An attempt was made to access an object 7580 0.24 
5447 
A Windows Filtering Platform filter has been 
changed 5416 0.17 
4771 Kerberos pre-authentication failed 5279 0.17 
5061 Cryptographic operation 3877 0.12 
5058 Key file operation 3877 0.12 
4768 
A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was 
requested 1648 0.05 
4776 
The domain controller attempted to validate 
the credentials for an account 1536 0.05 
4905 
An attempt was made to unregister a security 
event source 317 0.01 
4904 
An attempt was made to register a security 
event source 317 0.01 
4780 
The ACL was set on accounts which are 
members of administrators group 180 0.01 
4662 An operation was performed on an object 147 0.00 
4625 An account failed to log on 120 0.00 
4985 the state of a transaction has changed 116 0.00 
4742 A computer account was changed 39 0.00 
4689 A process has exited 20 0.00 
4688 A new process has been created 20 0.00 
63 Content type imported 9 0.00 
6145 
One or more errors occurred while processing 
security policy in the group policy objects 6 0.00 
4954 
Windows firewall group policy settings has 
changed.  The new settings have been applied 6 0.00 
64 Information management policy deleted 4 0.00 
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629 User Account Disabled 4 0.00 
5140 A network share object was accessed 4 0.00 
5154 
The Windows filtering platform has permitted 
an application or service to listen on a port for 
incoming connections 2 0.00 
4723 
An attempt was made to change an account's 
password 2 0.00 
4673 An attempt was made to access an object 2 0.00 
4767 A user account was unlocked 1 0.00 
4702 A scheduled task was updated 1 0.00 
4647 User initiated logoff 1 0.00 
Table 5.5: Windows Server 2008 Event IDs Observed in Log Data 
5.4.4 Log Volume Trend Analysis 
 
The exact time stamps associated with penetration tests were not provided.  Event 
volume graphs were generated for each common event in order to determine the 
penetration test activity within the data set for additional analysis.  Trend graphs of 
firewall activity over time indicated constant activity, obfuscating the limited 
penetration actions within the data set, making discovery of the penetration test from 
visualization tools very difficult.  Trend graphs from 27-28 April are depicted in 















Fewer alarms were generated than was expected during the evaluation.  This 
evaluation was executed without the prior knowledge of security personnel which 
may have contributed to the low number of reported incidents during the evaluation.  
However, the low number of alarms is assessed to be associated with improper 
classification of logs by the SIEM into the operations event type, or into security 
classifications that are too generic and often overlooked by analysts.  Additionally, 
many events of mild interest may have been “tuned out” based on perceived low 
forensic value to volume ratio.  The process of “tuning out” logs from alarms would 
affect alarm data, but would not affect log classification data.  The endpoint security 
audit policy also appeared to be misconfigured as it overlooked many important 
security group modification events.  True positive and false positive evaluation of 
network security devices was not possible during the evaluation as exact times 
associated with penetration actions were not provided and many alarms not related to 
the penetration test were generated from live network data and real world probing 
activity.  The continuous high volume of firewall data hindered the task of rapidly 
identifying malicious activity within the data set.  Endpoint operating system firewall 
logs were generated for both successful and failed connections, drastically increasing 
log volume generated.   
 
A sterile network security lab must be constructed to properly evaluate the efficacy 
of the proposed SIEM rule hierarchy and remediate issues with the current SIEM 
ontology.  Too many extraneous uncontrolled variables were exhibited within the 
evaluation data to determine accurate true positive and false positive data.  The large 
number of low value logs generated and improper audit policy configuration greatly 
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hindered the process of reviewing log data for events of interest.  Additionally, 
network security device placement and network architecture review as beyond the 
scope of this evaluation.  As such, it is uncertain whether network security devices 
were monitoring all pertinent traffic generated during the evaluation. 
 
This evaluation also provided insight to a potential flaw with the concept of chaining 
correlation rules.  Unfortunately, rule chaining requires certain rules to fire 
consistently in order to escalate a series of events to an analyst.  As many events that 
were expected to generate alarms did not, higher level correlation rules would not 
have been trigger based on the absence of this data.  However, it may be possible to 
improve rule chaining by expanding the SIEM ontology to include additional events 
of interest in more specific log classifications or event types.  Rules could then be 
generated based on event type or classification satisfaction rather than very specific 




This chapter reviewed data extracted from a series of penetration tests conducted over 
a 96 hour period.  This data offered insight into potential issues with the LogRhythm 
SIEM log ontology that may be adjusted to improve detection performance.  
Additionally, the evaluation indicated the need to construct a sterile security lab for 
further tests.  Many of the events stimulated by penetration testers were not observed 
within the data collected, indicating monitored devices may not be configured 




6 Threat Framework Development and SIEM Ontology 
Modifications 
 
6.1 Overview  
 
Evaluation data derived from the penetration test data reviewed in chapter 5 indicated 
that a hierarchical model of chained events may not be feasible in systems consisting 
of data aggregated from multiple disparate subsystems.  The data reviewed indicated 
instances where essential data for correlation sequencing was either missing, or 
omitted by design.  However, the framework proposed for categorizing subsets of 
data based on attacker objectives remains sound.  As such, a framework representing 
different attacker objectives, tasks and related forensic data was created in the 
following section.  Additionally, modifications were applied to the SIEM ontology.  
6.2 Investigation Framework 
 
The modified kill chain model discussed in chapter four was used to investigate the 
penetration test log data.  However, the hierarchical model was flattened in order to 
identify the presence of indicators in each phase regardless of whether data existed 
in previous phases or not.  Additional analysis of the flattened model and the nature 
of data, in terms of content and type of devices reporting activity, indicated there 
were four distinct areas of similar log data, which will be referred to as named phases.  
These phases were labeled: network phase, endpoint phase, domain phase and egress 
phase.  Figure 6.1 shows the relationship between these phases and the kill chain 
model discussed in chapter four.   
 
 
Figure 6.1: Investigation Framework Phases 
6.2.1 The Network Investigation Phase 
 
The network phase consists of data that is often provided by network equipment, such 
as: routers, switches, remote access devices, and network scalers; as well as network 
intrusion detection systems and firewalls.  Data provided by these devices typically 
contains the following components of metadata: IP address of origin and destination 
devices, port numbers, and a signature.  The payload or packet capture analyzed by 
security devices may be provided, but is not guaranteed.  This data may also be 
correlated with data provided by devices monitoring the endpoint and domain phases, 
if the logged data is associated with network activity.  The network phase consists of 




The attacker objective of reconnaissance is further dissected into two distinct tasks: 
probing and enumeration.  Probing consists of detecting live hosts on a network and 
maps to the host identification techniques exhibited in the penetration test data.  This 
will often include ICMP traffic sent to sequential IP addresses as well as crafted TCP 
and UDP packets sent to common service ports. TCP scan packets will often be sent 
with a SYN flag only, with the attacker observing a SYN/ACK response from the 
probed host without sending an ACK flag completing the connection. Enumeration 
consists of operating system fingerprinting and service discovery.  Whereas probing 
may determine that a specific service is being hosted on a server, such as email, 
enumeration is used to determine which version of server software is being utilized.  
This is often done through a process referred to as “banner grabbing.”  Additionally, 
an attacker will make authentication attempts with default credentials for network 
technologies. 
 
The attacker objective of network delivery is also dissected into two distinct tasks: 
host access and payload delivery.  Host access is accomplished when an attacker 
authenticates to a service running on an end point.  This may manifest as a remote 
terminal session, or a successful response from a vulnerable service, such as a DNS 
zone transfer.  Successful service authentication indicates it may be possible to 
transfer a malicious payload to the endpoint.  Payload delivery is attempted following 
the identification of a vulnerable service channel in the host access phase.  However, 
novice attackers may attempt to deliver a payload without executing the 
reconnaissance or host access phases generating a large volume of intrusion detection 
system alarms associated with the payload signatures observed for services that are 
not running on endpoints.  This phenomenon explains the large number of false 
positives observed in intrusion detection system alarms, as the payload may not be 
confirmed as an effective network attack unless the endpoint is running the vulnerable 
service the attack was crafted to exploit. Therefore, indicators observed within the 
network phase do not necessarily indicate a system has been compromised, but 
merely that an attacker is searching for holes in the system.   
 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the type of data observed as well as the device(s) providing data 




Figure 6.2: Network Phase Forensic Data of Interest 
 
6.2.2 The Endpoint Investigation Phase 
 
The endpoint phase consists of data that is extracted from logs stored locally on a 
computer, such as a work station or server.  Data provided at this level consistently 
provides the computer name of the device logging the activity as well as data specific 
to the actions performed.  Network related actions may provide the IP addresses of 
origin and destination devices and port numbers.  Application modifications will 
provide vendor specific signatures or messages.  Authentication or privilege use will 
provide account credentials and indicate the level of privilege granted at the time of 
use.  These logs are especially useful in discovering unauthorized software 
installations via application whitelisting.  Additionally, this data may provide insight 
to the tools or commands used by an internal attacker.   The endpoint phase consists 
of two attacker objectives, installation and privilege escalation. 
 
The attacker objective of installation consists of two subordinate tasks: host delivery 
and software modification.  The host delivery task is similar to network delivery 
discussed in the network phase, however the detection mechanism and content of logs 
in this phase differ from the network phase.  Anti-malware products are the most 
likely mechanisms to detect the presence of malicious code uploaded to an endpoint.  
This data may corroborate data detected in the network phase, or identify payloads 
that avoided detection by network intrusion detection systems.  Additionally, 
malicious code may be identified by monitoring endpoint file and folder integrity 
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monitoring via operating system audit logs.  Whereas the previous network phase 
may have reported attempted but unsuccessful payload delivery, this phase confirms 
the presence of malicious software on the endpoint. The software modification task 
involves the installation or registration of malicious binaries, or the modification of 
existing software to serve a malicious purpose.  Again, this task is most likely 
detected by anti-malware software installed on the end point, or via local operating 
system audit logs. Registry key modifications, file or folder access, scheduled task 
registration, service registration and starting, as well and windows installer logs are 
useful in detecting this type of activity.  
 
The attacker objective of privilege escalation consists of two subordinate tasks: 
privilege escalation and privilege use.  The privilege escalation task entails actions 
associated with gaining administrative access on an endpoint.  This may be 
represented as direct security group manipulation, such as creating or modifying a 
security group, or it may be represented as credential replay, such as passing a hash.  
The privilege use task is represented by evidence of administrative level actions 
exercised on an endpoint system.  This may be observed by the endpoint reporting an 
administrative logon during authentication or via a “runas” command, wherein 
credentials other than those of the current account are used to execute commands at 
a higher privilege level.       
 
Figure 6.3 illustrates the type of data observed as well as the device(s) providing data 





Figure 6.3: Endpoint Phase Forensic Data of Interest 
 
6.2.3 The Domain Investigation Phase 
 
The domain phase consists of data that resides on the central authentication server, 
typically a domain controller in a Microsoft Windows domain.  This data consistently 
contains the computer name and account name associated with observed activity.  
Network data, such as IP address and port numbers may also be provided for remote 
authentication.  This data is beneficial for detecting unusual communication between 
internal computers, or by accounts that do not often communicate with specific 
devices or directories.  There may be similar or redundant data logged by the domain 
controller and the local machine manipulated by an attacker during this phase.  As 
such, logs stored on the domain controller may be compared to logs stored on local 
machines to detect attacker attempts to destroy evidence and avoid detection.  The 
domain phase consists of two objectives: lateral movement and actions on the 
objective. 
 
The attacker objective of lateral movement consists of two subordinate tasks: internal 
reconnaissance and lateral movement.  Internal reconnaissance is similar to 
reconnaissance observed during the network phase; however this is often conducted 
from an internal host rather than the attacker’s original machine.  As such, legitimate 
processes organic to the compromised operating system may be used to avoid 
detection by anti-malware software.  Since local processes are used, there are 
additional opportunities for forensic data both on the compromised endpoint and via 
the domain controller logging authentication or failed authentication between internal 
hosts.  In situations where organizations have not deployed network intrusion 
detection systems on their internal networks, endpoint or domain controller logs may 
be the only systems providing forensic data of interest.  Lateral movement is the 
process of exercising compromised credentials and privileges on additional internal 
hosts within the network.  Domain controller logs provide the unique ability to track 
privilege use across disparate endpoints. 
 
Figure 6.4 illustrates the type of data observed as well as the device(s) providing data 





Figure 6.4: Domain Phase Forensic Data of Interest 
6.2.4 The Egress Investigation Phase 
 
The egress phase is identical to the network phase in regards to data provided by 
monitoring devices.  However, this phase is differentiated by the direction of travel 
and the presence of known malicious actor indicators, such as black-listed IP 
addresses, domains, or email addresses.  This phase may be an indicator of 
compromise even if indicators were not observed in previous phases.   Figure 6.5 
illustrates the type of data observed as well as the device(s) providing data associated 




Figure 6.5: Egress Phase Forensic Data of Interest 
6.3 Building a SIEM Correlation Framework 
Investigators often attempt to identify natural one-to-many relationships while 
searching for patterns within network data.  The attacker objective phases defined in 
the investigation framework discussed in section 6.2 were selected based on their 
suitability for conducting efficient investigations based on common aggregate fields 
that satisfy this natural tendency.  Figure 6.6 below depicts the investigation phases 
discussed in section 6.2 as well as the natural aggregate filed used to correlate 
multiple related data fields within a phase.  Additionally, the most likely sensor to 
detect activity within the objective phase is depicted via a grey text box and typical 
metadata fields contained within log data provided by said sensor are listed.  The 
aggregate field, or identity field, is highlighted within the list of typical metadata 
fields contained within the objective phase column.  Arranging data observed in each 
phase in this manner greatly simplifies the process of identifying prospective 
correlation fields for constructing SIEM logic blocks used to generate alarms.  The 
light blue lines between objective phases indicate which metadata fields a network 
security analyst is likely to use when pivoting through forensic data while attempting 
to reconstruct the attack scenario.  These are the most likely fields to leverage when 
attempting to perform correlation on multiple events via SIEM rule chains or 






Figure 6.6: Identity Fields for Aggregation and Correlation 
6.4 Revising Log Classifications 
The one-to-many relationships discussed in the previous section pertaining to SIEM 
correlation rule construction may be leveraged to construct join operations within a 
relational database.  The LogRhythm SIEM selected for evaluation in this thesis 
leverages Microsoft’s implementation of the SQL database language and may be 
easily modified to accommodate the addition of these new labels via the 
“classification” field contained within the database.  The classification field is often 
used in constructing correlation rules that aggregate many events that may have no 
other common data, aside from the classification applied by the rule constructor.  
Figure 6.7 illustrates the result of injecting new classification labels within the 






Figure 6.7: Applying New Classification Labels to the LogRhythm Log Ontology 
Four classification labels were used for each objective phase in order to establish a 
logical hierarchy similar to the model explained within section 6.2 pertaining to the 
investigation framework.  The top level classification is used to store all subordinate 
classifications contained within an objective phase, such as the “installation” phase.  
The next classification label is used to identify primitive attacks, for instance 
“installation alarms”.  The remaining two classification labels are used to label events 
that may not be alarming in isolation, but may be aggregated into hyper alarms if 
observed a predefined time period of a primitive attack, similar to the concept of 
subplans described in chapter 4.  The introduction of new classification labels within 
the SQL database also resulted in modifications to the LogRhythm graphical user 
interface (GUI).  Figure 6.8 below compares the resultant changes between the former 
and resultant LogRhythm investigation wizard GUIs and illustrates the hierarchical 
relationship between classification objectives, primitive attacks and subplans.  The 





Figure 6.8: Changes to SIEM Graphical User Interface after Database Modifications 
6.5 Implementing the New Ontology – Parsing, Correlating and 
Alarming 
 
The previous section discussed the process for modifying the existing LogRhythm 
database to incorporate the new log ontology yet maintain the existing code leveraged 
by the SIEM to parse log data and generate security alarms.  However, the 
components of the SIEM responsible for processing data must also be modified in 
order to recognize these new additions to the database.  These components may be 
considered a series of database queries used to prepare metadata for processing at 
later stages in the SIEM alerting cycle.  
 
The first type of query leveraged within the SIEM is referred to as “parsing.”  Parsing 
is performed on raw log data received by one of the SIEM’s collection agents.  
Collection agents may either extract data directly from an operating system they are 
residing within, or forward network data they received from other network devices, 
often via the syslog protocol.  Data received from the collection agent is then 
segregated into specific metadata fields via regular expression matching.  Finally, 
regular expression capture groups may be referenced by SQL queries for rudimentary 
pattern matching.  Figure 6.9 depicts the process of extracting common metadata 
fields from snort IDS logs and applying the “delivery alarm” primitive attack 
classification to a SQL injection signature based on pattern matching applied to the 
vendor message ID metadata field in LogRhythm.  This type of query is very specific 
and always returns a set number of metadata fields based on the regular expression 





Figure 6.9: Parsing Log Data and Applying New Ontological Labels 
The next type of query is a primitive attack query leveraging the LogRhythm 
Advanced Intelligence Engine (AIE).  This is also a specific query that will return a 
set number of metadata fields defined within the rule logic.  The AIE engine is 
capable of conducting more advanced transformations on metadata beyond merely 
performing the basic pattern matching conducted in the parsing phase such as 
statistical comparisons, event chaining, or thresholding.  However, the most 
important feature of this type of query is that the results of the query may be given a 
new classification label providing a mechanism to mutate previously innocuous data 
into an alarming classification group.  This may be used to operationalize the concept 
of dynamic suspicion escalation described within chapter 4.  Figure 6.10 depicts an 
AIE rule created to convert any log with a parsed process name metadata field 
containing a process name depicted on list of known reconnaissance tools into an 
event with the “lateral movement alarm” primitive attack classification.  
Additionally, the resultant event will provide several other metadata fields for 
additional correlation with existing SIEM events.  These metadata fields are depicted 





Figure 6.10: Primitive Attack Rule Construction with the LogRhythm AI Engine 
The third type of query provides an additional mechanism for dynamic suspicion 
escalation by mutating subplan classifications into primitive attack classifications.  If 
an event containing a primitive attack classification is observed and subsequent 
events are generated with subordinate subplan classifications that share a common 
aggregate identifier field, described in section 6.3, with the primitive attack event, 
these events will be mutated into alarms and aggregated with the initial event.  Figure 
6.11 below illustrates an AIE rule designed to combine events with the following 
classifications: “lateral movement alarms”, “internal reconnaissance”, or “remote 
access” into a single alarm if observed within two minutes of a previous event with 
the classification “lateral movement alarms”.  This provides an efficient mechanism 
for collecting logs that are useful for investigations, but often overlooked based on 
high volume such as logon activity or handle manipulation logs.   
 
 




The fourth and final type of query modified to enable alerting with the new log 
ontology is a data greedy aggregation rule.  This rule differs from the previous queries 
as it is capable of collecting and returning an infinite number of metadata fields and 
values.  This is accomplished by merely combining events with a common 
classification value and a common aggregate field associated with the objective phase 
as was defined in section 6.3.  Figure 6.12 below depicts an alarm created to combine 
all metadata fields contained in events with the “lateral movement alarms” 
classification and identical values in the “account” metadata field.  This query is 
designed to replicate the “pivot” action security analysts conduct during 
investigations described in section 6.3.   
 
 
Figure 6.12: Data Greedy Aggregation Alarm Construction 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter discussed the process used to develop and implement a new SIEM log 
ontology.  Historical data provided during the case study was leveraged to identify 
logical data groups based on attacker actions and kill-chain theory described in 
chapter 3.  These data groups were analyzed for common identifier fields conducive 
for automatic aggregation within alarms.  Finally, a series of specific and generic 
database queries were constructed to condition metadata within in each of the 
investigative phases for correlation and aggregation prior to generating an alert to an 




7 Threat Framework Evaluation and Conclusions 
 
A sophisticated network security laboratory environment was designed to evaluate 
the efficacy of the novel threat ontology designed in chapter 6.  Two identical 
laboratory environments were constructed with the single variable between 
deployments being modifications to the SIEM database used to detect security events.  
Appendix A of this thesis provides a detailed description of the design and 
implementation of this laboratory environment, as well as the test cases developed to 
stimulate attacker actions across the entire kill-chain spectrum.  Appendix B of this 
thesis contains detailed metrics associated with the alarms, logs and events generated 
by each of the test cases.  This chapter focuses on the high level findings associated 
with analysis of the data generated through experimentation. 
7.1 Analysis of Detection Rates between SIEM Ontologies 
The modified SIEM ontology outperformed the baseline SIEM ontology in alarm 
metrics by generating an alarm for 25 out of 26 test scenarios resulting in a 96% true 
positive detection rate.  The baseline SIEM ontology and LogRhythm default rule set 
generated alarms for 7 out of 26 of the test cases resulting in a 26.9% detection rate.  
Additionally, the modified ontology generated aggregate alarms, meaning alarms 
comprised with metadata from multiple events, for 19 out of 25 alarms, roughly 76% 
of alarms generated.  The remaining 6 alarms were only associated with singular 
events, so no additional data was available for aggregation.   
 
In addition to the true positive rate, it is worth noting the difference in alarm volume 
generated by the different SIEM configurations.  The baseline SIEM generated a total 
of 83 alarms during the evaluation; however these alarms were only associated with 
7 of the 26 test cases.  The OpenVas vulnerability scanner test case resulted in nearly 
half of the baseline SIEM alarms with 41 separate alarms.  Conversely, the modified 
SIEM configuration generated 5 alarms during the same test case, containing 
aggregate metadata from 401 correlated events, and a total of 46 alarms from all test 
cases.  This data indicates the ability to aggregate data via a logical identifier metadata 
field proved to be an effective mechanism for decreasing alarm volume. 
 
Analysis of SIEM alarm rates between the baseline SIEM ontology and the modified 
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Kali 18 18 1 1 56 
26 
Audit Log 
Purging 0 0 3 11 304 
Table 7.1: SIEM Ontology Alarm Metrics 
7.2 Comparison of Alarm Forensic Value between SIEM Ontologies 
The primary motivation for developing the new SIEM ontology was to provide a 
mechanism for the aggregation of pertinent and related metadata into alarm 
notifications in order to decrease the investigative effort associated with explaining 
security alarms.  The following alarms were extracted from the email notifications 
provided by the SIEM during the OpenVas vulnerability scanner test case and will 
be evaluated based on the level of investigative effort required to explain the event(s) 
that generated the alarm.  An alarm generated by the baseline SIEM will be analyzed 
first, following an alarm generated by the modified SIEM for the same test case. 
7.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology Email Alert Analysis 
 
The baseline SIEM ontology combined 47 alarms generated during the OpenVas test 
case into a single email, comprised of 7,154 words.  Unfortunately, it is not obvious 
which metadata field was used to correlate these events, as none of the fields are 
common amongst all 47 alarms.  Furthermore, the email batching process merely 
listed the discrete alarms, rather than combining the alarms in a logical manner.  
Additionally, only 41 alarms were generated in the console during the OpenVas scan 
test case, indicating 6 additional alarms must have been aggregated from previous 
scan activity.  It appears this aggregation was most likely performed based on the 
large increase in alarms generated within a short time frame during the scan, resulting 
in combination based on temporal proximity, rather than through metadata 
correlation.   
 
Figure 7.1 depicts one of the alarms contained within the batch of 47 alarms generated 
during the OpenVas scan.  This alarm correctly identified abnormal network 
connections to the Windows 7 host “W7host” with IP address 10.13.201.94.  
However, no additional information was provided to indicate which computer or 
66 
 
computers were attempting to communicate with this workstation, nor what aspect of 
said communication was considered abnormal.   
 
 
Figure 7.1: Example Email Alert from Baseline SIEM Ontology 
10 of the alarms contained within the pool of 47 correctly identified the attacker 
machine as the origin host with IP address 172.16.0.3.  However, it was not obvious 
what actions this host was conducting within this batch of alarms.  The alarm depicted 
in figure 7.2 indicated that the machine with IP address 172.16.0.3 was suspected of 
being associated with a system compromise or lateral movement.  Unfortunately, 
there were no metadata artifacts assocaited with this alarm to indicate how this 
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conclusion was reached.  In reality, the attacker had not yet successfully 
compromised a machine at this point within the evaluation. 
 
Figure 7.2: Example Email Alert from Baseline SIEM Ontology Indicating Attacker 
Machine 
4 of the 47 batched alarms indicated that the observed activity was suspected of being 
associated with a port scan.  However, only 1 of these 4 alarms indicated both the 
source and destination machines associated with the port scan activity.   Figure 7.3 
depicts an alarm that accurately indicates the source of the port scan as the attacker 
machine with IP address 172.16.0.3 and the target machine as the webserver named 
“IIS” with the IP address 10.13.201.61.  However, the remaining 3 alarms appeared 
identical to the alarm depicted in figure 7.4, where only the targeted machine is 




Figure 7.3:Example Email Alert from Baseline SIEM Ontology Indicating Port 
Scan Activity 
 
Figure 7.4: Example Email Alert from Baseline SIEM Ontology Indicating Port 
Scan Activity with Incomplete Information 
7.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology Email Alert Analysis 
 
In contrast to the 47 batched alarms generated by the baseline SIEM ontology, the 
modified SIEM ontology accurately identified the scan activity with a single alarm.  
This was achieved by aggregating metadata fields from multiple events within the 
alarm.  Note the event field within the notification reflects 92 related events were 
combined to generate the alert depicted in figure 7.5, while all alarm notifications 
69 
 
generated in the baseline configuration were comprised of a single event, even when 
batched.  The modified SIEM alarm title, depicted in the email subject line, identifies 
this event as being associated with suspected reconnaissance activity and the 
aggregate field for correlation is the “origin host” field.  The origin host, highlighted 
in red, is correctly identified as the Kali Linux machine with IP address 172.16.0.3.  
The entire list of targeted machines is provided within the alert and highlighted in 
green.  Supporting metadata, including port numbers, and names for aggregated 
events are highlighted in purple.      
 
 
Figure 7.5: Example Email Alert from Modified SIEM Ontology 
7.2.3 Alarm Forensic Value Conclusions 
The modified SIEM alarms provide considerably more correlated data with each 
alarm than the baseline SIEM alarms.  As a result, security analysts are more likely 
to be presented with enough information to draw conclusions regarding the nature of 
the detected activity and potentially execute fewer specific queries to validate their 
hypothesis.  The alarms presented using the baseline SIEM configuration often 
required a considerable amount of analysis of similar alarms in order to determine 
what data was actually detected and what data may warrant additional investigation.  
The data contained within the modified alarm was clearly superior to the data 
contained within the baseline SIEM alarms from a forensic perspective.   
7.3 Comparison of Email Alarm Volume between SIEM Ontologies 
The baseline SIEM configuration generated 2,364 alarms from 9/29/2015 to 
10/21/2015, an average of approximately 100 alarms per day.  Conversely, the 
modified SIEM configuration generated 8 alarms from 11/23/2015 to 11/30/2015, an 
average of 1 alarm per day.   Figure 7.6 depicts a screen capture of historical emails 
associated with the baseline SIEM configuration and figure 7.7 depicts emails 











Figure 7.7: Email Alerts Generated by Baseline SIEM from 23 to 30 November 
The decreased alarm volume may be attributed to the decreased number of detection 
rules configured between the two deployments.  The modified SIEM configuration 
contained less than a third of the alarms contained within the baseline SIEM 
configuration.  However, the modified SIEM configuration generated 99% less 
alarms than the baseline configuration when test data was not being generated.  The 
128 baseline SIEM rules generated an average of .78 alarms per rule per day, while 
the modified SIEM rules generated an average of .025 alarms per rule per day.  In 
light of the improved true positive detection rate exhibited by the modified rule set, 
it is determined the decrease per alarm rule rate during non-testing conditions reflects 








7.4 SIEM Rule Complexity Comparison 
 
The baseline SIEM rule set consisted of 128 correlation rules while the modified 
SIEM rule set consisted of 39 rules.  This was achieved by segregating rules into 
separate groups consisting of specific event queries and aggregate alarm queries, 
while the baseline SIEM configuration only leveraged specific queries.  The modified 
SIEM rule set is roughly 30% the size of the baseline SIEM rule set.  The decreased 
number of queries required to detect threat actions is assessed to be an improvement 
over the base model due to the assumption that fewer administrative actions will be 
required by SIEM engineers to maintain the system.  Additionally, the queries 
contained within the modified SIEM rule set hierarchy were generally less complex 
than the baseline rule when compared side by side.   
 
 
7.4.1 Baseline SIEM Rule Complexity Analysis 
Figure 7.8 depicts a baseline rule constructed to detect abnormal processes launched 
by a specific computer.  This rule consists of two stages, a baselining or learning 
stage and a threshold comparison stage.  The baselining stage constructs a dynamic 
list of unique values during the learning period, which is configured to be seven days 
by default, and generates an average number of unique values observed by host.  The 
threshold stage searches for deviations from said base line.  The example in figure 
7.8 searches for more than 5 unique processes running in memory beyond the average 





Figure 7.8: Baseline SIEM Process Anomaly Detection Rule 
 
 
Figure 7.9 depicts the amount of system resources consumed by the baseline SIEM 
process monitoring rule.  As the rule is designed to maintain a baseline in memory, 
this rule consumes approximately 17% of the memory allocated to the “Advanced 




Figure 7.9: Baseline SIEM Process Anomaly Detection Rule Resource Consumption 
 
7.4.2 Modified SIEM Rule Complexity Analysis 
Figure 7.10 depicts a modified rule constructed to detect abnormal processes 
launched on a specific computer, similar to the baseline SIEM rule discussed 
previously.  However, this rule leverages a static list of approved processes rather 
than a baselining mechanism.  This list was derived from the static indicators depicted 
in the investigation phase of chapter 6 of this thesis.  Using a static indicator list 
removes the need to implement a multi-stage rule consisting of baselining and 
thresholding.  Additionally, the modified rule is configured to generate an event for 
any violation from the static list of approved processes.  Alarm thresholding is 
performed by a separate set of rule blocks that also perform aggregation.  This 
configuration allows every violation to populate an event database for investigation 
by analysts even if no alarm was triggered.  However, the baseline configuration only 
generates an anomalous event if the threshold is exceeded.      
 
Figure 7.11 depicts the resources consumed by the modified SIEM query.  The 
resources consumed by the modified SIEM rule are negligible and reported as 0% of 
the total resources available to the “Advanced Intelligence Engine” process running 
on the SIEM.  This is a marked improvement over the baseline SIEM rule constructed 





Figure 7.10: Modified SIEM Process Anomaly Detection Rule 
  
 
Figure 7.11: Modified SIEM Process Anomaly Detection Rule Resource 
Consumption 
7.5 Investigation Framework Analysis 
7.6 Conclusions 
The modified ontology appears to be an improvement over the baseline SIEM 
ontology in every dimension measured throughout this thesis.  The modifications 
depicted within this thesis successfully resulted in a drastic reduction in the number 
alarms that provided little forensic value to analysts.  Additionally, the amount of 
data provided on a per alarm basis was greatly improved through the novel 
aggregation mechanism provided by the adoption of them modified log ontology 
classification labels paired with identity metadata fields specific to each kill-chain 
phase.  Though the primary motivation for the modified log ontology revolved around 
alarm forensic value, marked improvements in SIEM resource consumption were 
noted following the implementation of simplified correlation rule queries.  
76 
 
Additionally, it is assessed that simpler correlation queries will result in decreased 
administrative effort required by SIEM engineers to maintain the system.   
 
These improvements are assessed to have improved the mean time required to detect 
security events based on the following factors: 
 Increased visibility during network security attacks through improved 
detection rate (roughly 70% improvement in number of test cases detected). 
 Increased number of metadata fields contained within alarms generated. 
 Decreased total alarm volume. 
 Decreased effort required by engineers to deploy detection rules. 








8 Contributions and Areas of Further Research 
 
8.1 Research Contributions 
 
Several prospective contributions to future security monitoring research have been 
identified within this thesis and are explained in further detail in the following 
subsections.  
8.1.1 Network Security Laboratory Design 
The network security laboratory environment created for this thesis is suitable for 
multiple security research applications beyond the scope of this thesis.  The 
environment is ideal for malware analysis based on the ability to compartmentalize 
the virtualized environment from the public facing internet, yet still maintain internal 
network connectivity and services.  Additionally, the security lab design is portable 
and may be deployed across multiple hardware implementations in parallel, as was 
demonstrated within this thesis.  This laboratory environment has been referenced by 
the author for consulting engagements beyond the scope of this thesis, with great 
success in evaluating cyber-attack indicators of compromise.  Additionally, the 
software selected to design the security lab is freely available to students of most 
universities and may serve as a model for constructing similar labs dedicated to 
network security research. 
8.1.2 Advanced Persistent Threat Attack Scenario 
A similar scenario stimulating the entire spectrum of kill-chain actions could not be 
discovered during the research conducted in support of this thesis.  The test cases 
designed for this thesis required an extensive amount of field research spanning 
several months to develop.  The “attack replication” section of chapter 9 in this thesis 
is detailed enough for a network security novice to replicate the actions depicted and 
generate adequate security data for continued evaluation of network and endpoint 
security solutions.  As such, this scenario is assessed to be one of the premier network 
security test scenarios published to date.  
8.1.3 Network Security Investigation Framework 
The investigation framework designed around two of the predominant kill-chain 
models is currently unique within the realm of network security.  The notion of 
“pivoting” within data sets has been widely discussed within security circles, but 
often continues to revolve around layer three of the Open Systems Interconnectivity 
(OSI) model, specifically IP addresses.  This framework extended investigation 
pivoting to discrete logical aggregate fields for specific attack phases.  This 
framework has also been validated through field work and consulting performed by 
the author beyond the scope of this thesis with great success.  The marked 
improvements in SIEM correlation rule detection rates are attributed to the theoretical 
foundation of the investigation framework devised within this thesis.   
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8.1.4 A Method for Aggregating SIEM Data through a Hierarchy of 
Structured Data Queries 
The method employed to create alarms aggregating metadata from multiple events is 
not commonly observed within SIEM technologies.  Though the capability is present 
within the software, it is seldom observed within industry due to the belief that human 
analysts may augment shortcomings in SIEM data aggregation within alarms through 
a series of directed queries.  As such, most SIEM administrative work appears to 
fixate on detecting events that may prompt human analysts to initiate investigations, 
rather than provided data to support investigations.  The novel approach exhibited in 
this thesis is argued to be more efficient in equipping human beings to triage trivial 
notifications and rapidly identify critical events from a pool of security alarms.  The 
aggregate fields provided within the investigation framework may be beneficial in 
future research dedicated to data aggregation in security expert systems in support of 
human analytical triage.      
8.1.5 Advanced Persistent Threat SIEM Log Ontology 
Though a specific SIEM technology was leveraged to implement this framework, the 
principles of metadata aggregation and identifier field correlation may be extended 
to any SIEM platform that performs data normalization.  The author is currently 
entertaining efforts beyond this thesis to deploy this ontology within Splunk, and 
Elasticsearch deployments.  
8.2 Future Work 
Several potential research areas were identified throughout the course of developing 
this thesis that may benefit the advancement of network security monitoring.  These 
areas are explained in further detail within the following subsections. 
8.2.1 Dynamic Suspicion Escalation across Kill-Chain Phases within 
SIEM Systems 
 
This thesis focused on metadata aggregation within discrete phases of the kill chain.  
It may be beneficial to extend this aggregation through SIEM rule chains that report 
successful completion of multiple actions across the kill chain.  Many existing SIEM 
solutions implement correlation rules comprised of multiple logic blocks; however 
they do not currently leverage the log ontology devised within this thesis and often 
result in high false negative or false positive detection ratios.  Applying the novel log 
ontology to more complex correlation rules was not evaluated within this thesis, but 
may be beneficial in identifying additional efficiencies in data presentation to 
analysts and improvements in alarm detection rates. The hybrid SIEM rule hierarchy 
discussed in section 4.5 of this thesis may be modified to reflect the new log ontology 
and evaluated for its suitability in developing SIEM rule chains.   
8.2.2 Sensor Authority Weighting For Probabilistic Modeling 
The risk based priority (RBP) metrics built into the LogRhythm SIEM were not 
leveraged for rule construction during the evaluation based on the inconsistent weight 
assignments within the SIEM ontology.  Attempts to leverage RBP values for alarm 
generation proved to be inconsistent throughout this thesis and during filed work 
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conducted in industry.  However, it may be possible to extend the log ontology 
devised within this thesis to apply authority weights to sensors providing data to the 
SIEM based on the likelihood that said sensor is an authority for the activity it claims 
to have observed.  The kill chain phases seem to be well suited as evaluation criteria 
for sensor preference based on the typical metadata required by phase and the typical 
metadata provided by the sensor.  Additionally, analysis of investigation data 
indicated that location within a network has a large impact on the value of data 
observed and reported by said sensor.  Based on this observation, sensors may be 
aligned with logical categories similar to those depicted in figure 8.1 below.  The 
method of applying authority weights based on a sensor’s ability to accurately 
describe or detect a type of attack is hypothesized to result in more consistent 
weighting assignments and ultimately better detection rates than the current RBP 
calculations within the LogRhythm SIEM. 
     
 
Figure 8.1: Hypothetical Weighting System for Security Sensors by Kill-Chain 
Phase and Network Location 
   
8.2.3 Applied Belief Functions within SIEM Software 
Several papers reviewed during the research portion of this thesis discussed 
leveraging probabilistic models to decrease false positive alarm rates within intrusion 
detection systems.  The Dempster-Shaffer algorithm was cited by many of these 
papers as a candidate algorithm for evaluating the criticality of data provided by 
intrusion detection systems.  However, the Dempster-Shaffer algorithm is dependent 
upon static authority weight assignments, which are applied inconsistently across 
disparate research groups.  The hypothetical weighting system discussed in section 
8.2.2 may be applied as a weighting system for the Dempster-Shaffer algorithm.  This 
may yield a new risk based priority algorithm (RBP), or joint mass function in 












𝑤𝑏] + [(𝑃𝑎 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒)




m𝑎𝑏 = 𝐽𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
𝑃𝑥 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙  
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 8.2 
𝑤𝑥 = 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔  
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 8.2 
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Appendix A   
Network Security Lab Design and Test Cases 
A.1 Laboratory Design 
 
A network laboratory was constructed within a VMWare Workstation 10 virtualized 
environment to replicate an enterprise data network.  The laboratory consisted of a 
Microsoft Windows domain hosting enterprise services typical to commercial internal 
networks.  Microsoft Server 2012 R2 was used for the base operating system for Active 
Directory domain controllers.  Microsoft Server 2008 R2 was used as the base operating 
system for the mail server and the web server.  Microsoft Exchange 2010 was installed as 
the mail server software.  Microsoft Office SharePoint Server 2010 was installed on the 
web server to host web services.  The web server also utilized a SQL database running 
Microsoft SQL Server 2008 software.  A pfSense firewall running on FreeBSD Linux was 
deployed as a virtual router to segregate vlans as well as provide logging for attacker traffic 
traversing subnets.  The snort intrusion detection system package was installed on the 
pfSense virtual router to provide network security data.  A Kali Linux virtual machine was 
deployed to replicate attacker actions originating from an external network connected to 
the perimeter Palo Alto firewall.  All laboratory devices were configured to send security 
and event logs to the LogRhythm SIEM.   
 
 
Figure A.1: Network Diagram of Virtual Network Environment 
A-3 
 
Figure A.1 represents the logical flow of data within the laboratory network.  Log transport 
between servers was conducted via the syslog protocol for Linux machines and via 
specialized software installed on Microsoft Windows machines.  The LogRhythm 
proprietary System Monitor Configuration Agent program was used to ship windows logs 
to the LogRhythm SIEM.    
 
A.2 Host Auditing Levels 
 
 Windows Auditing Levels 
 
Microsoft Windows hosts are not configured to audit all security events by default and 
auditing must be configured by group policy to detect several hacker tools and techniques 
deployed during the testing portion of this thesis (Microsoft, 2013).   Figures A.2 and A.3 
depict the location to enable auditing within the Microsoft Local Group Policy Editor via 
the gpedit.msc command.   
 






A.3: Enabling Advanced System Audit Policies 
Log volume generated by Windows endpoints will rapidly consume storage on the SIEM 
platform.  As such, only certain Windows audit policies were enabled.  Table 9.1 below 
depicts the audit policy subcategories that are enabled or left disabled for the optimal 











Subcategory: Audit Credential Validation Success   
Volume: High (Domain Controller)    
Event IDs: 4774, 4775, 4776, 4777    
      
Subcategory: Audit Kerberos Authentication Service     
Volume: High (Domain Controller)    
Event IDs: 4768, 4771, 4772    
      
Subcategory: Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations     
Volume: High (Domain Controller)    
Event IDs: 4769, 4770    
      
Subcategory: Audit Other Account Logon Events Success Failure 
Volume: Varies    
Event IDs: 4649, 4778, 4779, 4800, 4801, 4802, 4803, 5378, 
5632, 5633     







Subcategory: Audit Application Group Management Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4783, 4784, 4785, 4786, 4787, 4788, 4789, 4790    
      
Subcategory: Audit Computer Account Management Success Failure 
Volume: Low      
Event IDs: 4741, 4742, 4743     
      
Subcategory: Audit Distribution Group Management     
Volume: Low  Event IDs    
Event IDs: 4744, 4745, 4746, 4747, 4748, 4749, 4750, 4751, 
4752, 4753, 4759, 4760, 4761, 4762    
      
Subcategory: Audit Other Account Management Events Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4782, 4793    
      
Subcategory: Audit Security Group Management Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4727, 4728, 4729, 4730, 4731, 4732, 4733, 4734, 
4735, 4737, 4754, 4755, 4756, 4757, 4758, 4764    
      
Subcategory: Audit User Account Management Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4720, 4722, 4723, 4724, 4725, 4726, 4738, 4740, 
4765, 4766, 4767, 4780, 4781, 4794, 5376, 5377    







Audit DPAPI Activity Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4692, 4693, 4694, 4695    
      
Subcategory: Audit Process Creation Success Failure 
Volume: Low to Medium depending on System    
Event IDs: 4688    
      
Subcategory: Audit Process Termination Success Failure 
Volume: Varies    
Event IDs: 4689    
      
Subcategory: Audit RPC Events     
Volume: High on RPC Servers and DCs    
Event IDs: 5712    
      
Subcategory: DS Access     
Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication    
Volume: Very High    
Event IDs: 4928, 4929, 4930, 4931, 4934, 4935, 4936, 4937    
      
Subcategory: Audit Directory Service Access     
Volume: High on Domain Controllers Only    
Event IDs: 4662    
      
Subcategory: Audit Directory Service Changes Success Failure 
Volume: High on Domain Controller Only    
Event IDs: 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141    
      
Subcategory: Audit Directory Service Replication     
Volume: Medium on Domain Controller Only    
Event IDs: 4932, 4933     




Logon and Logoff 
Auditing 
Enabled 
Subcategory: Audit Account Lockout Success   
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4625    
      
Subcategory: Audit IPsec Extended Mode     
Volume: High    
Event IDs: 4978, 4979, 4981, 4982, 4983, 4984    
      
Subcategory: Audit IPsec Main Mode     
Volume: High    
Event IDs: 4646, 4650, 4651, 4652, 4653, 4655, 4976, 5049, 
5453    
      
Subcategory: Audit IPsec Quick Mode     
Volume: High    
Event IDs: 4977, 5451, 5452    
      
Subcategory: Audit Logoff Success   
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4634, 4647    
      
Subcategory: Audit Logon Success Failure 
Volume: Low (medium on Domain Controller)    
Event IDs: 4624, 4625, 4648, 4675    
      
Subcategory: Audit Network Policy Server Success Failure 
Volume: Medium to High    
Event IDs: 6272, 6273, 6274, 6275, 6276, 6277, 6278, 6279, 
6280    
      
Subcategory: Audit Other Logon/Logoff Events Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4649, 4778, 4779, 4800, 4801, 4802, 4803, 5378, 
5632, 5633    
      
Subcategory: Audit Special Logon Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4964     









Subcategory: Audit Application Generated Success Failure 
Volume: Application Specific (Custom)    
Event IDs: 4665, 4666, 4667, 4668    
      
Subcategory: Audit Certification Services Success Failure 
Volume: low to Medium on Certificate Servers    
Event IDs: 4868, 4869, 4870, 4871, 4872, 4873, 4874, 4875, 
4876, 4877, 4878, 4879, 4880, 4881, 4882, 4883, 4884, 4885, 
4886, 4887, 4888, 4889, 4890, 4891, 4892, 4893, 4894, 4895, 
4896, 4897, 4898    
       
Subcategory: Audit Detailed File Share     
Volume: High on DC and File Servers    
Event IDs: 5145    
      
Subcategory: Audit File Share     
Volume: High on DC and File Servers    
Event IDs: 5140, 5142, 5143, 5144, 5168    
      
Subcategory: Audit File System     
Volume: Varies depending on SACLs    
Event IDs: 4664, 4985, 5051    
      
Subcategory: Audit Filtering Platform Connection   Failure 
Volume: High    
Event IDs: 5031, 5140, 5151, 5151, 5154, 5155, 5156, 5157, 
5158, 5159    
      
Subcategory: Audit Filtering Platform Packet Drop     
Volume: High    
Event IDs: 5152, 5153    
      
Subcategory: Audit Handle Manipulation     
Volume: Varied depending on SACLs    
Event IDs: 4656, 4658, 4690    
      
Subcategory: Audit Kernel Object     
Volume: High if Global Object Setting enabled    
Event IDs: 4660, 4661, 4663    
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Subcategory: Audit Other Object Access Events Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4671, 4691, 4698, 4699, 4700, 4701, 4702, 5148, 
5149, 5888, 5889, 5890    
      
Subcategory: Audit Registry Success Failure 
Volume: Low to medium based on SACL    
Event IDs: 4657, 5039    
      
Subcategory: Audit Registry Success Failure 
Volume: High on Domain Controllers    
Event IDs: 4659, 46600, 4661, 4663    
      







Audit Audit Policy Change Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4715, 4719, 4817, 4902, 4904, 4905, 4906, 4907, 
4908, 4912    
      
Subcategory: Audit Authentication Policy Change Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4713, 4716, 1717, 1718, 1739, 4864, 4865, 4866, 
4867    
      
Subcategory: Audit Authorization Policy Change Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4704, 4705, 4706, 4707, 4714    
      
Subcategory: Audit Filtering Platform Policy Change Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4709, 4710, 4711, 4712, 5040, 5041, 5042, 5043, 
5044, 5045, 5046, 5047, 5048, 5440, 5441, 5442, 5443, 5444, 
5446, 5448, 5449, 5450, 5456, 5457, 5458, 5459, 5460, 5461, 
5462, 5463, 5464, 5465, 5466, 5467, 5468, 5471, 5472, 5473, 
5474, 5477    
      
Subcategory: Audit MPSSVC Rule-Level Policy Change Success   
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4944, 4945, 4946, 4947, 4948, 4949, 4950, 4951, 
4952, 4953, 4954, 4956, 4957, 4958    
      
Subcategory: Audit Other Policy Change Events Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4670, 4909, 4910, 5063, 5064, 5065, 5066, 5067, 
5068, 5069, 5070, 5447, 6144, 6145    
      







Subcategory: Audit Non-Sensitive Privilege Use Success Failure 
Volume: VERY HIGH    
Event IDs: 4672, 4673, 4674    
      
Subcategory: Audit Sensititve Privelege Use Success Failure 
Volume: High     
Event IDs: 4672, 4673, 4674     
      





Subcategory: Audit IPsec Driver Success Failure 
Volume: Medium    
Event IDs: 4960, 4961, 4962, 4963, 4965, 5478, 5479, 5480, 
5483, 5484    
                      5485    
      
Subcategory: Audit Other System Events Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 5024, 5025, 5027, 5028, 5029, 5030, 5032, 5034, 
5035, 5037, 5058, 5059, 6400, 6401, 6402, 6403, 6404, 6405, 
6406, 6407, 6408    
      
Subcategory: Audit Security State Change Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4608, 4609, 4616, 4621    
      
Subcategory: Audit Security System Extension Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4610, 4611, 4614, 4622, 4697    
      
Subcategory: Audit System Integrity Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4612, 4615, 4618, 4816, 5038, 5056, 5057, 5060, 
5061, 5062, 6281    
      




Global Object Access Auditing 
Auditing 
Enabled 
Subcategory: Audit IPsec Driver     
Volume: Medium    
Event IDs: 4960, 4961, 4962, 4963, 4965, 5478, 5480, 5483, 
5484, 5485    
      
Subcategory: Audit Other System Events Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 5024, 5025, 5027, 5028, 5029, 5030, 5032, 5033, 
5034, 5035, 5037, 5058, 5059, 6400, 6401, 6402, 6403, 6404, 
6405, 6406, 6407, 6408    
      
Subcategory: Audit Security State Change Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4608, 4609, 4616, 4621    
      
Subcategory: Audit Security System Extension Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4610, 4611, 4614, 4622, 4697    
      
Subcategory: Audit System Integrity Success Failure 
Volume: Low    
Event IDs: 4612     
Table A.9: Windows Auditing: Global Object Access Auditing Subcategories 
 
 
 Windows Internet Information Services 
 
Microsoft Windows Internet Information Services (IIS) must also be configured to log 
events.  This was done via the Internet Information Services (IIS) Manager Administrative 




Figure A.4: Opening the Internet Information Services (IIS) Manager 
Logging for websites hosted on the web server is configured under the IIS > Logging 
section of the Internet Information Services (IIS) Manager, illustrated in figures A.5 and 





Figure A.5: Opening the Logging Window in the Internet Information Services (IIS) 
Manager 
Note that web application logs will be deposited in a different directory than normal 
windows security logs, as illustrated in figure A.6.  This directory is different for each 
website hosted on the server and listed with the “Logging” window.  These logs must be 
harvested via agent software stored locally on the server.  The LogRhythm system 
configuration monitor agent was used to ship these logs to LogRhythm SIEM.   
 
 




 Microsoft Exchange Message Tracking Logs 
 
Microsoft Exchange message tracking logs may be useful for detecting attempts to send 
emails to privileged user accounts, a common phishing tactic.  Message tracking logs are 
enabled by default on Microsoft Exchange 2007 and later, however the logs are not stored 
in the local security logs, but rather in a folder under the path c:\Program 
Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\TransportRoles\Logs\MessageTracking\.  The primary 
data of value from message tracking logs are the: sender, recipient, subject, and time fields 
of the tracking messages.  Figure A.7 depicts the contents on the Microsoft Exchange 
message tracking log folder.   
 
 
Figure A.7: Location of Microsoft Exchange Message Tracking Logs 
 
 Microsoft SharePoint Logging 
 
The Microsoft SharePoint web application must be configured to log user actions within 
the central administration webpage.  The figures A.8 through A.11 depict where to enable 



















Figure A.11: Enabling Auditing Within SharePoint 
 
 Snort Intrusion Detection System 
 
The snort intrusion detection system is a flexible and powerful program for detecting 
network attacks.  However, the interface to configure snort is unintuitive and varies greatly 
between deployments depending on the modules configured.  The pFsense virtual machine 
was leveraged to configure snort via its integrated packaged manager.  Figure A.12 depicts 





Figure A.12: Installing Snort IDS via PfSense Package Manager 
Once installed, the pFsense snort package is easily configured via the services tab.  The 
snort IDS service is applied on a per interface basis.  This service will be assigned to the 
simulated external 172.16.0.0/24 network containing the attacker Kali virtual machine.  




Figure A.13: Configuring the Snort Package Service 
 
The snort service requires multiple pieces of information in order to contextualize alerts 
and apply detection rules.  These options are configured within the edit settings splash page 





Figure A.14: Snort Service Configuration Options 
 
All available rules were enabled under the “rules” tab located on the service configuration 
options screen depicted in figure A.14.  Figure A.15 illustrates many of the available rules 





Figure A.15: Selecting Available Snort Detection Rules 
  

















































Table A.10: Snort Rule Categories Enabled 
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Finally, the snort package was configured to send logs to the LogRhythm SIEM via syslog.  
Note the snort package was configured to send alerts to the pFsense native firewall system 
logs as depicted on the screen capture in figure A.14 under “alert settings.”  The will allow 
the pFsense virtual machine to serve as a syslog relay for both firewall and IDS events.  
PFsense syslog settings are configured under the status > system logs pFsense menu 
depicted in figure  A.16 below. 
 
 
Figure A.16: Configuring pFsense for Syslog Forwarding 
 LogRhythm SIEM Configuration 
 
The LogRhythm SIEM has been configured to reflect network segmentation represented 
by data structures referred to as ‘entities.”  The monitored network has been segregated 
into three entities based on logical network depicted in the laboratory design: the internal, 
external and DMZ local area networks.  Entity data stores subnet, geographic location, host 
IP address, and risk or threat levels associated with networks and hosts.  Risk and threat 
information is used to establish the risk based priority score associated with detected events 
associated with network entities stored in the SIEM database.  This enables suspicion 
escalation based on network traffic origin and destination.  The LogRhythm entity 





Figure A.17: Entity Representation for DMZ Network 
 
A.2.6.1 Baseline SIEM Correlation Rules 
 
128 default correlation rules were configured within the SIEM based on the LogRhythm 
Base Security Analytics and APT Detection packages prior to executing penetration 
testing.  Figure A.18 depicts the “knowledge base manager” interface where vendor SIEM 
rule modules are loaded.  A complete listing of the rules enabled is depicted in table A.11 
below.   
 
 









Account Anomaly: Account Added to Admin Group Enabled Enabled 
Account Anomaly: Multiple Lockouts Enabled Enabled 
Account Anomaly: Users Added to Admin Group Enabled Enabled 
Account Anomaly: Users Removed from Admin Group Enabled Enabled 
Compromise: Config Change After Attack Enabled Enabled 
Compromise: Corroborated Account Anomalies Enabled Enabled 
Compromise: Corroborated Anomalies Enabled Enabled 
Compromise: Corroborated Data Access Anomalies Enabled Enabled 
HIPs Alarm Enabled Enabled 
Host Anomaly: Abnormal Data Transfer Size Enabled Enabled 
Host Anomaly: Repeat Security Events Enabled Enabled 
Malware: Double File Extension Enabled Enabled 
Malware: Malware Event Enabled Enabled 
Malware: Not Cleaned Enabled Enabled 
Malware: RTLO File Name Enabled Enabled 
Malware: ZeroAccess C2 Enabled Enabled 
Misuse: Misuse Event Enabled Enabled 
Network Anomaly: Attack then Inbound Traffic Enabled Enabled 
Network Anomaly: Blocked Inbound Traffic then Allow Enabled Enabled 
Network Anomaly: Blocked Outbound Traffic then Allow Enabled Enabled 
Network Anomaly: Excessive HTTP Errors Enabled Enabled 
SANS: abuse.ch SpyEye IP Enabled Enabled 
SANS: abuse.ch Zeus IP Enabled Enabled 
SANS: Alienvault IP Enabled Enabled 
SANS: SRI Malware Threat Center IP Enabled Enabled 
SANS: Tor Exit Node Enabled Enabled 
SANS: Tor Server Enabled Enabled 
Account Anomaly: Abnormal Amount of Audit Failures Enabled Disabled 
Account Anomaly: Abnormal Auth Behavior Enabled Disabled 
Account Anomaly: Abnormal Email Activity Enabled Disabled 
Account Anomaly: Abnormal Host Enabled Disabled 
Account Anomaly: Abnormal Origin Location Enabled Disabled 
Account Anomaly: Abnormal Process Activity Enabled Disabled 
Account Anomaly: Blacklist Location Auth Enabled Disabled 
Account Anomaly: Concurrent VPN from Multiple Cities Enabled Disabled 
Account Anomaly: Concurrent VPN from Multiple 
Countries Enabled Disabled 
Account Anomaly: Concurrent VPN from Multiple 
Regions Enabled Disabled 
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Account Anomaly: Concurrent VPN from Same User Enabled Disabled 
Account Anomaly: Disabled Account Auth Failures Enabled Disabled 
Account Anomaly: Disabled Account Auth Success Enabled Disabled 
Attack: Brute Force Internal Auth Failure Enabled Disabled 
Attack: Critical Event After Attack Enabled Disabled 
Attack: Failed Account Probe Enabled Disabled 
Attack: Failed Account Probe on Multiple Hosts Enabled Disabled 
Attack: Failed Brute Force Auth Enabled Disabled 
Attack: Failed Distributed Brute Force Auth Enabled Disabled 
Attack: Internal Recon then Attack Enabled Disabled 
Attack: Multiple Unique Internal Attack Events Enabled Disabled 
Attack: Numerous and Dispersed Internal Failed Auths Enabled Disabled 
Attack: Numerous Internal Failed Auths Enabled Disabled 
Attack: Recon Followed by Attack Enabled Disabled 
Attack: Vuln Exploited Externally Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Account Creation Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: After Numerous and Dispersed Failed 
Auths Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Attack then New Process Starting Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Auth After Numerous Failed Auths Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Auth After Security Event Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Brute Force Auth Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Cross-site Scripting Victim (XSS) Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Data Destruction Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Distributed Brute Force Auth Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Early Attack Cycle Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Failed Auths then Success Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Internal Brute Force Auth Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Internal Brute Force then Exfil Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Internal Distributed Auth Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Internal Distributed Auth Failure Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Internal Port Scan then Attack Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Internal Recon then Account Creation Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Internal Recon then Process Starting Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Lateral Movement Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Lateral Movement then Account Creation Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Lateral Movement then Critical Event Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Lateral Movement then Data Destruction Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Lateral Movement then Exfil Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Lateral Movement then External 
Connection Enabled Disabled 
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Compromise: Lateral Movement then Log Cleared Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Lateral Movement then Privilege 
Escalation Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Lateral Movement then Process Starting Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Lateral Movement with Account Sweep Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Log Cleared Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Malicious Payload Drop Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Privilege Escalation After Attack Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Recon then Account Creation Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Recon then Process Starting Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: System Time Change Enabled Disabled 
Compromise: Vuln Exploited Internally Enabled Disabled 
DoS: Internal DoS Enabled Disabled 
Host Anomaly: Abnormal Internal Connections Enabled Disabled 
Host Anomaly: Abnormal Malicious Classification Enabled Disabled 
Host Anomaly: Abnormal Outbound Connections Enabled Disabled 
Host Anomaly: Communication with Low Rep Address Enabled Disabled 
Host Anomaly: New Process Activity Enabled Disabled 
Host Anomaly: Outbound Connections Increase Enabled Disabled 
Host Anomaly: Outbound Traffic Rate Increase Enabled Disabled 
Host Anomaly: Significant Outbound Traffic Increase Enabled Disabled 
Malware: IRC Botnet Outbreak Enabled Disabled 
Malware: Outbound IRC Enabled Disabled 
Malware: Outbreak Enabled Disabled 
Malware: Spamming Bot Enabled Disabled 
Network Anomaly: Internal URL Directory Traversal Enabled Disabled 
Network Anomaly: Metasploit Port External Enabled Disabled 
Network Anomaly: Metasploit Port Internal Enabled Disabled 
Network Anomaly: SQL Injection Outbound Enabled Disabled 
Ops Critical: Config Change then Critical Error Enabled Disabled 
Recon: Internal Ping Sweep Enabled Disabled 
Recon: Internal Port Scan Enabled Disabled 
Recon: Internal Port Scan: Slow Enabled Disabled 
Recon: Internal Port Sweep Enabled Disabled 
Recon: Internal Port Sweep: Common Port Enabled Disabled 
Recon: Ping Sweep Enabled Disabled 
Recon: Port Scan Enabled Disabled 
Recon: Port Scan: Slow Enabled Disabled 
Recon: Port Sweep Enabled Disabled 
Recon: Port Sweep: Common Port Enabled Disabled 
SANS: Abnormal File Access Enabled Disabled 
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SANS: Abnormal FIM Activity Enabled Disabled 
SANS: Attack then External Connection Enabled Disabled 
SANS: Cross-site Scripting (XSS) Attack Enabled Disabled 
SANS: Data Exfiltration Enabled Disabled 
SANS: DDoS Enabled Disabled 
SANS: General DoS Enabled Disabled 
SANS: Lateral Movement then Exfil Enabled Disabled 
SANS: Multiple Unique Attacks Enabled Disabled 
SANS: Port Scan then Attack Enabled Disabled 
SANS: Recon After Attack Enabled Disabled 
SANS: SQL Injection Attack Enabled Disabled 
SANS: URL Directory Traversal Enabled Disabled 
Table A.11: Default LogRhythm Rule Set 
 
A.2.6.2 Modified SIEM Correlation Rules 
 
39 correlation rules were created to generate events and alarms leveraging the modified 
SIEM ontology.  These rules were constructed to detect the indicators observed within each 
kill-chain phase and tabulated in the “investigation framework” sectionin chapter 6 of this 
thesis.   32 rules were designed to create events, but not generate alarms in isolation, while 
7 rules were designed to aggregate events with common classification labels and common 
metadata values in classification specific identified fields.  Table A.12 below depicts the 
non-alarming and alarming rules used during the evaluation.   
 



































Aggregate Alarm Rules 
Multiple Actions on Events by Computer Name 
Multiple Installation Events by Computer Name 
Multiple Delivery Events by Impacted Host 
Multiple Reconnaissance Events by Origin Host 
Multiple Exfiltration Events by Impacted Host 
Multiple Privilege Escalation Alarms by Account 
Multiple Lateral Movement Alarms by Account 
Table A.12: Modified LogRhythm Rule Set 
 
A.3 Weaponization 
Some custom applications were required to simulate attacks during the initial phases of the 
test scenario.  The following sections describe the code developed and their intended 
purpose during the scenario. 
 User to Admin Executable 
The following program will create a user account, promote the account to the local 
administrators group and enable remote interactive logons to the compromised machine 
with the account.  This code was developed on the attacker’s Kali virtual machine and 
compiled into a Microsoft Windows Native executable. 
 




Figure A.19: Source Code for User to Admin Executable in C 
The source code depicted in figure A.19 was compiled on the Kali Linux virtual machine 
with the i586-mingw32msvc-gcc tool as depicted in figure A.20 below.   
 
 
Figure A.20: Compiling User to Admin Source Code into Windows Executable 
 Weak Reverse Shell (fake patch) 
A reverse shell program was created to provide remote access to a compromised 
workstation from the attacker’s machine.  The figure A.21 depicts  python code written to 
accept and execute shell commands on a compromised host and forward output from 
commands to an attacker listening machine on port 4444.  This requires a remote server to 
be accepting commands on this port or the program will exit. 
 
 
Figure A.21: Reverse Shell Written in Python 
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The python utility “pyinstaller-2.1” was used to compile the code depicted in figure A.22 
into a native windows executable. 
 
 
Figure A.22: Compiling Python Reverse Shell with Pyinstaller-2.1 
The executable was later renamed and sent via a phishing email with a legitimate program 
and disguised as a patch for the accompanying software.  Figure A.23 depicts a screen 
capture of the renamed executable.   
 
 
Figure A.23: Screen Capture Renamed Reverse Shell Executable 
 
 




A legitimate program known to host a service with a globally writeable executable file was 
packaged with a weak reverse shell created in section A.3.2 above.  This enabled an 
attacker to connect to the compromised machine and inject exploit code in place of the 
weak executable that would be launched with system privileges upon the next system boot.  
Figure A.24 below depicts the contents of the .zip archive sent within a phishing email. 
 
 
Figure A.24: Screen Capture Compressed Archive Containing Phishing Payload 
 
The compressed file depicted in figure A.24 was hosted on the attacker machine for the 
user to download through a phishing link.  Figure A.25 below depicts a screen capture of 
the tools hosted in the attacker’s apache root folder located at /var/www. 
 
 
Figure A.25: Apache Root Directory on Attacker's Kali Linux Machine 
 
A phishing message was constructed and sent to the primary victim in the attack scenario 
via the command depicted in figure A.26 below.  This email provides instructions for the 
victim to access the compressed file hosted on the attacker machine through a hyperlink 





Figure A.26: Sending a Phishing Email via SendEmail Command 
 
 Meterpreter Reverse TCP Shell 
 
A reverse Meterpreter reverse shell payload was constructed to establish a strong shell on 
the compromised host.  This shell enabled privilege escalation to system level privileges, 
rather than administrative privileges, as well as access to multiple advanced hacking scripts 
and tools.  The “msfvenom” command was used to construct this payload.  Figure A.27 
depicts the command execution below. 
  
 
Figure A.27: Creating Meterpreter Reverse Shell Payload with Msfvenom 
 
A.4 Attacker Services 
 
The following services were installed on the Kali Linux machine performing attacker 




The Apache2  service was used to host files accessed through http:// urls. 
 









Figure A.29: Starting the Samba Service 
 Postgresql 
 
The postgresql service was used to store Metasploit data. 
 
 
Figure A.30: Starting the Postgresql Service 
 Metasploit Framework 
 
The metasploit framework was used to generate and execute exploits. 
 
 
Figure A.31: Starting the Metasploit Framework Service 
 OpenVAS 
 





Figure A.32: Starting the OpenVas Vulnerability Scanner Service 
 
 
A.5 Attack Replication 
 
A scenario was constructed to simulate an external attacker gaining privileged access to an 
enterprise data network with the intent to conduct data theft.  This scenario was comprised 
of a series of actions aligned with the threat objectives defined in section 6.2 in chapter 6 
of this thesis.  The following subsections provide detail for the actions performed during 
this evaluation. 
 
 Reconnaissance: Port Scanning 
 
Network reconnaissance was stimulated via the Metasploit framework packaged with the 
default installation of Kali Linux.  The command nmap –v –sV 10.13.201.0/24 –oA 
network_1 was executed to scan the entire lab network range 10.13.201.0/24.  The entire 
class C network was selected as it is unlikely an attacker would know the discrete subnets 




Figure A.33: Network Reconnaissance via Nmap Port Scan 
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 Reconnaissance: Host Enumeration 
 
The Metasploit framework SMB scanner tool packaged with Kali Linux was used to 
replicate operating system fingerprinting typical of an attacker attempting to identify the 
version of Windows operating systems identified in the previous scan.  Hosts with the 
following IP addresses were identified as running Microsoft services and will be the sole 
members of the following scans: 10.13.201.60, 10.13.201.61, 10.13.201.67, 10.13.201.68, 
10.13.201.93, and 10.13.201.94.  Figure A.34 depicts the SMB scan command and scan 
results.   
 
 




 Reconnaissance: Enumeration-Vulnerability Analysis With OpenVas 
 
The OpenVas vulnerability scanner was used to scan the hosts identified in the previous 
phases for additional vulnerabilities.  This will generate a large number of events on the 
snort network intrusion detection system and the windows security logs on the Microsoft 





A.35: OpenVas Scanner Configuration 
 
 Delivery – Network Delivery 
 
The following command was used to send a phishing email to the target containing 
legitimate software and a python reverse shell.  Figure A.36 depicts the commands used to 
send the phishing email via sendEmail command.  Figure A.37 depicts the output resulting 






Figure A.36: Phishing Email Commands 
 
Figure A.37: Output Following SendEmail Command 
 
 Installation- Host Delivery 
 
The non-privileged user targeted in the phishing email received and opened the message.  
An example of the message is shown in figure A.38 below.  The user ignored the phishing 
warning message and decided to download the program stored on the attacker’s machine.  
A screen capture of the download process is shown in figure A.39 below.      
 
 





Figure A.39: User Downloads Phishing Attachments 
 
After downloading the attachments, the user moved the attachments from their 
“downloads” folder to their desktop and examined the contents of the .zip file that was 
transferred as depicted in figure A.40 below. 
 
 




 Installation – Software Modification 
 
The user heeded the instructions contained within the phishing message and launched the 
“pspro_50_3310.exe” executable depicted in figure A.40 to initiate the ProShow Producer 
installation.  The user did not execute the fake patch executable “fake-fix.exe” until the 






Figure A.41: Screen Capture of ProShow Producer Installation Splash Screen 
 Installation: Command and control 
 
Upon completing the ProShow producer installation, the user executed the fake patch, 
initiating the reverse shell connection to the attacker machine.  The program launched a 
command prompt but did not display the commands executed by the attacker, as depicted 





Figure A.42: Screen Capture Victim's Perspective of Reverse Shell 
 
The attacker’s machine accepted the connection and the attacker executed a quick “dir” 
command to verify the shell was functioning properly.   
 
 
Figure A.43: Reverse Shell Connection Established 
After verifying connectivity via the reverse shell, the attacker began the process of 
uploading the user to admin exploit developed previously by replacing the vulnerable 
ProShow Producer service with exploit code.  The attacker mounted a local drive to the 
Kali Linux samba share for file uploads via the following command: 
net use h: \\172.16.0.3\haxor.   
The attacker then renamed the target weak service identified to be replaced by the exploit 
code with the following command: 
ren “C:\Program Files (x86)\Photodex\ProShow Producer\scsiaccess.exe” 
scsiaccess_2.exe” 
The attacker copied the user2admin.exe exploit into the ProShow Producer folder on the 
victim machine with the following command: 




Finally the attacker removed evidence of the network share and rebooted the machine with 
the following commands: 
net use h: /delete 
shutdown  /r 
A script containing these commands is depicted in figure A.44 below.   
 
 
Figure A.44: Weak Reverse Shell Commands 
 Privilege Escalation – Local User to Root 
 
The user2admin.exe exploit executed on the victim machine with system level privileges 
upon system startup, creating a new user and granting them remote administrative rights to 
the machine.  Figure 9.19 in the “weaponization” section of this thesis depicts the exploit 
source code and commands executed. 
 Delivery – Host Access 
 
The attacker accessed the victim machine using the remote desktop protocol with the newly 
created account by launching the following command: 
rdesktop 10.13.201.94 –u haxor –p password1 




Figure A.45: Attacker Launches Remote Desktop Session on Victim Workstation 
 
 Installation – Host Delivery – Staging Hacking Tools 
 
The attacker began the process of transferring additional hacking tools to the victim 
machine by mounting the samba share located on the attacker machine.  This action is 




Figure A.46: Mounting Attacker's Samba Share to Stage Hacking Tools 
 
The attacker disabled the anti-virus software installed on the victim machine prior to 
transferring hacking tools in an attempt to evade detection.  Figure A.47 illustrates the 
process of disabling the McAfee anti-virus software.  Figure A.48 depicts the process of 









Figure A.48: Disabling Microsoft Security Essentials 
The attacker launched the listener process for accepting meterpreter reverse shell 
commands on their Kali Linux machine prior to launching the meterpreter executable on 





Figure A.49: Starting Meterpreter Reverse Shell Handler 
The attacker then transferred the “reverse_met_tcp.exe” and “wce64.exe” to the attacker’s 
desktop on the victim machine for use in the next evaluation phase.  Figure A.50 depicts 
the process of transferring these files from the attacker’s samba share to the victim 
machine.   
 





 Installation – Software Modification – Launching Meterpreter 
 
After circumventing anti-virus protection mechanisms and uploading hacking tools, the 
attacker launched the “reverse_met_tcp.exe” payload, depicted in figure A.51, on the 
victim machine to establish a meterpreter reverse shell to their Kali Linux machine. 
 
 
Figure A.51: Reverse Meterpreter Shell Process on Victim Desktop 
Figure A.52 below depicts the resultant connection established on the attacker’s machine, 




Figure A.52: Meterpreter Shell on Kali Machine 
 Privilege Escalation- Privilege use: pass the hash 
 
After the attacker attained access to the victim machine via a meterpreter shell they began 
the process of extracting account credentials stored as account name and password hash 
pairs.  The attacker began this process by executing the “shell” command on the 
compromised host depicted in figure A.53 below.   
 
 
Figure A.53: Accessing the Shell through Meterpreter 
The attacker then executed the “wce64.exe” process stored on the victim machine to extract 






Figure A.54: Extracting Hashes with Wce64.exe 
 
The attacker then used the “pth-winexe” command to authenticate to the victim machine 
as the domain administrator “labadmin” who’s credentials were extracted via the 
“wce64.exe” command.  This action is depicted in figure A.55 below. 
 
 
Figure A.55: Accessing the Compromised Workstation with Pass the Hash 
 Actions on the Objective – Data Manipulation - Create local share to 
stage files 
 
The attacker successfully compromised the domain administrator credentials and assumed 
the administrator’s identity on the compromised workstation.  The attacker decided to 
create a network share on the compromised workstation to enable internal data transfer and 
consolidation prior to transferring data to the attacker machine.  Figure A.56 illustrates the 








Figure A.56: Creating a Network Share on Victim Machine for Staging Data 
 Lateral Movement – Internal Reconnaissance – Locate Critical Servers 
 
The attacker leveraged the domain administrator’s credentials to execute a series of 
reconnaissance tools in order to identify potential targets to exploit.  The attacker chose the 
“nslookup.exe” command to issue DNS queries for internal domain services.  The 
“nslookup” command returned the IP addresses for the webserver at IP address 
10.13.201.61 in figure A.57 and the email server at IP address 10.13.201.60 in figure A.58 
below.   
 
 









  Lateral Movement – Lateral Movement- Migrate to Web Server 
 
The attacker leveraged the “pth-winexe” command to access the webserver using the 
domain administrator’s stolen credentials.  Figure A.59 depicts the pass the hash technique 
used.   
 
 
Figure A.59: Passing the Hash to the Webserver 
 Actions on the objective: Data Modification : Stage Webserver Database 
 
Once authenticated to the webserver, the attacker began searching for critical processes on 
the web server.  This was accomplished via the “net start” command depicted in figure 






Figure A.60: Identifying Services with Net Command 
The attacker identified the SQL service on the web server and decided to conduct additional 
reconnaissance of the SQL service via the SQL command parser sqlcmd.exe.  The 
following command was used to return a list of local data bases on the server command: 
sqlcmd –s localhost –q “exec sp_databases” 
 






Figure A.61: Listing Local SQL Databases 
 
The attacker decided to copy the database named “WSS_Content” as this was identified as 
a common name used to store Microsoft SharePoint server content.  The sqlcmd.exe 
command parser was leveraged a second time to conduct the database backup.  The 
following command copied the database to the systems local root drive: 
sqlcmd –e –s localhost –q “backup database wss_content to 
disk=’c:\sharepoint.bak’” 
quit 
Figure A.62 illustrates the sqlcmd.exe command used to conduct the database backup.   
 
 




 Actions on Objective – Data Manipulation- Establish persistence 
 
The attacker was unable to access the share drive created on the initially compromised 
workstation with the domain administrator’s hash credentials.  The attacker decided to 
create new remote user haxor with admin credentials on the web server.  The attacker used 
the net.exe process and commands depicted in the user2admin.exe exploit leveraged earlier 
to perform privilege escalation on the workstation.  The attacker began the process by 
creating a new user named “haxor” with the password “password1” with the following 
command: 
net user haxor password1 /add 
 This command is illustrated in figure A.63 below. 
 
 
Figure A.63: Creating a New User 
The attacker then added the newly created “haxor” account to the local “administrators” 
group with the following command: 
net localgroup administrators haxor /add 
This command is illustrated in figure A.64 below. 
 
 
Figure A.64: Adding New User to Local Administrators Group 
The attacker then added the newly created “haxor” account to the “remote desktop users” 
group with the following command: 
net localgroup “Remote Desktop Users” haxor /add 





Figure A.65: Adding New User to Remote Desktop Users Group 
 Lateral Movement- Initial Foothold to Web Server 
 
The attacker used the newly created “haxor” account to return to the webserver via a remote 
desktop session launched from the workstation initially compromised by the attacker.  
Figure A.66 illustrates the chain of connections from the Kali Linux machine to the 
Windows 7 workstation to the webserver via remote desktop sessions. 
 
 
Figure A.66: Remote Desktop Session from Kali Linux to Workstation and Workstation 
to Webserver 
 Actions on Objective – Data Manipulation: Transfer Data Internally 
 
The attacker used the local administrator account “haxor” to mount the network share 
created on the Windows 7 workstation in order to transfer the copied database files to an 
internal host.  The following command was used to mount the share drive: 
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 net use h: \\10.13.201.94\share 
Figure A.67 depicts the results of the net.exe command. 
 
Figure A.67: Mounting the Network Share on the Windows 7 Workstation from the 
Webserver 
The attacker copied the database backup file to the network share on the Windows 7 host 




Figure A.68: Copying the Database Backup File to the Windows 7 Workstation 
 Lateral Movement- Lateral Movement: Foothold to Mail Server 
 
The attacker repeated the process of moving laterally between critical servers with the 
domain administrator’s credentials and logged into the organization’s email server.  Figure 




Figure A.69: Pass the Hash to the Email Server 
 
 Actions on Objective – Data Manipulation: Establish Local Persistence 
 
The attacker repeated the process of creating a local administrator account named “haxor” 
in the same manner conducted on the webserver.  Figure A.70 illustrates the commands 




Figure A.70: Creation of Local Administrator on Email Server 
 
 Actions on Objective – Data Manipulation: Stage Email Database 
 
The attacker traversed the local file system on the email server in order to locate the 
database containing the organization’s email messages.  Figure A.71 illustrates the series 











Figure A.71: Locating the Email Database on the Email Server 
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After locating the Microsoft Exchange mailbox database, the attacker had to temporarily 
disable the “Microsoft Exchange Information Store” process in order to copy the database 
file.  The attacker accomplished this task by executing the following command: 
 net stop “Microsoft Exchange Information Store” 
This command is depicted in figure A.72 below. 
 
 
Figure A.72: Disabling the Microsoft Exchange Information Store Service 
The attacker then copied the exchange database .edb file to the local root drive with the 
following command: 
Copy “C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\v14\Mailbox\Mailbox 
Database 1482797590\Mailbox Database 1482797590.edb” c:\ 
This command is depicted in figure A.73 below. 
 
 
Figure A.73: Copying the Exchange .edb File 
The attacker restarted the “Microsoft Exchange Information Store” service after the file 
was successfully copied.  The command used to restart this service was: 
 net start “Microsoft Exchange Information Store” 
This command is depicted in figure A.74 below. 
 
 
Figure A.74: Restarting the Microsoft Exchange Information Store Service 
 
 Lateral Movement- Lateral Movement: Initial Foothold to Mail Server 
 
The attacker connected to the email server using the newly created “haxor” account through 
a remote desktop session in order to mount the network share hosted on Windows 7 





Figure A.75: Remote Desktop Connection from Windows 7 Workstation to Email Server 
 
 Actions on Objective – Data Manipulation: Transfer Data Internally 
 
The attacker repeated the process of mounting the network share and transferring backup 
files to the Windows 7 Workstation.  Figure A.76 illustrates the commands executed to 






Figure A.76: Mounting Network Share and Transferring Files to Windows 7 Host 
 Exfiltration – External Data Transfer 
 
The attacker initiated the final data transfer from the Windows 7 workstation to the 
attacker’s Kali Linux machine located on an external network.  This data transfer was 
accomplished by merely copying files from the shared folder on the workstation to the local 
drive mounted to the attacker’s samba share.  Figure A.77 below illustrates this process. 
 
  
Figure A.77: Data Transfer from Windows 7 Workstation to Attacker Machine 
 
 Actions on the Objective- Obfuscation 
The attacker completed the scenario by logging into all of the machines the attacker 
accessed and clearing the local operating system audit logs that recorded all of their actions.  
This is accomplished via leveraging the stolen administrator credentials through the pass-
the-hash technique and the “wevtutil.exe” command to clear the event logs.  The wevtutil 
command utilized follows: 
 wevtutil cl application && wevtutil cl security && wevtutil cl system 
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Figure A.78 illustrates the process of accessing the email server and purging the security 
logs.  This process was repeated for the webserver at IP address 10.13.201.61 and the 
Windows 7 Workstation at IP address 10.13.201.94. 
 
 
Figure A.78: Wevtutil.exe Command Used to Delete Windows Audit Logs 
B-1 
 
Appendix B   
Test Case Results 
 
Data was collected at discrete breakpoints following each of the 26 test cases depicted in 
appendix A.  The testing process entailed two separate yet identical test network 
environments, one leveraging the original SIEM log ontology with the other leveraging the 
new SIEM log ontology.  Alarm results were combined from each of these tests within 
each test case section to present a juxtaposition of alarm efficiency between the original 
SIEM ontology and the newly modified ontology and alarm hierarchy.  The subsection 
numbers below correspond with the test case actions depicted in similar subsection 
numbers in chapter A.5.x, i.e. the results depicted in section B.1 map to the actions 
performed in section A.5.1.   
 
Each test case is expanded into three sections.  The first section provides a brief description 
of the attack scenario and presents a diagram indicating the data flow of actions performed 
by the attacker which may assist in rapidly identifying likely sensors detecting the attacker 
actions.  The second section presents the alarms generated by both of the test SIEMs.  The 
final section presents analysis of log data harvested during the test case phase.  This data 
may be used to identify alarm efficiency or potential logs useful for generating SIEM 
correlation rules if no alarm was generated during the test. 
 
B.1 Reconnaissance: Port Scanning 
 Test Case Description 
 
The simulated attacker machine attempted to identify potential vulnerable hosts on the test 
network by transmitting a series of crafted packets to all possible IP addresses within the 
10.13.201.0/24 network.  These transmissions provide the attacker with information 
pertaining to common network services that may be exploited to gain access to the test 
machines located inside the protected test network.  Figure B.1 illustrates the location of 
the attacker machine in a simulated external network with IP address 172.16.0.3 and the 





Figure B.1: Port Scan Test Case Data Flow 
 SIEM Alarms Generated 
B.1.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
No alarms were generated by the baseline SIEM configuration. 
B.1.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 





Figure B.2: Modified SIEM Alarm for Port Scan Activity 
 
 Log Data Generated 
 
87 logs were collected during the test case.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base 
ontology classification fields, vendor specific event ID codes, and specific parsing rules 




Access Failure 4 
Access Success 18 
Activity 2 
Authentication Success 49 
Startup and Shutdown 14 
  











MPE Rule  
BEID 2001581 - Unusual Port 135 
traffic 2 
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 24 
C EVID 4673 : Fail Priv Svc Call 1 
C EVID 4673 : Priv Svc Call 1 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 7 
EVID 4634 : Anonymous Logoff Type 3 2 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 18 
EVID 4634 : User Logoff Type 3 2 
EVID 4648 : Explicit Logon 1 
EVID 4674 : Fail Priv Object Operation 3 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 7 
EVID 4769 : Svc Ticket Granted, Usr 
Acct 2 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was 
Accessed 7 
EVID 5145 : Network Share Object 
Checked 10 
Table B.1: Port Scan Log Statistics 
 
B.2 Reconnaissance: Host Enumeration 
 Test Case Description 
 
The simulated attacker machine attempted to perform operating system fingerprinting via 
the server message block (SMB) protocol.  The activity provides information that may be 
useful in identifying potential exploits to leverage against systems running vulnerable 






Figure B.3: SMB Scan Test Case Data Flow Diagram 
 
 SIEM Alarms Generated 
B.2.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated by the baseline SIEM configuration. 
B.2.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated by the modified SIEM configuration. 
 Log Data Generated 
 
76 logs were generated during the test case.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base 
ontology classification fields, vendor specific event ID codes, and specific parsing rules 








Authentication Failure 10 
Access Success 12 
Authentication Success 18 
Startup and Shutdown 22 
Host Access 5 
Other Audit 5 
  












MPE Rule  
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 5 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 10 
CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware 
Application 6 
EVID 4625 : User Logon Type 3: No Such 
Username 12 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 10 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 5 
EVID 4776 : Failed Rem Logon : User Does 
Not Exist 8 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was Accessed 5 
McAfee HIPs event Header 5 





B.3 Reconnaissance: Enumeration-Vulnerability Analysis with OpenVas 
 
 Test Case Description 
 
The simulated attacker machine leveraged a comprehensive vulnerability assessment tool 
to identify additional vulnerabilities on information systems within the test network.  This 
tool attempted to exploit insecure accounts configured with default credentials, or exploit 
common services such as those residing on webservers.  This was expected to be the most 
obvious reconnaissance activity performed by the attacker machine generating the largest 




Figure B.4: OpenVas Vulnerability Scanner Test Case Data Flow Diagram 
 
 Alarms Generated 
B.3.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
41 alarms were generated by the baseline SIEM configuration.  Alarms were generated 




Figure B.5: Baseline SIEM Alarms for Vulnerability Scan 
 
B.3.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
5 alarms were generated within the SIEM console using the modified ontology.  These 
alarms represented 401 events observed by the SIEM as containing relevant security data 
associated with a suspicious origin IP address.  Aggregation limits were capped at 100 
events, resulting in 5 alarms for 401 events.  This threshold may be modified to reduce the 
alarm volume further.  Additionally, unique values observed for all metadata fields were 
returned within the “alarm properties” pane drastically reducing security analyst effort to 





B.6: Modified SIEM Alarms for Vulnerability Scan 
 Log Data Generated 
 
4,158 logs generated during the test case.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base 
ontology classification fields, vendor specific event ID codes, and specific parsing rules 
are presented in the following table. 
 
Classifications  
Access Success 469 
Authentication Success 790 
Startup and Shutdown 377 
Access Failure 72 
Host Access 5 
Other Audit 5 
Reconnaissance 118 
Attack 84 
Other Security 628 
Suspicious 64 
Activity 20 
Authentication Failure 363 
Error 1156 
Policy 6 
Access Revoked 1 
  






















































MPE Rule  
BEID 2001569 - Unusual Port 445 traffic 2 
BEID 2001579 - Unusual Port 139 traffic 64 
BEID 2001581 - Unusual Port 135 traffic 2 
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 4 
C EVID 4624 : User Logon Type 5 7 
C EVID 4673 : Priv Svc Call 72 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 189 
Catch All : Level 4 : Signature Detection 1 
CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware 
Application 628 
EVID 4625 : Failed Authentication 1156 
EVID 4625 : User Logon Type 3: Account 
Disabled 17 
EVID 4625 : User Logon Type 3: No Such 
Username 5 
EVID 4625 : User Logon Type 3: Wrong 
Password 5 
EVID 4634 : Anonymous Logoff Type 3 6 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 387 
EVID 4634 : User Logoff Type 3 11 
EVID 4662 : Operation Performed On Object 10 
EVID 4674 : Fail Priv Object Operation 4 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 2 
EVID 4740 : Admin Account Locked Out 2 
EVID 4768 : Auth Ticket Granted, Sys Acct 14 
EVID 4769 : Svc Ticket Granted, Sys Acct 20 
EVID 4770 : Ticket Renewed, System Acct 149 
EVID 4776 : Failed Rem Logon : Account 
Disabled 6 
EVID 4776 : Failed Rem Logon : Bad Password 14 
EVID 4776 : Failed Rem Logon : User Does Not 
Exist 149 
EVID 4776 : Failed Remote Logon - Admin 170 
EVID 4793 : Password Policy Checker API Called 16 
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EVID 5140 : Network Share Was Accessed 14 
EVID 5145 : Network Share Object Checked 2 
General Error 4 
McAfee HIPs event Header 5 
PreProc: 119:18 WEBROOT DIRECTORY 
TRAVERSAL 1 
PreProc: 119:2 DOUBLE DECODING ATTACK 375 
PreProc: 122:1 TCP Portscan 1 
PreProc: 122:23 UDP Filtered Portsweep 294 
PreProc: 122:25 ICMP Sweep 68 
PreProc: 122:3 TCP Portsweep 8 
PreProc: 122:5 TCP Filtered Portscan 188 
PreProc: 122:7 TCP Filtered Portsweep 11 
PreProc: 125:2 Invalid FTP command 74 
SID 32 : HTTP Inspection Simple Request 1 




B.4 Delivery – Network Delivery: Phishing Email Sent to User 
 Test Case Description 
 
The previous reconnaissance activity indicated that all test machines were deployed with 
the most current security patches.  The attacker decided to send a crafted phishing email to 
users in an attempt to introduce vulnerable software onto an endpoint that may be exploited 
for privileged access.  The phishing email contained a copy of legitimate software that 
would not trigger alarms in anti-malware software yet contained vulnerabilities in services 
that could be exploited by the attacker.  A fake patch was also supplied within the phishing 
email masqueraded as a program intended to mitigate the vulnerabilities in the supplied 
software.  However, the patch program was actually designed to establish a reverse shell 
to the attacker machine so the vulnerable software provided may be exploited for privileged 
access.   
 
 
Figure B.7: Phishing Email Test Case Data Flow Diagram 
 
 Alarms Generated 




1 new alarm was generated.  This alarm may be associated with the previous 
reconnaissance activity.  Unfortunately, the alarm is ambiguous and only indicates a new 
process was created following the previously observed vulnerability scan.  No identifying 
characteristics for the attacker machine are provided in the alarm metadata.  
 
 
Figure B.8: Baseline SIEM Alarm for Phishing Email Test Case 
 
B.4.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
1 new alarm was generated by the modified SIEM.  However, the alarm is specific to the 
attack method employed.  The attacker machine is identified as the originating host, the 
attacker method is identified as a phishing attempt, the email address used is provided, the 
affected recipient is identified, and the program used to send the message is identified as 
the send mail program on Kali Linux.  This additional data drastically decreases the amount 
of effort required by a security analyst to describe the actions performed by the attacker. 
 
 





 Log Data Generated 
 
92 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 




Access Failure 3 
Access Success 12 
Access Success 12 
Authentication Success 39 
Information 4 
Startup and Shutdown 22 
  












MPE Rule  
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 20 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 11 
EVID : SMTP:RECEIVE Email Message Received 2 
EVID : STOREDRIVER:DELIVER Msg Dlvrd To 
Mailbox 2 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 18 
EVID 4674 : Fail Priv Object Operation 3 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 11 
EVID 4769 : Svc Ticket Granted, Sys Acct 1 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was Accessed 5 
EVID 5145 : Network Share Object Checked 7 
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Table B.4: Phishing Email Test Case Log Statistics 
B.5 Delivery- Downloading Suspicious Files 
 Test Case Description 
 
The phishing email sent by the attacker merely contained a link to download suspicious 
files.  This test case represents detection of the download activity after the user has accessed 
the hyperlink provided by the attacker.   
 
 
Figure B.10: Unauthorized Software Download Test Case Data Flow Diagram 
 
 Alarms Generated 
B.5.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated. 
B.5.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
1 alarm was generated.  However, the alarm generated was attributed to observing the 
process “ie4uinit.exe” which had not been baselined as an authorized process.  This process 
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indicates download activity via the Microsoft Internet Explorer program, but does not 
necessarily indicate a suspicious file.  This is deemed a false positive. 
 
Figure B.11: Modified SIEM Alarm for Suspicious Download 
 Log Data Generated 
 
25 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 




Startup and Shutdown 25 
  




MPE Rule  
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 12 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 13 










B.6 Installation – Software Modification 
 Test Case Description 
 
This test case represents the installation of unauthorized software by the user that opened 
the attacker’s phishing email.  These files do not match anti-malware signatures as they are 
either legitimate software or custom code that has not been analyzed by malware 
researchers.  Anti-Malware device logs were not expected to generate logs during this 
activity.   
 
 
Figure B.12: Installation of Unauthorized Software Test Case Data Flow Diagram 
 
 Alarms Generated 
B.6.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated. 




Two alarms were generated.  The host intrusion prevention system identified multiple 
registry key modifications and process monitoring identified multiple unauthorized 
processes starting on the workstation.  These alarms were attributed to both the delivery 
and installation phases.  Additionally, the metadata details provided within the alarm 
properties pane clearly indicate the modifications performed by the software, greatly 
reducing the research effort required by security analysts to investigate these events.   
 
 












 Log Data Generated 
 
105 were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification fields, 




Access Success 19 
Authentication Success 8 
Configuration 1 
Host Access 3 
Other Audit 23 
Other Security 2 
Startup and Shutdown 29 
Suspicious 20 
  












No vendor ID 23 
  
MPE Rule  
A Service Was Installed In The System 1 
C EVID 4624 : User Logon Type 11 2 
C EVID 4624 : User Logon Type 5 1 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 15 
Catch All : Level 4 : Signature Detection 2 
CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware 
Application 3 
EVID 4611 : Trusted Logon Process Registered 3 
EVID 4634 : User Logoff Type 11 1 
EVID 4648 : Explicit Logon 1 
EVID 4663 : Attempt Made To Access Object 19 
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EVID 4689 : Process Exited 14 
McAfee HIPs event Header 23 
Uninstall Registry Key Modification 20 




B.7 Delivery: Host Access -Command and control 
 Test Case Description 
 
One of the programs executed by the user in the previous test case established a persistent 
TCP connection to the attacker machine that accepts windows shell commands and 
redirects input to the compromised machine and output to the attacker machine.  This 
provided the attacker with limited access to the user’s workstation with the user’s current 
set of limited privileges.  However, these privileges were sufficient for the attacker to 
exploit the vulnerability in the photo editing software the user installed along with the 
reverse shell.  The attacker capitalized on the opportunity to upload additional files through 
the reverse shell and replace a vulnerable service executable installed by the photo editing 
software with custom exploit code.  This new code would be run with system level 
privileges following the next machine reboot.  The attacker concluded the exploit by 








 Alarms Generated 
B.7.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated. 
B.7.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
Two alarms were generated with the modified SIEM ontology.  The first alarm identified 
the use of the net.exe command to mount a network share to the attacker machine.  The 
second alarm identified warning message issued by the reboot command initiated by the 
attacker post exploit upload.   
 
 
Figure B.16: Modified SIEM Alarm Indicating Mounting Network Share to Attacker 
 
 




 Log Data Generated 
 
344 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 




Access Failure 5 
Access Success 57 
Authentication Success 54 
Configuration 8 
Error 3 
Host Access 61 
Other Audit 1 
Policy 5 
Startup and Shutdown 9 
Warning 54 
  





























MPE Rule  
McShield Service Start 1 
General : Service Control Manager Error 4 
EVID 5447 : Filtering Platform Filter Chng : Add 20 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 49 
EVID 5446 : Filtering Platform Callout Chng : 
Add 22 
EVID 5449 : Filtering Platform Cntxt Chng : Add 1 
EVID 4674 : Fail Priv Object Operation 3 
C EVID 4624 : User Logon Type 5 4 
EVID 6009: System Starting 1 
C EVID 4673 : Priv Svc Call 6 
EVID 6 : File System Filter Registered 4 
EVID 4614 : Notification Package Loaded 1 
EVID 4902 : Per User Audit Policy Refreshed 1 
EVID 4622 : Security Package Loaded 9 
EVID 4610 : Authentication Package Loaded 1 
C EVID 4624 : Authentication Success 1 
EVID 4608 : System Starting 1 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 67 
EVID 8222 : Shadow Copy Has Been Created 1 
Successful Logoff 1 
VMware Tools 1 
EVID 4634 : User Logoff Type 11 1 
EVID 4647 : User Initiated Logoff 1 
Desktop Windows Manager Exited 1 
EVID 4674 : Privileged Object Operation 1 
CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware 
Application 54 
McAfee HIPs event Header 61 









B.8 Privilege Escalation – Local User to Root 
 
 Test Case Description 
 
The exploit code uploaded in the previous test case is executed upon the next machine 
reboot.  This code is designed to create a new local account as a member of the local 
administrator and remote desktop user security groups.  These privileges will allow the 
attacker to access the compromised machine with a more powerful interactive logon 




Figure B.18: Local Privilege Escalation on Workstation Data Flow Diagram 
 
 Alarms Generated 
B.8.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
3 alarms were generated.  The first alarm indicates suspected lateral movement activity and 
a new process starting on the compromised workstation; however it does not provide 
metadata details associated with the activity in the alarm properties pane.  The second alarm 
indicates that a new account has been added to the local administrators group and also 
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provides the name of the account that was used “haxor.”  However, the alarm does not 
indicate other security groups the account has been granted access to.  The third alarm 
indicates that the SIEM has identified the early stages of an attack cycle, but provides no 
descriptive data indicating how this conclusion was determined. 
   
 
Figure B.19: Baseline SIEM Alarm Identifying Lateral Movement 
 
 
Figure B.20: Baseline SIEM Rule Detecting Local Privilege Escalation 
 
B.8.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
One alarm was generated with the modified SIEM ontology consisting of six correlated 
events.  The metadata provided within the alarm properties pane indicates the account 





Figure B.21: Modified SIEM Rule Identifying Local Privilege Escalation 
 
 Log Data Generated 
 
997 logs were generated. Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 





Access Failure 2 
Access Granted 444 
Access Success 22 
Account Created 5 
Account Modified 54 
Authentication Success 1 
Configuration 5 
Error 28 
Host Access 363 
Other Audit 1 
Policy 61 
Startup and Shutdown 9 
Warning 2 
  
















































MPE Rule  
C EVID 4624 : Authentication Success 1 
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 4 
C EVID 4624 : User Logon Type 11 1 
C EVID 4624 : User Logon Type 5 4 
C EVID 4624 : User Logon Type 7 1 
C EVID 4673 : Fail Priv Svc Call 3 
C EVID 4673 : Priv Svc Call 6 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 191 
CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware 
Application 54 
Desktop Windows Manager Exited 1 
EVID 4608 : System Starting 1 
EVID 4610 : Authentication Package Loaded 1 
EVID 4611 : Trusted Logon Process Registered 7 
EVID 4614 : Notification Package Loaded 1 
EVID 4622 : Security Package Loaded 9 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 3 
EVID 4634 : User Logoff Type 11 1 
EVID 4634 : User Logoff Type 7 1 
EVID 4647 : User Initiated Logoff 1 
EVID 4648 : Explicit Logon 3 
EVID 4674 : Fail Priv Object Operation 6 
EVID 4674 : Privileged Object Operation 1 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 168 
EVID 4714 : Encrypted Data Recovery Policy 
Changed 1 
EVID 4720 : User Account Created 1 
EVID 4722 : User Account Enabled 1 
EVID 4724 : Password Change Attempt 1 
EVID 4728 : User Added Glbl Security Grp 1 
EVID 4732 : Usr Added To Local Sec Grp 3 
EVID 4738 : User Account Changed 1 
EVID 4902 : Per User Audit Policy Refreshed 1 
EVID 4956 : Firewall Changed Active Profile 1 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was Accessed 1 
EVID 5142 : Network Share Object Was Added 4 




EVID 5145 : Network Share Object Checked 6 
EVID 5446 : Filtering Platform Callout Chng : 
Add 22 
EVID 5447 : Filtering Platform Filter Chng : Add 241 
EVID 5447 : Filtering Platform Filter Chng : Del 162 
EVID 5448 : Filtering Platform Provider Chng: 
Add 2 
EVID 5449 : Filtering Platform Cntxt Chng : Add 1 
EVID 5450 : Filtering Platform SubLayer Chng : 
Add 1 
EVID 5478 : IPSEC Service Started 1 
EVID 6 : File System Filter Registered 4 
EVID 6009: System Starting 1 
EVID 8222 : Shadow Copy Has Been Created 2 
General : Service Control Manager Error 4 
McAfee HIPs event Header 61 
McShield Service Start 1 
Successful Logoff 1 
VMware Tools 1 




B.9 Delivery – Host Access 
 Test Case Description 
 
The attacker initiates a remote desktop connection to leverage the newly created 
administrative account on the compromised workstation.  
 
 
Figure B.22: Remote Desktop Connection from Attacker to Workstation Test Case Data 
Flow Diagram 
 
 Alarms Generated 
B.9.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated. 
B.9.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
Two alarms were generated with the modified SIEM ontology.  The first alarm was 
reported by the host intrusion prevention system identifying new registry key installation 
associated with the Linux remote desktop process.  The second alarm identified the 
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rdpclip.exe process start on the workstation and attributed this action as a possible lateral 
movement tool.   
 
 
Figure B.23: Modified SIEM Alarm Detecting Registry Key Modifications Following 
Linux Remote Desktop Process Installation 
 
 
Figure B.24: Modified SIEM Rule Detecting Process Execution of a Suspected Lateral 
Movement Tool 
 Log Data Generated 
 
174 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 





Startup and Shutdown 136 
Warning 1 
Other Audit 13 
Host Access 4 
Suspicious 8 
Access Failure 5 
Access Success 1 
Authentication Success 6 
  














MPE Rule  
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 77 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 59 
VMware Tools 1 
McAfee HIPs event Header 13 
CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware 
Application 4 
Uninstall Registry Key Modification 8 
C EVID 4673 : Fail Priv Svc Call 5 
EVID 4663 : Attempt Made To Access Object 1 
Successful Login 1 
EVID 4776 : Remote Logon 1 
EVID 4611 : Trusted Logon Process Registered 1 
EVID 4648 : Explicit Logon 1 
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 10 2 
Table B.9: Initial Lateral Movement Test Case Log Statistics 
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B.10 Actions on Objective – Disable Protection and Stage Hacking Tools 
 Test Case Description 
 
The attacker established a remote desktop session with administrative privileges on a 
workstation within the protected environment in the previous test case.  The attacker used 
these privileges to disable anti-malware protection mechanisms on the compromised 
system and upload additional hacking tools to the compromised system to establish more 
powerful remote access tools and extract password hashes stored on the workstation.  These 
hacking tools are transferred to the compromised workstation via mounting a network share 
to the attacker machine samba service.   
 
 
Figure B.25: Disabling Protection Software and Transferring Hacking Tools Test Case 
Data Flow Diagram 
 
B.10.1.1 Alarms Generated 
B.10.1.2 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated. 
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B.10.1.3 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
One alarm was generated using the new SIEM ontology consisting of three correlated 
events.  Review of the metadata contained within the “command” field of the alarm 
properties pane indicates the actions performed to disable the anti-malware protection 
software and mount a samba share on the attacker machine were detected.  This data also 
provides attribution to the attacker’s machine via IP address contained within the 
“command” field.   
 
 
B.26:  Modified SIEM Rule Detecting Anti-Virus Bypass and Network Share Mounting 
 
 Log Data Generated 
 
86 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 




Startup and Shutdown 41 
Access Success 2 
Access Failure 2 
Authentication Success 6 
Other Audit 18 
Host Access 17 
  










MPE Rule  
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 22 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 19 
C EVID 4673 : Priv Svc Call 2 
EVID 6281 : Code Integrity 1 
EVID 4611 : Trusted Logon Process Registered 6 
C EVID 4673 : Fail Priv Svc Call 1 
McAfee HIPs event Header 18 
CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware 
Application 17 




B.11 Installation – Software Modification – Launching Meterpreter 
 Test Case Description 
 
The attacker initiates executes a program on the compromised workstation that establishes 
a privileged reverse shell back to the attacker machine via the meterpreter hacking 
program.  This provides the attacker with access to a multitude of common hacking scripts 




Figure B.27: Meterpreter Reverse Shell from Workstation to Attacker Test Case Data 
Flow Diagram 
 
 Alarms Generated 
B.11.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
18 alarms were generated using the baseline SIEM ontology.  However, it is difficult to 
determine if these alarms are associated with the meterpreter shell code or anomaly 
detection alarms associated with previously baselined traffic.  The highlighted alarm 
indicates suspected lateral movement activity to the internal email server, which is likely 
attributed to the vulnerability scan activity conducted in previous test cases.  Regardless, 
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the alarms below are not easily recognized as being associated with the attacker’s actions 
on the compromised workstation.   
 
 
Figure B.28: Baseline SIEM Alarms Identified During Meterpreter Reverse Shell 
Execution 
 
B.11.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
1 alarm was generated using the modified SIEM ontology.  The meterpreter shell was 
detected based on observation of a new process not listed on a whitelist of approved 
programs.  The location of the file was provided in the “url” metadata field in the alarm 
properties pane indicating this program was located on the desktop belonging to the user 
“haxor” and the name of the process is “reverse_met_tcp.exe.”  This data may be utilized 
by security analysts to rapidly identify the source of this incident and escalate this 
observation to administrative personnel for action. 
 
 
Figure B.29: Modified SIEM Alarm Detecting Meterpreter Shell Process 
 




106 logs were generated. Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 




Access Failure 1 
Access Success 4 
Authentication Success 4 
Configuration 12 
Startup and Shutdown 85 
  
















MPE Rule  
C EVID 4624 : User Logon Type 5 1 
C EVID 4673 : Priv Svc Call 2 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 43 
EVID 19 : Update Installed 1 
EVID 4611 : Trusted Logon Process Registered 3 
EVID 4663 : Attempt Made To Access Object 2 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 41 
EVID 5446 : Filtering Platform Callout Chng : 
Del 4 
EVID 5447 : Filtering Platform Filter Chng : Del 4 
EVID 5448 : Filtering Platform Provider Chng: 
Del 1 




EVID 6281 : Code Integrity 1 
EVID 903 : Software Protection Service 
Stopped 1 
Service Start Type Was Changed 1 




B.12 Actions on the Objective- Privilege use: Hash Dump 
 Test Case Description 
 
The attacker leveraged to reverse meterpreter shell to execute the hash dump program 
“wce64.exe” that was uploaded to the victim machine in test case B.10.  This provide hash 
values and account names for accounts that had previously accessed the workstation.  A 
domain administrator account had previously logged onto the machine and cached the 
username and hash value within the workstations volatile memory.  These credentials were 
extracted by the attacker and stored on the attacking machine for future use via the pass-
the-hash authentication technique.   
 
 
Figure B.30: Hash Extraction on Compromised Workstation Test Case Data Flow 
Diagram 
 
 Alarms Generated 
B.12.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated. 
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B.12.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
One alarm was generated using the modified SIEM ontology containing three correlated 
events.  The alarm highlighted in figure 10.31 depicts the “wce64.exe” process used to 
extract hash values on the workstation as well as the “cmd.exe” process used to evoke the 
“wce64.exe” process. The alarms “multiple lateral movement alarms by account” and 
“multiple reconnaissance events by origin host” in figure B.31 below were associated with 
test case B.13 and will be discussed in section B.13.   
 
 
Figure B.31: Modified SIEM Alarm Detecting Hash Extraction 
 
 Log Data Generated 
 
55 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 




Startup and Shutdown 37 
Authentication Success 4 
Access Success 14 
  












MPE Rule  
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 19 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 17 
EVID 4634 : User Logoff Type 3 1 
EVID 5145 : Network Share Object Checked 11 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was Accessed 2 
EVID 4674 : Privileged Object Operation 1 
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 2 
EVID 903 : Software Protection Service 
Stopped 1 
EVID 4634 : User Logoff Type 10 1 




B.13 Actions on the Objective – Data Manipulation - Create Network 
Share to Stage Files 
 Test Case Description 
 
The attacker leveraged the newly acquired domain administrator hash value to access the 
compromised workstation with the pass-the-hash technique in order to validate the 
compromised credentials and obfuscate the attacker’s identity by assuming a legitimate 
administrative account.  The attacker then used the compromised administrative account 
to create a network share on the compromised workstation for staging sensitive files 
extracted from future compromised machines.   
 
 
Figure B.32: Creation of Network Share Folder on Compromised Workstation Test Case 
Data Flow Diagram 
 
 Alarms Generated 
B.13.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated.   
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B.13.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
Three alarms were generated from 6 correlated events.  The first alarm, depicted in figure 
B.33, detected the installation of the “winexesvc.exe” process used by the attacker machine 
as a compatibility layer for Linux commands issued to the compromised workstation 
through the network session established through the pass-the-hash authenticated shell.  The 
second alarm, depicted in figure B.34, identified anomalous port activity from the attacker 
machine on TCP port 593; this is likely not related to the actual pass-the-hash technique 
and may be a false positive.  The final alarm, depicted in figure B.35, detected the “net.exe” 
commands used by the attacker to create a new network share drive with full permissions 
granted to all domain users.   
 
 
Figure B.33: Modified SIEM Alarm Detecting Pass-The-Hash Process 
 
 





Figure B.35: Modified SIEM Alarm Detecting Network Share Creation and Privilege 
Modification 
 
 Log Data Generated 
 
33 logs were generated. Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 




Startup and Shutdown 14 
Configuration 16 
Access Success 1 
Host Access 1 
Other Audit 1 
  







MPE Rule  
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 7 
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C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 7 
EVID 4947 : Firewall Exception Rule 
Modified 16 
EVID 5142 : Network Share Object Was 
Added 1 
CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware 
Application 1 
McAfee HIPs event Header 1 




B.14 Lateral Movement – Internal Reconnaissance – Locate Critical Servers 
 Test Case Description 
 
The attacker leveraged the compromised workstation to execute domain name system 
queries for the internal webserver and mail server IP addresses.  This information could be 
used to move laterally to these servers via the pass-the-hash technique from the attacker 
machine.     
 
 
Figure B.36: Internal Reconnaissance via Nslookup Tool Test Case Data Flow Diagram 
 
 Alarms Generated 
B.14.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated. 
B.14.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
1 alarm was generated using the new SIEM ontology.  This alarm merely identifies the 
use of the “nslookup.exe” command as a possible indicator for lateral movement activity.  
The metadata fields returned in the alarm properties pane provide the account used to 
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execute the command and the machine the command was executed on.  In this case, a 
security analyst can identify that the domain administrator “labadmin” executed this 
command on the “w7host” workstation.   
 
 
Figure B.37: Modified SIEM Alarm Indicating Use of the Nslookup Command 
 
 Log Data Generated 
 
54 logs were generated. Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 





Access Failure 3 
Access Success 13 
Authentication Success 26 
Startup and Shutdown 10 
  











MPE Rule  
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 12 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 4 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 14 
EVID 4674 : Fail Priv Object Operation 3 
EVID 4674 : Privileged Object Operation 2 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 6 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was 
Accessed 3 
EVID 5145 : Network Share Object 
Checked 8 





B.15  Lateral Movement – Lateral Movement- PTH to Webserver 
 Test Case Description 
 
The attacker used the information gathered from domain name system queries on the 
compromised workstation to determine the IP address of the internal webserver.  The 
attacker used this information to authenticate to the webserver using the domain 
administrator password hash. 
 
 
Figure B.38: Pass the Hash Technique from Attacker to Webserver Test Case Data Flow 
Diagram 
 
 Alarms Generated 
B.15.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated 
B.15.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
3 alarms were generated using the modified SIEM ontology consisting of 27 correlated 
events.  The alarm depicted in figure B.39 detected the winexesvc.exe Linux compatibility 
B-53 
 
process exhibited in previous pass-the-hash actions.  The alarms depicted in figures B.40 
and B.41 are attributed to the attacker machine with IP address 172.16.0.3 but are not 
suspected of being related to the pass-the-hash activity in this test case.   
 
 
Figure B.39: Modified SIEM Alarm Identifying Pass-The-Hash Process 
 
 




Figure B.41: Modified SIEM Alarm Detecting Additional Anomalous Port Activity 
 
 Log Data Generated 
 
80 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 




Access Failure 6 
Access Success 33 
Authentication Success 36 
Startup and Shutdown 5 
  












MPE Rule  
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 18 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 4 
EVID 4634 : Anonymous Logoff Type 3 2 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 13 
EVID 4634 : User Logoff Type 3 1 
EVID 4674 : Fail Priv Object Operation 6 
EVID 4674 : Privileged Object Operation 1 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 1 
EVID 4776 : Remote Logon 2 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was 
Accessed 7 
EVID 5145 : Network Share Object 
Checked 25 




B.16  Actions on the objective: Data Modification: Stage Webserver Database 
 Test Case Description 
 
After successfully authenticating to the webserver with a domain administrator’s 
credentials, the attacker executed a series of commands to identify services running on the 
local server.  The Microsoft SQL service was quickly identified and the attacker began 
executing SQL commands to identify potential sensitive databases on the SQL server.  The 
SharePoint content database was identified as a prospective high value target and the 
attacker initiated a database backup process.  The database backup was stored on the root 




Figure B.42: Webserver Database Replication and Staging Test Case Data Flow Diagram 
 
 Alarms Generated 
B.16.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated. 
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B.16.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
2 alarms were generated using the modified SIEM ontology.  The alarm depicted in figure 
B.43 identified the sqlcmd.exe and net.exe commands used by the attacker to reconnoiter 
server process, identify high value databases, and execute the backup process on the local 
server.  The alarm depicted in figure B.44 identified the process “hostname.exe” which is 
seldom observed but known to be associated with possible lateral movement actions.  
 
 
Figure B.43: Modified SIEM Alarm Detecting Administrative Commands Used to Copy 
the Webserver SQL Database 
 
 




 Log Data Generated 
 
250 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 





Access Failure 3 
Access Success 16 
Authentication Success 33 
Startup and Shutdown 198 
  









MPE Rule  
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 16 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 99 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 17 
EVID 4674 : Fail Priv Object Operation 3 
EVID 4674 : Privileged Object Operation 8 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 99 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was 
Accessed 2 
EVID 5145 : Network Share Object 
Checked 6 




B.17 Actions on Objective – Data Manipulation- Establish persistence 
 
 Test Case Description 
 
The attacker was unable to mount the share hosted on the compromised workstation from 
the webserver to transfer the stolen database file through the pass-the-hash remote shell.  
However, the attacker was successful in using the shell to create another local 
administrative account with remote desktop access that would be capable of mounting the 




Figure B.45: Establish Local Administrative Account on Webserver Test Case Data Flow 
Diagram 
 
 Alarms Generated 
B.17.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
1 alarm was generated using the baseline SIEM ontology.  The account name “haxor” was 




Figure B.46: Baseline SIEM Rule Detecting New Administrator Account on Webserver 
 
B.17.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
2 alarms were generated using the modified SIEM ontology.  The alarm depicted in figure 
B.47 detected the addition of the “haxor” account to the “local administrators” and “remote 
desktop users” groups.  The alarm depicted in figure B.48 detected the commands used to 
create the “haxor” account and add the account to the local security groups detected in the 
alarm in figure B.47.   
 
 





Figure B.48: Modified SIEM Alarm Detecting Net Commands Associated with Account 
Creation 
 
 Log Data Generated 
 
61 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 





Access Granted 5 
Access Success 5 
Account Created 1 
Account Modified 2 
Authentication Success 30 
Startup and Shutdown 18 
  
















MPE Rule  
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 17 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 9 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 13 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 9 
EVID 4720 : User Account Created 1 
EVID 4722 : User Account Enabled 1 
EVID 4724 : Password Change Attempt 1 
EVID 4728 : User Added Glbl Security 
Grp 1 
EVID 4732 : Usr Added To Local Sec Grp 3 
EVID 4738 : User Account Changed 1 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was 
Accessed 3 
EVID 5145 : Network Share Object 
Checked 2 





B.18 Lateral Movement- Remote Desktop to Web Server 
 Test Case Description 
 
The attacker leveraged the local administrator account created on the webserver to establish 
a remote desktop connection from the workstation the attacker compromised earlier.  The 
new remote session allowed the attacker to mount the network share created on the 




Figure B.49: Lateral Movement to Webserver from Initial Compromised Workstation via 
Remote Desktop Protocol Test Case Data Flow Diagram 
 
 Alarms Generated 
B.18.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated. 




4 alarms were generated using the modified SIEM ontology.  The alarm depicted in figure 
B.50 detected the “mstsc.exe” process used by the Microsoft terminal server controller 
program to initiate a remote desktop session from the w7host workstation, which was the 
initial foothold established by the attacker.  The alarm depicted in figure B.51 detected the 
“rdpclip.exe” process on the webserver, indicating the second half of the remote desktop 
session terminating on the webserver named “IIS.”  The alarm depicted in figure B.52 
detected the “audiodg.exe” process on the workstation used by the attacker.  The 
“audiodg.exe” process was once thought to be a possible indicator of a meterpreter reverse 
shell, however this appears to be a false positive.  The alarm depicted in figure B.53 
detected multiple process launches associated with the chrome browser installed on the 
webserver following a new account logon being registered on the machine.  This alarm is 
also assessed to be a false positive attributed to the same process monitoring technique 
used to detect the alarms detected in figured B.50 and B.51. 
 
 
Figure B.50: Modified SIEM Alarm Detecting Mstsc.exe Process 
 
 




Figure B.52: Modified SIEM Alarm Detecting Audiodg.exe Process 
 
 
Figure B.53: Modified SIEM Alarm Detecting Chrome Browser Processes 
 
 Log Data Generated 
 
353 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 







Access Failure 14 
Access Success 19 
Authentication Success 41 
Host Access 2 
Other Audit 2 
Startup and Shutdown 274 
Warning 1 
  

















MPE Rule  
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 10 2 
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 17 
C EVID 4624 : User Logon Type 5 1 
C EVID 4673 : Fail Priv Svc Call 10 
C EVID 4673 : Priv Svc Call 6 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 144 
CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware 
Application 2 
EVID 4611 : Trusted Logon Process Registered 1 
EVID 4634 : Anonymous Logoff Type 3 2 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 12 
EVID 4634 : User Logoff Type 3 1 
EVID 4648 : Explicit Logon 1 
EVID 4674 : Fail Priv Object Operation 3 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 130 
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EVID 4776 : Remote Logon 3 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was Accessed 5 
EVID 5145 : Network Share Object Checked 8 
EVID 6281 : Code Integrity 1 
McAfee HIPs event Header 2 
Successful Login 1 
VMware Tools 1 





B.19 Exfiltration – Unauthorized Data Transfer 
 
 Test Case Description 
 
The attacker transferred the webserver database backup file from the webserver to the 
workstation initially compromised by the attacker through a network share.   
 
 
Figure B.54: Internal Data Transfer from Webserver to Initial Compromised 
 Alarms Generated 
B.19.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated. 
B.19.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
1 alarm was generated using the new SIEM ontology consisting of 2 correlated events.  The 
“net.exe” command was detected in the alarm illustrated in figure B.55 below.  The 
metadata “command” filed depicts the share mounted by the attacker and attributes this to 





Figure B.55: Modified SIEM Alarm Detecting Network Share Mounted on Webserver 
 
 Log Data Generated 
 
64 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 





Access Failure 4 
Access Success 14 
Authentication Success 26 
Startup and Shutdown 20 
  














MPE Rule  
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 11 
C EVID 4673 : Fail Priv Svc Call 1 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 9 
EVID 4611 : Trusted Logon Process 
Registered 2 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 11 
EVID 4634 : User Logoff Type 3 1 
EVID 4674 : Fail Priv Object Operation 3 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 11 
EVID 4776 : Remote Logon 1 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was Accessed 3 
EVID 5145 : Network Share Object 
Checked 11 
Table B.19: Internal Data Transfer from Webserver to Initial Compromised Workstation 




B.20 Lateral Movement- Lateral Movement: Pass the Hash to Mail Server 
 Test Case Description 
 
The attacker leveraged the domain administrator password hash to access the enterprise 
email server identified through domain name system queries earlier by using the pass-the-
hash technique.     
 
 
Figure B.56: Pass the Hash Lateral Movement from Compromised Workstation to Email 
Server Test Case Data Flow Diagram 
 
 Alarms Generated 
B.20.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated. 
B.20.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
1 alarm was generated using the modified SIEM ontology.  Figure B.57 depicts the alarm 






Figure B.57: Modified SIEM Rule Detecting Pass-The-Hash from the Attacker Machine 
to the Email Server 
 
 Log Data Generated 
 
51 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 








Access Failure 3 
Access Success 20 
Authentication Success 24 
Startup and Shutdown 4 
  










MPE Rule  
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 12 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 3 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 11 
EVID 4674 : Fail Priv Object Operation 3 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 1 
EVID 4776 : Remote Logon 1 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was Accessed 4 
EVID 5145 : Network Share Object 
Checked 16 
B.20: Pass the Hash Lateral Movement from Compromised Workstation to Email Server 




B.21 Privilege Escalation – Establish Persistence on Email Server 
 Test Case Description 
 
The attacker used the pass-the-hash shell on the email server to create another local user 
account with administrator and remote desktop user privileges.  This account could then 
be used to connect to the machine via a remote desktop session from the initial foothold 
workstation.   
 
 
Figure B.58: Local Privilege Escalation on Mail Server Test Case Data Flow Diagram 
 Alarms Generated 
B.21.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
1 alarm was generated with the baseline SIEM ontology.  This alarm detected the local 
administrative account being created on the email server. 
 
 
Figure B.59: Baseline SIEM Alarm Detecting Local Administrator Account Creation 
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B.21.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
1 alarm was generated using the modified SIEM ontology comprised of 8 correlated events.  
Figure B.60 depicts the alarm generated. 
 
 
Figure B.60: Modified SIEM Alarm Detecting Local Administrator Account Creation on 
Email Server 
 
 Log Data Generated 
 
64 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 




Access Failure 3 
Access Granted 5 
Access Success 8 
Account Created 1 
Account Modified 2 
Authentication Success 25 
Startup and Shutdown 20 
  

















MPE Rule  
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 14 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 10 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 11 
EVID 4674 : Fail Priv Object Operation 3 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 10 
EVID 4720 : User Account Created 1 
EVID 4722 : User Account Enabled 1 
EVID 4724 : Password Change Attempt 1 
EVID 4728 : User Added Glbl Security 
Grp 1 
EVID 4732 : Usr Added To Local Sec Grp 3 
EVID 4738 : User Account Changed 1 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was 
Accessed 2 
EVID 5145 : Network Share Object 
Checked 6 




B.22 Actions on Objective – Data Manipulation: Stage Email Database 
 Test Case Description 
 
The attacker used remote shell access to the email server to copy the email server mail 
database to the root directory.   
 
 
Figure B.61: Email Database Replication and Staging for Data Transfer Test Case Data 
Flow Diagram 
 
 Alarms Generated 
B.22.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated. 
B.22.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
Additional events were aggregated with the alarm that was generated in the previous test 
case.  Figure B.62 highlights the additional commands aggregated with the previous 
privilege escalation alarm generated in test case B.21.  The “net1.exe” process was 
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leveraged by the attacker to stop and start the “Microsoft Exchange information store” 
service during the database backup process.  
 
 
Figure B.62: Modified SIEM Alarm Detecting Email Service Start/Stop Commands 
 Log Data Generated 
 
131 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 




Access Failure 3 
Access Success 19 
Authentication Success 89 
Startup and Shutdown 20 
  













MPE Rule  
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 48 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 10 
EVID 4611 : Trusted Logon Process Registered 1 
EVID 4634 : Anonymous Logoff Type 3 2 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 37 
EVID 4674 : Fail Priv Object Operation 3 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 10 
EVID 4769 : Svc Ticket Granted, Sys Acct 1 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was Accessed 9 
EVID 5145 : Network Share Object Checked 10 





B.23 Lateral Movement- Lateral Movement: Initial Foothold to Mail Server 
 Test Case Description 
 
The attacker leveraged the local administrator account created on the email server to 
establish a remote desktop connection from the workstation the attacker compromised 
earlier.  The new remote session allowed the attacker to mount the network share created 
on the workstation to the email server.    
 
 
Figure B.63: Lateral Movement to Mail Server via Remote Desktop Protocol from Initial 
Compromised Workstation Test Case Log Statistics 
 Alarms Generated 
B.23.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated. 
B.23.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
4 alarms were generated using the modified SIEM ontology aggregating a total of 10 
events.  Figure B.64 depicts an alarm detecting the initiation of a remote session on 
workstation “w7host” via the “mstsc.exe” process.  Figures B.65 and B.66 are attributed to 
process monitoring for previously unobserved processes and are assessed to be false 
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positives.  Figure B.67 depicts an alarm detecting the “rdpclip.exe” process initiating on 
the email server “exch1” indicating the second half of the remote desktop connection.  
  
 
Figure B.64: Modified SIEM Rule Detecting Mstsc.exe Process 
 
 












 Log Data Generated 
 
204 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 




Access Failure 52 
Access Success 2 
Authentication Failure 4 
Authentication Success 22 
Startup and Shutdown 16 
Warning 108 
  



















MPE Rule  
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 10 13 
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 2 
C EVID 4624 : User Logon Type 5 6 
C EVID 4673 : Fail Priv Svc Call 1 
C EVID 4673 : Priv Svc Call 47 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 12 




EVID 4625 : User Logon Type 3: Wrong 
Password 1 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 16 
EVID 4634 : User Logoff Type 10 1 
EVID 4634 : User Logoff Type 3 4 
EVID 4648 : Explicit Logon 1 
EVID 4674 : Fail Priv Object Operation 1 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 4 
EVID 4776 : Failed Rem Logon : Bad 
Password 1 
EVID 4776 : Remote Logon 2 
EVID 4778 : Win Session Reconn, Usr Acct 9 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was Accessed 2 
EVID 5145 : Network Share Object Checked 3 
EVID 6281 : Code Integrity 1 
General : EventSystem Warning 2 
General Warning Messages 8 
Successful Login 1 
VMware Tools 5 
Table B.23: Lateral Movement to Mail Server via Remote Desktop Protocol from Initial 




B.24 Exfiltration – Unauthorized Data Transfer: Send Email Database to 
Initial Compromised Host 
 Test Case Description 
 
The attacker transferred the email database backup file from the email server to the 
workstation initially compromised by the attacker through a network share.   
 
 
Figure B.68: Internal Data Transfer from Mail Server to Initial Compromised 
Workstation Test Case Data Flow Diagram 
 Alarms Generated 
B.24.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated. 
B.24.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
1 alarm was generated using the modified SIEM ontology aggregating 5 correlated events.  
Figure B.69 depicts an alarm detecting the “net.exe” command used to mount the network 




Figure B.69: Modified SIEM Alarm Detecting Mounting Network Share to 
Compromised Workstation 
 Log Data Generated 
80 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 




Startup and Shutdown 25 
Authentication Success 35 
Access Success 16 
Access Failure 4 
  












MPE Rule  
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C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 13 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 12 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 18 
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 14 
EVID 5145 : Network Share Object 
Checked 11 
EVID 4674 : Fail Priv Object Operation 3 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was Accessed 4 
C EVID 4673 : Fail Priv Svc Call 1 
EVID 4776 : Remote Logon 1 
EVID 4611 : Trusted Logon Process 
Registered 2 
C EVID 4673 : Priv Svc Call 1 
Table B.24: Internal Data Transfer from Mail Server to Initial Compromised Workstation 




B.25 Exfiltration – External Data Transfer 
 Test Case Description 
 
The attacker transferred the email database backup file from the email server to the 
workstation initially compromised by the attacker through a network share.   
 
 
Figure B.70: Data Transfer from Compromised Workstation to Attacker Machine on 
External Network Test Case Data Flow Diagram 
 
 Alarms Generated 
B.25.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
18 alarms were generated using the baseline SIEM ontology.  Figure B.71 depicts the 
alarms generated when the attacker transferred files from the compromised workstation to 




Figure B.71: Baseline SIEM Alert During External Data Transfer 
 
B.25.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
1 alarm was generated using the modified SIEM ontology.  Figure B.72 depicts the alarm 
generated when the attacker mounted the external share drive hosted on the attacker’s Kali 
Linux computer. 
   
 
Figure B.72: Modified SIEM Alert Detecting External Data Transfer 
 
 Log Data Generated 
 
56 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 




Access Failure 3 
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Access Success 7 
Authentication Success 27 
Host Access 1 
Other Audit 1 
Startup and Shutdown 17 
  










MPE Rule  
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 14 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 9 
CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware 
Application 1 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 12 
EVID 4634 : User Logoff Type 3 1 
EVID 4674 : Fail Priv Object Operation 3 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 8 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was Accessed 1 
EVID 5145 : Network Share Object Checked 6 
McAfee HIPs event Header 1 
Table B.25: Data Transfer from Compromised Workstation to Attacker Machine on 




B.26 Actions on the Objective- Obfuscation 
 Test Case Description 
 
The attacker transferred the email database backup file from the email server to the 
workstation initially compromised by the attacker through a network share.   
 
 
Figure B.73: Evidence Destruction via Clearing Security Logs Test Case Data Flow 
Diagram 
 Alarms Generated 
B.26.2.1 Baseline SIEM Ontology 
 
No alarms were generated. 
B.26.2.2 Modified SIEM Ontology 
 
3 alarms were generated using the modified SIEM ontology aggregating 11 correlated 




Figure B.74: Modified SIEM Alert Detecting Audit Log Deletion on Email Server 
 
 




Figure B.76: Modified SIEM Alert Detecting Audit Log Deletion on Webserver 
 
 Log Data Generated 
 
304 logs were generated.  Statistics pertaining to LogRhythm base ontology classification 




Access Failure 9 
Access Success 56 
Authentication Success 135 
Startup and Shutdown 104 
  


















MPE Rule  
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 10 4 
C EVID 4624 : System Logon Type 3 52 
C EVID 4688 : New Process Created 47 
EVID 104 : Event Log Cleared 8 
EVID 4611 : Trusted Logon Process Registered 4 
EVID 4634 : Anonymous Logoff Type 3 2 
EVID 4634 : System Logoff Type 3 49 
EVID 4634 : User Logoff Type 10 4 
EVID 4634 : User Logoff Type 3 7 
EVID 4648 : Explicit Logon 2 
EVID 4674 : Fail Priv Object Operation 9 
EVID 4689 : Process Exited 55 
EVID 4769 : Svc Ticket Granted, Sys Acct 1 
EVID 4776 : Remote Logon 8 
EVID 4778 : Win Session Reconn, Usr Acct 2 
EVID 5140 : Network Share Was Accessed 16 
EVID 5145 : Network Share Object Checked 29 
EVID 8222 : Shadow Copy Has Been Created 3 
Windows Modules Installer Start Type 
Changed 2 
Table B.26: Evidence Destruction via Clearing Security Logs Test Case Log Statistics 
 
